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v
“Do these authors despise no one? The book is remarkable for the
open-mindedness and generosity of its interpretations; the authors
have clearly paid as much good attention to those they are
criticizing as to their favorites.”
Daniel Dennett (1993, p. 124) reviewing
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991)

“He is surely the kind of philosopher I like to hang out with, but
more important than that, he is the kind of philosopher who is
likely to make a difference in the field.”
Francisco Varela (1993, p. 126) reviewing
Dennett (1991)

Abstract
Technological artefacts have, in recent years, invited increasingly intimate
ways of interaction. But surprisingly little attention has been devoted to
how such interactions, like with wearable devices or household robots,
shape our minds, cognitive capacities, and moral character. In this thesis, I
develop an embodied, enactive account of mind–technology interaction
that takes the reciprocal influence of artefacts on minds seriously. First, I
examine how recent developments in philosophy of technology can inform
the phenomenology of mind–technology interaction as seen through an
enactivist lens. Second, I show how an enactive account of remembering
can improve operationalizations of the memory palace mnemonic through
virtual reality devices. Third, I draw on virtue ethics to argue that an
enactivist approach allows us to better grasp the morally shaping aspects
of artefacts by looking at social robots. Fourth, I fend off an underlying
metaphysical concern about enactivism by arguing that an embodied,
enactive account is compatible with the multiple realization of cognitive
processes. This principle is often seen as a crucial test favouring accounts
such as extended functionalism over enactivism and I argue that some
forms of enactivism pass this test as well. Finally, I conclude by considering
what the future relationship between enactivism and functionalism may
have in store for the study of mind–technology interaction.

Samenvatting (Abstract in Dutch)
Technologische artefacten hebben ons de afgelopen jaren tot steeds intiemere manieren van interactie verleid. Toch is er verrassend weinig
aandacht geschonken aan hoe zulke interacties, zoals met draagbare apparaten en thuisrobots, onze geest, cognitive capaciteiten en ons moreel
karakter vormen. In dit proefschrift ontwikkel ik een belichaamde, enactieve benadering van geest–technologieïnteractie die de wederkerige
invloed van artefacten op de geest serieus neemt. Ten eerste onderzoek
ik hoe recente ontwikkelingen in de techniekfilosofie de fenomenologie
van geest–technologieïnteractie, bekeken vanuit een enactief perspectief,
kunnen informeren. Ten tweede toon ik aan hoe een enactief begrip van
herinneren het operationaliseren van de geheugenpaleistechniek door
middel van virtual reality-apparaten kan verbeteren. Ten derde betoog ik,
op basis van deugdethische overwegingen in onze omgang met sociale
robots, dat een enactieve benadering ons beter in staat stelt de moreel
vormende aspecten van artefacten te begrijpen. Ten vierde weerleg ik een
onderliggend metafysisch probleem voor enactivisme door te betogen dat
een belichaamde enactieve benadering te verenigen is met de meervoudige
realisatie van cognitive processen. Dit principe wordt doorgaans gezien
als een belangrijke proef die voordeel biedt aan uitgebreide vormen van
functionalisme ten opzichte van enactivisme. Ik betoog dat sommige vormen van enactivisme ook voor deze proef slagen. Ten slotte overweeg
ik wat de toekomstige relatie tussen enactivisme en functionalisme kan
betekenen voor het bestuderen van geest–technologieïnteractie.
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Preface
I must have built my first robot when I was about 14 or 15 years old. That
sounds more impressive than it is. In that period, which must have been
around 2001, I managed to convince my parents to finance a subscription
on a Dutch robotics magazine. Each new issue came with a component
to construct your own robot and, as such magazines are wont to do, the
first one or two issues were freely distributed before subscribers had to
pay a quite hefty fee. Yet I remained subscribed and managed to construct
a cute-looking, blue-domed robot on wheels that happily followed the
flashlight I used to illuminate its surroundings. I have been fascinated by
technology for as long as I can remember, but that moment still stands out
to me as a bit of a revelation: we are able to build things that move around
of their own accord, and do so in a seemingly intelligent manner!
What motivates the present dissertation is my curiosity about not just
technologies, but particularly about how technologies shape our existence
as experiencing, moral, and sometimes even intelligent human beings.
This can be illustrated with a relatively simple example. It is well-known
that George R.R. Martin, author of the A song of ice and fire series that
was famously televised as Game of thrones, writes his hulking tomes in
WordStar 4.0 on an old DOS desktop computer without Internet connection. This ageing machine provides all the tools he needs and none of the
distractions of the modern digital workplace. Martin the writer is deeply
entwined with his tool of choice and would not have it any other way.
Having written the present text, I can understand some of his concerns.
Expanding on this theme, we find J.R.R. Tolkien, one of Martin’s main
sources of inspiration, relating his feelings about being temporarily deprived from using his right hand. In a letter to his publisher Stanley Unwin
dated October 1963, Tolkien laments how he found “not being able to use a
pen or pencil as defeating as the loss of her beak would be to a hen” (letter
xiii

xiv

Preface

#248 in The letters of Tolkien). Note how Tolkien specifically mentions not
being able to use the hand for writing. As becomes clear from his other
letters, writing was for Tolkien as essential as breathing. But why are their
specific writing implements of such importance to Martin and Tolkien?
Why can’t Martin just use a modern computer and why didn’t Tolkien
rely on a typewriter or friend to write things down?
Philosophy is able to shed light on such questions. Both Richard
Menary (2007b) and Don Ihde (1990, p. 141) discuss the ways in which
specific writing implements not only shape the act of writing – some tools
allow faster writing than others – but actually change the author’s mental
activity and, therefore, the text being written. Coming from a philosophy
of mind perspective, Menary argues that writing is, quite literally, thinking.
Putting words and sentences on a piece of paper allows us to manipulate
them in ways we couldn’t do without the paper, which in turn feeds back
into the writing process. Simply put: I am able to write part of an argument
down and, when I reach the conclusion, restructure some of the original
parts once I am clear on the exact steps involved in the argument.
Coming from a philosophy of technology perspective, Ihde reflects
on the differences between using an old-fashioned dip or fountain pen, a
typewriter, and a modern computer. Each enable different writing speeds
and incline the author to different styles of editing. A dip pen invites one
to write slowly and leaves room for thinking more carefully about words
while writing. A modern computer, on the other hand, allows one to write
fast and edit at whim. The reflections by Menary and Ihde are confirmed in
an empirical study which revealed, among other things, that people who
write with a pen generally think at the level of sentences and paragraphs
while writing, and edit after the text is done. In contrast, authors who
use computers are prone to pause and edit at the individual word level
(Van Waes & Schellens, 2003). In this light, the paradoxical feeling of only
knowing what one wanted to write by the very act of writing it, becomes
more clear. This helps explain why authors such as Martin and Tolkien are
so attached to their specific writing implements: the writing activity itself
would otherwise likely be very different, as would the texts produced.
Reflecting on different types of writing implements may seem like a
fairly innocent exercise, but it reveals something very fundamental about
the nature of our engagements with various technologies. After all, if

xv
merely exchanging a pen for a computer results in a different cognitive
process and a different text, then to what extent do other, more complex
technologies influence our thoughts and behaviours? And if our mental and
bodily activities may depend so heavily on the characteristics of specific
technologies, then to what extent do they become part of who we are?
Indeed, many of us make photos of important events in our lives and, after
many years, might not even remember such events if they did not have
access to their photos. This has ethical implications as well. What if a
person passes away and their friend or relative is responsible for going
through their belongings: is the act of throwing away pictures kept by
the deceased an act of memory removal, or perhaps even erasure of that
person?
These are some of the questions with which the present dissertation
engages. I wish for it to shed some light on these matters and clarify, even
if only in part, the different ways in which we engage with technologies.
If we are better able to understand such relations, then we are in a better position to hold on to human freedom and responsibility in a world
where technologies are not only becoming increasingly complex but also
increasingly invisible.
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Introduction
Cognitive science is changing. It is witnessing a turn towards pragmatic,
action-oriented, and dynamic approaches to cognition and away from
views leaning on representations, computations, and mechanisms (Engel,
Maye, Kurthen & König, 2013; Menary, 2016). Dramatically, philosopher
Andy Clark (2016) says approaches that place context and action centre
stage require us “to abandon the last vestiges of the ‘input–output’ model”
(p. 139). In the present work, I look at the pragmatic turn through the
lens of mind–technology interaction.1 This move secures a double treasure. First, thinking about how minds engage with technologies in light
of the pragmatic turn, helps us reconsider current approaches to cognition. Second, applying cognitive accounts that are at the vanguard of the
pragmatic turn to cases of mind–technology interaction, helps us to better
understand such types of interaction. These rewards make the present
work of interest both to those working in cognitive science and to those
working in mind–technology interaction, broadly construed.
My investigation of mind–technology interaction targets a crucial
assumption in some prominent theories that attempt to align themselves
with the pragmatic turn. To draw out this assumption, let us look again at
Clark’s input–output model. This model permeates many of the disciplines
which constitute cognitive science, such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence. This is unsurprising, because
the input–output model is fuelled by the idea that our mind works like a
computer. In the words of Paul Thagard (2005), in his Mind: Introduction
1

While terms like ‘human–computer interaction’, ‘human–technology interaction’, or
‘human–robot interaction’ are perhaps more familiar, I deliberately use mind–technology
interaction. Mind–technology interaction, because my research concerns the cognitive
aspects of how we engage with environmental resources, such as technologies. Mind–
technology interaction, because I would like to emphasise the general category of technological artefacts and not just those artefacts that compute.

1
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to cognitive science: “Many but not all cognitive scientists view thinking as
a kind of computation and use computational metaphors to describe and
explain how people solve problems and learn” (pp. 3–4).2 The computer
metaphor is the assumption I target in the current investigation. It is a
powerful metaphor: amongst its virtues is the concrete and mathematically
precise toolkit that scientists and philosophers have used to study mind
and cognition. However, the adequacy of this metaphor is up for debate
and questioning it has important consequences for how we think about
mind and cognition.
The computer metaphor underlies much recent work in understanding mind–technology interaction. Its most influential incarnation is that of
functionalism: the philosophical idea that mental states are defined by what
they do and not by what they are made of. Clark’s input–output model is
one form of functionalism. In contrast, the pragmatic turn is exemplified
by the various strands of enactivism: the idea that mind arises out of an
organism’s active and continuing engagement with its environment. These
two schools of thought form the guiding frames within which I examine
mind–technology interaction.
In order to perform this examination, I will do the following. First, I
show that the philosophical theory of functionalism underlies many of
the current debates on mind–technology interaction. Second, I provide
reasons to think that functionalism is not always in the best position to
explain such interactions. Third, I argue that the competing theory of
enactivism is better equipped to help us understand the relation between
mind and technology. In sum, the guiding question motivating the present
dissertation is whether functionalism makes any explanatory contribution
over enactivism within the field of mind–technology interaction and, potentially, beyond. To situate these terms and steps, I now turn to a famous
example from the philosophical literature on the interaction of mind and
artefact: the case of Otto’s notebook.

2

There is little reason to doubt the communis opinio has changed much since Thagard’s
declaration. A recent announcement for the 2017 meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
reads: “computation can serve as the foundational theory of how people actively process
information in service of control and decision making ... greater effort must be made to
connect cognitive science theories to computational foundations” (cited in Núñez et al.,
2019, p. 7).

3
In their classic paper “The extended mind”, Andy Clark and David
Chalmers (1998) take a closer look at how the mind may make use of
environmental resources. They do so by considering a thought experiment
that features two rememberers: Inga and Otto. Inga and Otto are both
looking to visit the Museum of Modern Art while in New York. But whereas
Inga uses her biological memory to recall the museum’s address, Otto,
a sufferer of early-onset Alzheimer’s, retrieves it through his notebook.
Otto’s notebook, Clark and Chalmers argue, plays for Otto the same role
that memory plays for Inga (p. 13). In it, Otto stores the things he would like
to remember and his daily routine depends systematically, not incidentally,
on his writing – similar to how Inga depends on her biological memory.
Since Otto’s notebook is playing the same role as Inga’s biological memory
and because we consider Inga’s biological memory to be part of her mind,
saying that Otto’s notebook is not part of Otto’s mind would be a case
of neural chauvinism. Thus we have the extended mind thesis: that, in
principle, the physical underpinnings of the mind may sometimes extend
beyond the skull and skin.
While an excellent paper, that generated many research programmes
on extended cognition, the proposal it puts forward is not without flaws.
One important aspect, which remains underdeveloped from a mind–technology interaction perspective, is the fact that there are different ways
to interface with technological artefacts and that those differences fundamentally matter. This is reason for Helena De Preester (2011) to warn us
against equating Otto and Inga all too easily, arguing that, because “Inga
has a stronger ownership over the informational items in her memory than
Otto, and ... therefore the information in her memory functions differently
from the information Otto has in his notebook” (p. 134). The different levels
of ownership are themselves based on the different phenomenologies that
Inga and Otto presumably have of the ways they bodily engage with their
respective memories.
The role of the body is crucial if we want to be in a position to understand interfacing with artefacts and De Preester grabs hold of the right
thread in this conceptual knot. But she is pulling in the wrong direction. If
we are to untangle the problem, we should not follow Clark and Chalmers’
lingo of “informational items” being accessed from storage, whether biological or otherwise. I take a cue here from Tom Froese (2014) who suggests

4
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that “current symbolic computer interfaces are a source of alienation because their underlying principles are inherently alien to those of embodied
life and mind” (p. 555). Though not a computer interface, Otto’s notebook
is vulnerable to the same critique. While interacting with artefacts through
symbolic representations is certainly one way of interfacing, it need not be
the only one. More fundamentally and perhaps paradoxically, interaction
through symbolic representations might not even be best explained in
terms of a computational theory of mind which puts information pick-up
and processing at the base of cognition, as such theories have troubles
accounting for the different roles the body plays. This is what I aim to
show in the rest of the present dissertation.
Why is the notion of information processing central to many of the
debates on extended cognition? This is due, I think, to the close connections between the extended mind thesis and the philosophical theory of
functionalism. Functionalism is the textbook framework for understanding
minds in analytic philosophy and cognitive science (Churchland, 2005;
Brook, 2009). Since its (re-)conception in the 1960s, it has developed into
many and sometimes contradictory shapes so it is understandable that
Thomas Polger (2004) reports that “[v]arieties of functionalism are as varied as fingerprints but not nearly so constant” (p. 71). Bearing this complex
history in mind, we may say that to a first and rough approximation functionalism describes mental states not by what they are made of (e.g., neural
states), but by what they do. In a traditional form of functionalism, mental
states are cast as computations over input, like sensory representations,
which lawfully and structurally result in output, like motor actions. In an
oft-repeated credo: “the mind is to the brain, as software is to hardware”
(for a recent iteration see Piccinini, 2010). This mental manipulation of
representations is what gives rise to the idea of mind as an information
processor (Harman, 1988; Wilson, 1994).
The bridge between the extended mind thesis and functionalism rests
on what Clark and Chalmers have dubbed the Parity Principle. This principle can be seen as a rule-of-thumb to determine when the mind extends:
“[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so
we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8).

5
Now, recall that functionalism explains mental states as requiring law-like,
causal relations between systemic inputs and outputs. However, there is no
need to understand these relations as necessarily being instantiated inside
skull and skin. Indeed, functionalism does not even assume physicalism:
witness Hilary Putnam (1967), one of functionalism’s initial architects,
exclaim how the doctrine “is not incompatible with dualism!” (p. 436). This
theoretical flexibility leads Michael Wheeler (2015) to say that “functionalism plausibly provides a theoretical backdrop for the operation of the
parity principle” (p. 160). It seems that the possibility of minds extending
is a built-in feature of functionalism.
We are now in a better position to see just why it is “a common move
in the literature to link [extended mind] in some way to ... functionalism”
(Wheeler, 2015, p. 160). Both Clark and Wheeler have, in a formal bond
between the two ideas, advocated a position Clark christened extended
functionalism (Clark, 2008a; Wheeler, 2010a, 2010b, 2017). With the advent
of the extended mind thesis in discussions on mind–technology interaction,
its functionalist credentials have entered those debates as well (Aydin,
2012, 2015). Whether or not these functionalist commitments best serve
discussions on mind–technology interaction in cognitive science is, as I
argued earlier, a live question and, given the staying power of the extended
mind thesis (Gallagher, 2018), an important one. To assess the viability of
functionalism in debates on mind and technology, it is useful to compare
it with a rival theory of mind.
A few years before the extended mind paper appeared, Francisco
Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991) presented the enactive
approach to mind and cognition in their book The embodied mind. Inspired
by work on self-producing or ‘autopoietic’ systems in molecular biology,
the phenomenological tradition, and Buddhist ideas on the mutual dependence of cognition and the experienced world, enactivism understands
mind as arising from an organism’s active participation with the environment it’s coupled with. In contrast with more traditional functionalist
programmes, Thompson (2007) proposes that the nervous system is to
be understood as an autonomous dynamic system which creates its own
coherent patterns: the “nervous system does not process information in the
computationalist sense, but creates meaning” (p. 13). Furthermore, where
extended functionalism allows for minds to extend sometimes, enactiv-
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ism holds that basic forms of cognition always have such reach (Hutto,
Kirchhoff & Myin, 2014).
The emphasis on cognition as depending on active bodily engagement
with an organism’s environment and its inherently extensive nature puts
enactivism in a better starting position than functionalism to explain the
role of the body in mind–technology interaction. However, enactivism
faces its own challenge as pointed out by Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009) when
he admits that the “more interesting and forward-looking themes introduced by the [extended mind] approach, and towards which enactivism
must still develop, include the problem space of technical individuation
and technological networks that bootstrap the generation of cognitive
identities” (p. 20). It is my hope that the present dissertation will make
contributions to this development by providing an enactivist alternative
to the extended functionalist tale of how minds and artefacts interact.
Some caveats have to be made regarding my depiction of functionalism up to this point. First, I must emphasise that Clark is, and has been, a
staunch advocate of the importance of the body in cognitive science and,
in his own words, would be horrified “to find myself suspected ... of now
believing that the body didn’t matter and the mind was something ethereal
and distinct” (Clark, 2003, p. 189). Yet, good intentions notwithstanding,
this might be exactly what he is doing. With the provocative accusation
of ‘body snatching’, Shaun Gallagher (2015) draws attention to a recent
trend by cognitive scientists who, in an attempt to march alongside the
banner of embodied cognition, have infiltrated research programmes on
embodied cognition and relegated any relevance the body might have to
bodily representations inside the brain. Gallagher does not mention Clark
in this colourful analogy, but Lawrence Shapiro (2019) does when he criticises Clark for focusing too much on the body as a computational resource
instead of as a shaper of cognition. Regardless, the treatment of the body
in extended functionalism deserves closer scrutiny and will receive it in
Chapter 2.
The second caveat on my discussion of extended functionalism is that
I have so far neglected to mention the evolution of the extended mind
thesis through different ‘waves’. The defining feature of the first wave
of extended cognition was the Parity Principle, and in the second wave
this principle was joined by the Complementarity Principle. Where the
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former focused on similar cognitive functions being performed at different
locations, the latter creates space for the idea that “different components of
the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play quite different roles
and have different properties while coupling in collective and complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting” (Sutton, 2010, p. 194).
These two principles are not mutually exclusive. The second wave signifies
a change towards a more distributed type of thinking about cognition.
It seems that the third wave, currently still only anticipated (Kirchhoff,
2012), will take this even further, with Gallagher (2018) suggesting that
this wave may strive to integrate ideas about the brain as a predictive
engine – the so-called ‘predictive processing’ paradigm – and enactivism
into one coherent framework.
It is with the suggestion of integrating enactivism and extended
mind that we have stumbled upon a deep question about the relationship between functionalism and enactivism. If integrating enactivism and
extended mind is a live option, and, as we have seen earlier, extended
mind and functionalism are seen as star-crossed, does that imply that functionalism and enactivism are on some level compatible with each other?
Will the diametrical opposition I have presented between these two rivals
collapse? In his introduction to the 2010a volume on the extended mind,
Richard Menary seems to think such compatibility is an option: “It may
turn out that a liberal functionalist account of cognition will provide a
way of determining which manipulations are part of cognition and which
are not, in which case there may not be any great tension between the
enactive and functionalist approaches to the extended mind” (pp. 21–22).
But he concludes by saying that the details of such a conjunction are not
yet explicated.
Interestingly, proponents of both functionalism (Wheeler, 2010a, 2017)
and enactivism (Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009) have denied
that compatibility between the two approaches is possible – though they
have done so for different reasons. Wheeler (2017) has gone so far as to
say that extended functionalism is explanatorily superior to enactivism,
particularly the branch of enactivism known as extensive enactivism. However, in recent work, Gualtiero Piccinini (2008, 2010, 2015) has taken steps
towards disentangling functionalism from its traditional commitments to
representational, computational, or mechanical theories of cognition. This
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raises the question whether a pure version of functionalism is compatible with enactivist theories. One possibility is that enactivist theories in
fact entail such a pure functionalism. If so, the functionalist framework
must feature, despite appearances, in any such pragmatic approaches to
cognition. This would mean that the denial of compatibility is based on a
confusion of pure functionalism with a computational, representational,
or mechanical account of cognition.
Even if some form of functionalism is entailed by enactivism, it leaves
open the question of whether extended functionalism, if cast in the guise
of a purified functionalist theory, makes an explanatory contribution to
enactivism, contra Wheeler. Responding to this question will be the job of
the remainder of this dissertation and I will do so by developing an enactivist account of mind–technology interaction and applying this account
to specific instances of human–technology relations.
In Chapter 1, I engage with current discussions in the field of philosophy of technology. The postphenomenological approach is an important
school of thought in contemporary philosophy of technology (Ihde, 1990;
Verbeek, 2005; Rosenberger & Verbeek, 2015). Unlike classic phenomenology, postphenomenology does not see technological artefacts as an alienating factor between subject and world, but instead understands such
artefacts as mediating between the two. For example, the discovery of
ultrasonic images allows expecting parents to see the developing fetus.
However, being able to see into the womb also confronts the parents with
new ethical questions, such as when the fetus displays a painful chronic
illness. Postphenomenology aims to clarify and structure the different
force-fields – surrounding subjects, artefacts, and the wider world – that
result from technological mediation.
There have been some attempts at converging extended cognition
thinking and postphenomenology. Some have argued that both approaches
are irreconcilable, as extended cognition assumes a subject–object dichotomy while postphenomenology does not (Kiran & Verbeek, 2010; Aydin,
2012, 2015). Others have attempted to show that extended cognition thinking is not vulnerable to such a critique (Heersmink, 2012). Enactivism similarly aims to understand mind and world as co-constitutive. Given that both
enactivism and postphenomenology can count classic phenomenology
amongst their pedigree, this will not be a surprise. My aim in Chapter 1,
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therefore, is to show that enactivism is better placed to provide a cognitive
framework to postphenomenology than extended functionalism. I do this
by looking at the categorisation of different human–technology relations
that have been put forward by postphenomenologists (Verbeek, 2008). This
will provide enactivists with a robust theory of artefact engagement, while
at the same time linking postphenomenology to an empirical cognitive
theory.
Virtual reality has recently drawn the attention of some prominent
philosophers of mind, as it may allow the investigation of scenarios which
could previously only be imagined (Chalmers, 2017; Metzinger, 2018). One
area where virtual reality opens up interesting lines of research is that of
memory and mnemonics (Michaelian, 2016; Heersmink, 2018). In Chapter 2,
I take a closer look at one of the most enduring and powerful mnemonics:
the memory palace. Because mastering the memory palace takes a lot
of commitment and practice, cognitive scientists have tried to support
the technique through virtual reality, hoping to improve its accessibility.
However, such operationalizations have so far not yielded results which
can compete with traditional memory palace usage. I propose that current approaches to the virtual memory palace are based on an extended
functionalist framework and, consequently, do not sufficiently account
for the user’s active bodily engagement in the memory palace. Instead, I
develop an enactive account of the memory palace and recommend how
future virtual operationalizations may benefit from design choices inspired
by my enactive proposal. If my design recommendations are taken in by
cognitive scientists and hold firm, we have further support for thinking
enactively about memory in general.
Enactivism may have important ethical implications for how we
think about ourselves. Chapters 3 and 4 form a pair that examines these
implications within the context of social robotics. The first of these deals
with the issue of sex robots. Though sex robots as such do not yet exist
and are little more than sex dolls, manufacture of such devices is looming
on the horizon. Unsurprisingly, major debates have erupted in society and
academia about the use and implications of such robots. I propose that the
framework of virtue ethics is well-disposed to examine the consequences of
sex robots for human moral character. In doing so, I argue against current
instrumentalist approaches to sex robot use. A contribution of the chapter
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to the field of social robotics is that it suggests that, within supervised,
therapeutic scenarios, it may be useful to implement robots with consent
modules. This suggestion is not without risks, but the topic nonetheless
deserves careful consideration before it is dismissed a priori. The chapter
concludes with a reflection on the implications of sex robots for human
autonomy and responsibility.
Because of the situated nature of virtue ethics, it is particularly of
interest to enactive cognition researchers. Chapter 4 therefore immediately
follows upon the issues raised in the previous and investigates the possibility of an enactive self and moral character. Situationists argue that humans
can never be truly virtuous, saying that moral character is not consistent
and overly dependent on environmental factors. I target their assumption
that character and environment need be seen as strictly separate and defend the proposal that social robots can not only cultivate vice but also
virtue. I do this by extending the concept of moral character to allow for
the incorporation of environmental resources. I consider both extended
functionalist and enactivist accounts of such an extended self, concluding
that the latter provides a fundamentally more robust alternative. Thinking
enactively about the self and moral character not only gives us ground for
concluding social robots may support the cultivation of virtue, but also
provides a novel answer to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics.
Finally, Chapter 5 examines a lingering issue between functionalism
and enactivism, namely the principle of multiple realization. Because of
enactivism’s sensitivity to the concrete embodiment of cognitive acts,
some are inclined to think that enactivism and multiple realizability do
not play well together (Myin & Zahnoun, 2018). However, such considerations turn on an assumption that multiple realization is dependent
on the conception of cognition as information-processing. I argue that
there is an understanding of multiple realization that considers cognitive
processes as potentially realized in cognitive systems, like humans in their
own habitats, that systematically incorporate environmental resources.
Contrary to what is often claimed, I argue that enactivism is compatible
with multiple realizability and conclude that this principle thus need not
give functionalism any decisive advantage over its competitor.
The internal logic of the present work is as follows. Broadly speaking the following chapters are connected as follows: Chapter 1 provides
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a broad framework for thinking of mind-technology interaction as enactive. It connects, on a general level, the philosophy of mind and the
philosophy of technology, and establishes the viability of an embodied
approach to mind–technology interaction by drawing on phenomenologically inspired developments in both fields. Its major conclusions are that
mind-technology interaction need not be understood in terms of informational exchange and that such interactions are co-shaping both agent and
technology design.
This framework then informs discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, where
I apply the distinctions drawn in the first chapter to concrete case-studies.
In Chapter 2, I focus on a specific mental process – namely memory –
in relation to a specific technology – namely virtual reality. By showing
how virtual interactions can be understood in embodied, enactive terms
instead of information-processing ones, I not only provide proof of the
pudding prepared in Chapter 1, but also aim to illustrate the ability of my
framework to inspire technology design and cognitive science. Similarly,
Chapters 3 and 4 together investigate the ethical implications of my framework. As I advance a theory of mind-technology interaction that takes the
reciprocal influence of agent and environment seriously, some immediate
points of ethical interest arise. For instance, if agent and environment
are as intimately linked as I advocate in Chapter 1, moral responsibility
cannot be thought to solely reside on the side of the agent. This calls for
a ethical theory that is sensitive to the concrete and unique contexts in
which moral acts take place. Virtue ethics is such a theory, as it reserves a
prominent place for the way moral acts shape a person’s character. Within
the context of current debates on social robotics, the ethical implications
of my framework are therefore made explicit in Chapters 3 and 4.
With the middle chapters securing the positive support for my argument, the fifth and final chapter aims to pre-empt a potential critique
to it. The augmentation of postphenomenology by its alliance to the enactive approach puts it in a stronger position of relevance for cognitive
science. With this, however, postphenomenology inherits a potential problem that has faced enactivists. Namely, if cognition is to be understood as
embodied and enactive, as I claim in Chapter 1, it stands to lose the ability
of information-processing cognitive approaches to understand cognitive
processes as potentially implemented in different media. In Chapter 5, I
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present this potential issue and show that my embodied, enactive framework can claim a similar ability to carve out the instantiation of a cognitive
process in distinct materials
Current debates about wide cognition have been intense and recent
years have seen a veritable explosion of literature on the topic. Inevitably,
this means that the present work cannot investigate all possible avenues
related to its main aim. Discussions about niche construction and scaffolding (Sterelny, 2010), cognitive integration (Menary, 2007a), cognitive
archeology (Malafouris, 2013; Ransom, 2019), feminist theory (Ihde, 2002;
Brancazio, 2019), and predictive processing (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016) are
all viable candidates for future dialogue partners with the present work.
But concessions to the scope of the dissertation had to be made and I have
attempted to restrain in-depth theoretical discussions to a critical pairing
of extended functionalism and enactivism. I will leave it to future work to
rectify any omissions this may have caused.
Though wide approaches to cognition are the talk of the day, not
everyone has jumped on the train. Such thinkers that remain sceptical of
cognition as extended or enactive argue that there is little to be gained
from an explanation of mind as realized in part by environmental factors
(Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Rupert, 2004). Wide cognition theorists have
responded both with theoretical and empirical counterarguments (Menary,
2010b; Wagman & Chemero, 2014). This is an important discussion but
as this dissertation is situated at the vanguard of discussions about wide
cognition, it will not engage with these fundamental issues and instead
assume that some form of wide cognition is a live possibility for theories
of mind.
The methodology of the second part of this dissertation is likely
somewhat different from what would commonly be expected in the context
of analytic philosophy. This is deliberate. Inspiration for this methodology
hails from philosophers who closely engage with empirical research and
reach across the disciplinary boundaries within and outside of philosophy.
Some of my philosophical heroes in this regard are Daniel Dennett and
Andy Clark. My attention was recently drawn to a paper by Eric Schliesser
(2019), in which he adopts the term ‘synthetic philosophy’. His description
is worth quoting in full:
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By ‘synthetic philosophy’ I mean a style of philosophy that
brings together insights, knowledge, and arguments from the
special sciences with the aim to offer a coherent account of
complex systems and connect these to a wider culture or other
philosophical projects (or both). Synthetic philosophy may,
in turn, generate new research in the special sciences, a new
science connected to the framework adopted in the synthetic
philosophy, or new projects in philosophy. (pp. 1–2)
It is my intention that the present dissertation can be read in the spirit
of synthetic philosophy as described in the quotation above.
The chapters in this work have been written as independent publishable papers and indeed some of them have appeared in academic journals.
The publication status of each chapter is signalled at the start of the chapter
where an abstract for that chapter can also be found in the style of an
academic paper. While all chapters are, naturally, thematically connected
and deal with related issues, some variation in tone and presentation has
been unavoidable, particularly in those chapters that were co-authored. I
have striven to keep the format of the chapters as consistent as possible. I
trust this will not cause much inconvenience for the reader and apologise
for any potential instances where it does.
My hope is that the present dissertation makes a convincing case for
two points. First, that it shows how, in the domain of mind–technology
interaction, an enactive approach to cognition helps inform and move
forward some of the current discussions in that field. In particular, I have
aimed to contribute to the design of new technological artefacts, such
as virtual reality devices. Second, that it spurs on discussion between
functionalists and enactivists about the future of their respective research
programmes. Progress is often driven by opposition and I would like to
see functionalists pick up the ball that I have kicked into their camp.

Abstract
Though many of our social and scientific practices are shaped by technological
artefacts, we lack a framework that adequately accounts for the cognitive role such
artefacts play. Current approaches to mind and technology interaction often depart from the extended mind thesis, which is cashed out in information-processing
terms. While proposals for mind extension have generated daring new research
programs, those flying under the banner of postphenomenology have critiqued the
extended mind approach to technology as Cartesian and instrumentalist. Taking
up this critique, I advocate an enactive understanding of mind–technology interaction that does justice to the shaping roles artefacts play in cognitive processes and
aligns with the postphenomenological approach. This provides enactivism with a
toolkit that allows them to better understand mind–technology interaction, while
at the same time providing a cognitive underpinning for postphenomenology.

This chapter is in preparation for publication as: Peeters, A. (in preparation-a).
Enactivism as a philosophy of technology.

14

Chapter 1
Enactivism as a philosophy of
technology
“The more interesting and forward-looking themes introduced by the
[extended mind] approach, and towards which enactivism must still
develop, include the problem space of technical individuation and
technological networks that bootstrap the generation of cognitive
identities.”
Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009, p. 20)

Many of our social and scientific practices are crucially shaped by our
bodily interactions with technological artefacts. Embodied cognition approaches seem ideally poised to capture the situated nature of the cognitive
processes involved in these interactions. However, two main contenders
among these approaches, extended functionalism and enactivism, both
struggle with providing an adequate account of mind–technology interaction. My aim in this paper is to argue that an embodied, enactive cognition approach, when informed by insights from recent discussions in
postphenomenology, is in a better position than functionalism to help us
understand the cognitive underpinnings of mind–technology interactions.
Because enactivism and postphenomenology agree that mind arises out of
both body and environment, they are a natural fit to each other.
In the philosophy of mind, functionalist approaches that allow for
cognitive processes to sometimes be partially constituted by states or
processes outside our physical bodies are arguably amongst the most
well-known in embodied cognition. Inspired by the extended mind thesis,
15
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these types of extended functionalism have, however, been accused of
reinforcing an Cartesian and instrumentalist understanding of mind and
technology. This motivates the consideration for alternative approaches
to mind–technology interaction.
Enactive cognition, in contrast to functionalism, understands mind
as essentially spread out across brain, body, and world, and sees our interactions with the world as inherently meaningful. Enactivism is a potential
alternative to the functionalist framework when it comes to explaining
our bodily engagements with technologies. However, enactivists have not
yet caught up to extended functionalists when it comes to accounting for
the roles that technological artefacts may play in our cognitive processes.
Some bridges between enactivism and postphenomenology have partially
been build. For example, both enactivism and postphenomenology have
aligned themselves with recent discussions in the field of cognitive anthropology, specifically the approach known as material engagement theory
(Gallagher, 2017; Ihde & Malafouris, 2019). But the pieces that connect
enactivism directly to postphenomenology are still missing, which this
chapter aims to rectify.
Unfolding my argument requires the putting in place of a number of
chess pieces, which include phenomenology, postphenomenology, pragmatism, and enactivism. In Section 1.1, I present the opening move. That is,
I defend the decision to opt for an enactive approach to mind–technology
interaction by looking at recent critiques levelled at extended functionalism by scholars in philosophy of technology and phenomenology. These
‘postphenomenologists’ accuse extended functionalism of not recognising
the roles that artefacts play in shaping our interactions with them, instead understanding artefactual use as merely instrumental. Having taken
the functionalist piece of the chess board, I aim to show in Section 1.2
that enactivism is resistant to this critique, in part because it shares some
important genealogical roots with postphenomenology. Both trace their
lineage back, in part, to pragmatists such as John Dewey and phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, which has led both research programmes
to place the shaping role of the body in worldly engagements front and
centre. However, enactivism is currently not sufficiently equipped to explain different types of mind-technology interaction. My next move, in
Section 1.3, involves freeing up space for the postphenomenological rook.
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I do so by arguing that postphenomenology can fruitfully inform enactivism by presenting a number of distinctions that help categorise mind–
technology interactions. This is followed, in Section 1.4, by moving the
enactivist and postphenomenological rooks next to each other. This is
done by translating the relations discussed in Section 1.3 into the language of dynamical systems as used in contemporary enactivist thought.
This provides concrete tools for those in cognitive science that want to
investigate mind-technology interaction and checks rival extended mind
accounts.

1.1

The charges against extended functionalism
Those advocating an understanding of the mind as extended (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008b; Wheeler, 2010a), have recently been the target of critique by philosophers of technology. Crucially, the main charges
include: first, the putative assumption by extended mind theorists of a
subject–object dichotomy between agent and world; and, second, the
subsequent wrongful instrumental conception of technological artefacts
(Vaccari, 2017; Aydin, 2015; Kiran & Verbeek, 2010). Some have attempted
to neutralize the critique by meeting the charges head-on (Heersmink,
2012). In this section, I discuss the extended mind, its relation to and
dependence on functionalism and the critiques levelled against it.
David Chalmers, in his foreword to Andy Clark’s 2008b book Supersizing the mind, fondly illustrates the extended mind thesis by drawing on
his use of the then-new iPhone. In his words, the smartphone contains his
memories and desires, by storing addresses and lists of his favourite dishes.
That his use of the iPhone should not merely be understood in causal
terms is shown by the fact that Chalmers would lose access to at least
some of those memories and desires were he to lose the iPhone and solely
rely on his biological cognitive apparatus. Like the iPhone, the extended
mind thesis arrived in a time when others had coined similar ideas (e.g.,
Harman, 1988; Varela et al., 1991; Wilson, 1994). But unlike the iPhone,
extended mind plays well with other schools of thought and this thesis
is now commonly mentioned in one breath under the nomer of wide or
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‘4E’ cognition: as embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive.1 There is
no doubt that the extended mind is now firmly established as a position
of recognition within the cognitive sciences (see Arnau, Estany, González
del Solar & Sturm, 2014).
But not all wide mind approaches are of a kind. Against this background, phenomenologists who have advocated their own approach to
wide minds from a philosophy of technology perspective have rallied
against extended mind thinking. These ‘postphenomenologists’ are inspired by such thinkers as Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse in
seeing the significance of technologies for the way we experience our
environment. However, they depart from classic phenomenologists by not
seeing technologies as a threat, but as mediating our experiences with the
world in ways that, while not neutral, need not necessarily be negative
(Ihde, 2002, p. 113). I single out two main points of critique on extended
cognition by postphenomenologists. First is the idea that in mind extension “technologies [are] seen as extensions of or substitutions for inherent
human capabilities” which in turn “reinforces the classical position of
technological instrumentalism—the disreputed view that technologies are
no more than simple means to an end” (Kiran & Verbeek, 2010, p. 414).
Second and related is the critique that “according to [extended mind thinking] ... an inner-outer dualism is ... preserved by ascribing to cognition an
original starting point in an internal biological core” (Aydin, 2015, p. 74).
Both critiques, that of seeing tools as neutral aspects of the world to be
picked up and discarded at will, and that of a dualism of mind and world,
attempt to reveal that mind–technology interaction is in fact bidirectional.
Human agents use technologies, but the use of such technologies in turn
shapes the human agent as well.
Much of the critique levelled at extended cognition thinking can be
attributed to its close association with functionalism. Crucially, this connection depends on the underlying assumption that cognitive interactions
with environmental factors depend on the exchange of information. Thus,
Clark (2008a, pp. 39–40) claims “that larger systemic wholes, incorporating
brains, bodies, the motion of sense organs, and (under some conditions)
1

The justification of this eucumenical approach is up for debate – indeed, much of this
thesis turns on a critical comparison of the 4E amalgamation. See for a concise discussion
Michelle Maiese (2018).
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the information-bearing states of non-biological props and aids, may sometimes constitute the mechanistic supervenience base for mental states and
processes.” However, although the concrete material make-up of artefacts
often matters for our embodied, cognitive interactions with them, this
aspect risks being ignored if cognition is seen as the processing of information (Vaccari, 2017).
To illustrate the previous critique, we may look at a recent example
from the field of astrophysics. In April 2019, the first photograph of a
black hole was released. The term ‘photo’ may be a bit misleading as the
iconic image in Figure 1.1 is not a direct representation of the black hole
in the sense that one would take a photo of a tree. Because even photons
cannot escape the pull of a black hole, the photo instead has captured
the final emissions of radiation by particles about to be swallowed. These
radiation emissions were observed by a worldwide network of satellites on
Earth and analysed independently by four teams encompassing hundreds
of physicists, computer scientists, and other experts. They constructed
a number of images from terabytes of observational data, of which Figure 1.1 is the main representative, in order to test the theory of general
relativity. The resulting image is powerful as evidenced by this reflection
from Heino Falcke, one of the lead scientists of the project, in an interview
by Nature: “We have seen the gates of hell at the end of space and time”
(Castelvecchi, 2019, p. 284). It is not hard to see why this image of a fiery
oval, reminiscent of the eye of The Lord of the Rings’ main villain Sauron,
evokes such a response. But a problem is revealed by attempting to understand the constructed nature of this image, its scientific function, and the
infernal associations that many observers of the photo will have in terms
of extended functionalism.
To point this tension out, let us consider the colouring of the image.
Shortly after the photo of the black hole was released, I asked Falcke
what the deciding factor behind the colours of the ring was. I specifically
enquired whether the colours were due to some characteristic physical
aspects of the hole, or if they came down to aesthetics. His reply: “Purely
aesthetics - [it] suggest some kind of glowing though, which is not completely wrong.”2 By way of experiment, I wondered how the associations
2

This public exchange happened on April 11, 2019, and can be found online on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/hfalcke/status/1116572521225056257.
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Figure 1.1: Image of the Messier 87* black hole. Data captured by the
Event Horizon Telescope array, after which the image was constructed
and released to the public on April 10, 2019. Credit: ESO/EHT Collaboration.

with the black hole image would change when the colours were adjusted
and had Figure 1.2 made. If you have not seen it yet, please take a look at
this figure and its caption before reading on.
While still an evocative image, the hue change from red to blue in
Figure 1.2 weakens the association to hellish gates or devilish eyes, or
at least in as much as such associations depend on icons anchored in
one’s cultural milieu. This is something that the functionalist account
will have a difficult time explaining and can be illustrated with Falcke’s
response about the colouring choice being purely a matter of aesthetics.
The colouring is required to make the scientific information contained in
the image, the degrees of intensity of emitted radiation from matter being
pulled into the event horizon, visible to human eyes. The functionalist
will likely understand this by saying that since the images are equivalent
with respect to the information they carry about the black hole, there
should be no interpretative difference between them. Additionally, any
other informationally equivalent representation of the black hole, like a
matrix with data, should be considered cognitively equivalent to either
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Figure 1.2: Hue adjustment of Figure 1.1, such that the red colours are
transformed into shades of blue. I invite the reader to consider whether
the associations with the ‘gates of hell’ are as strong with this image as
they are with the original.

image since cognition is information-processing. But this is mistaken for
two reasons.
First, engaging with different phenomena, whether they are books,
baskets or black hole photos, requires or is at least greatly facilitated
by embodiment. Second, the manner of embodiment influences how we
engage with phenomena. Both claims hold as much for our scientific
practices as they do outside of those.3 Even in those cases that are lauded as
the pinnacle of fundamental science like astrophysics is there an embodied
aspect. The colouring of the black hole photo is not ‘purely aesthetics’:
rather, it is aethetics guided by the need for embodied engagement. In
discussing images generated from the orbital Hubble space telescope,
postphenomenologist Don Ihde (2002) puts it well when he says that in
these cases “the scientific object must be experienced very differently since
it does not have any direct bodily presence at all” and that the images
in question “are the results of instrumentally constructed or mediated
3

For a phenomenological discussion of the relation between neuroscientists and their
instruments with a focus on functional magnetic resonance imaging, see Bas de Boer
(2019).
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processes that are translations into visual forms of phenomena themselves
not directly available to human perception” (pp. 39–40).4 In fact, the whole
enterprise of constructing a two-dimensional, coloured representation of
a four-dimensional, colourless phenomenon, is in itself, as Ihde points out,
an attempt at translating the invisible into a shape that is perceivable by us.
And as with any translation, certain aspects are up for interpretation. In the
case of the black hole photos this means that the different associations they
evoke create an important difference with respect to how we cognitively
engage with them.
Because of their focus on information-processing, the extended functionalist will have problems explaining how the embodied engagement
with the black hole photo matters for understanding our interpretation
of the image. But the colouring and associated images do matter. They
enable the public uptake of an iconic image and the caption ‘gates of hell’.
Some postphenomenologists state that the extended mind approach might
be adjusted to account for the sensitivities of embodied engagement with
technologies if linked to a so-called ‘third wave’ that moves away from
cognition as information-processing (see Section 2.3 Aydin, 2015; Sutton,
2010). For now, however, the tensions revealed warrant the consideration
of an alternative cognitive framework of mind–technology interaction. I
propose that enactivism fits this bill and will next explain why.

1.2

Enactivism & postphenomenology: common roots
Postphenomenology and enactivism can be thought of as natural allies.
In this section, I aim to bring these pieces closer together on the chessboard of my argument. Both approaches depart from the assumption that
mind needs to be understood as essentially dependent on an individual’s
engagement with their environment and both are increasingly successful
on their own terrains: respectively the philosophy of cognition and the
philosophy of technology. But both are also served by seeking inspiration
beyond their usual domain of application.
Inspiration for connecting postphenomenology and enactivism can
be found in Helena De Preester (2010, p. 341) who points out: “Enactivist
4

The idea discussed here is reminiscent of Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) account on constructive
empiricism and the use of scientific instruments.
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theories ... would form an excellent philosophical underpinning for postphenomenology.” She notes this in reply to a potential critique against
postphenomenology. The issue is that although postphenomenologists
have developed an account for understanding the experiential side of
human-technology relations and make suggestions for behavioural change
depending on artefact engagement, they currently lack concrete suggestions for how to study such relations in cognitive science. Enactivists can
provide a framework for making the study of mind–technology interaction
from a postphenomenologist perspective viable.
Conversely, enactivists would benefit from considering the suggestions put forward by postphenomenologists. Enactivism as a framework
of cognition is still relatively young (commonly said to have started with
Varela et al., 1991). The framework is still maturing and, although it has
made promising alternative proposals for the study of cognition (e.g., Di
Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran, 2017), it lacks an account of the cognitive
role that technologies may play in it. This is particularly clear in discussions
on extended cognition, which often draw on the functionalist framework
to explain specific cases of mind–technology interaction. It is against this
background that Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009, p. 20) remarks: “The more interesting and forward-looking themes introduced by the [extended mind]
approach, and towards which enactivism must still develop, include the
problem space of technical individuation and technological networks that
bootstrap the generation of cognitive identities.” Postphenomenologists
are able to support this development in enactivism.
Connecting the enactive and postphenomenological approaches is further motivated by the observation that they share a common genealogy. In
particular, both theories are inspired by pragmatism and phenomenology.
It is worthwhile to consider briefly how pragmatism and phenomenology
inform the former two approaches and play a supporting role in the current game. This will reveal areas of alignment and misalignment that will
help with the integration of these approaches later in the present chapter.
Chief postphenomenologist Ihde (2009) provides a useful overview of
its relation to pragmatism and classic phenomenology. Ihde argues that
early phenomenology, mainly by virtue of Edmund Husserl, wielded a rigorous methodology for a scientific investigation of first-person experience
through the idea of embodiment and embodied engagement in a particular

24

CHAPTER 1. ENACTIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

lifeworld (see also Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007). Yet at the same time he faults
Husserl for casting early phenomenology with “problems of subjectivism
and idealism” (p. 11), as the keystone for Husserl’s analysis remains the
subject and not the ongoing and reciprocal interaction between subject
and world. This is where pragmatism enters the stage, as Ihde takes it to
advocate an understanding of psychology, not in terms of representations,
but in terms of practice. What appears from this analysis is the combination of understanding of human experience as arising from embodied
engagement with the world, and investigating it through a Husserlian
methodology.
The final ingredient that Ihde presents as relevant for understanding
postphenomenology is characterised by the ‘empirical turn’ in philosophy
of technology (Achterhuis, 2001). This turn has three characteristics. First,
it advocates a shift in focus from Technology to technologies. The difference here is, besides a capital letter, a matter of focus: where thinkers such
as Martin Heidegger5 asked questions about the nature of Technology in
relation to human experience, contemporary philosophers of technology
are more interested in the diverse range of concrete technologies. Second
is the suggestion that in contemporary philosophy of technology our relation to technologies is not understood in a dystopian light, but instead in
terms of understanding human–technology relations and what it means
to co-exists with different technologies. This is in contrast to early phenomenologists who had a dystopian view of Technology, and were mainly
interested in the risks that technological change brought. Third and finally
is the recognition in contemporary philosophy of technology that science
has a deeply technological dimension which we ought to understand if we
want to understand our scientific practices, as I aimed to illustrate in the
previous section. In sum, postphenomenology “finds a way to probe and
analyze the role of technologies in social, personal, and cultural life that it
undertakes by concrete—empirical—studies of technologies in the plural”
(Ihde, 2009, p. 23).
In enactivism we find an aim similar to postphenomenology and
borne by similar observations. Though precursors to enactive thinking
were present in earlier work by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela
5

But also Karl Jaspers and lesser known phenomenologists, such as Heidegger’s Romanian
student Alexandru Dragomir (see Peeters, 2017).
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(1980), the founding text of enactivism is canonically singled out as the
1991 book The embodied mind, authored by Varela in collaboration with
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. The authors discuss that their main
inspiration for developing their embodied, enactive approach comes from
three sources: molecular biology, phenomenology, and various schools
of Buddhism – though recent discussions of the enactive approach do
not often acknowledge the latter’s influence (excepting Thompson, 2007).
From phenomenology, enactivists take up the idea that knowledge about
one’s environment and embodiment are intimately linked (p. 149).6 About
embodiment they say the following specifically:
By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points:
first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that
come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities
are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological,
psychological, and cultural context. (pp. 172–173)
Elaborating on this understanding of embodiment, the authors provide
a preliminary formulation of the two pillars of enaction: “(1) perception
consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge
from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 173). In sum, this means that
enactivism can be said to understand cognition as arising out of the active and reciprocal engagement of organism and environment. As with
postphenomenology, enactivism does not elevate the contribution of the
agent or subject to mental activity over that of external factors, instead
opting for an “even-handed Equal Partner Principle” (Hutto & Myin, 2013,
p. 137) between brain, body, and environment. Recent years have seen a
fruitful development of the enactivist research programme (Thompson,
2007; Gallagher, 2017; Di Paolo et al., 2017). Part of this development has
been the sprouting of new branches upon the enactivist tree (see Ward,
6

It might be interesting to note that Varela et al. (1991) trace the origins of their approach,
like postphenomenologists, back to Heidegger as the term ‘enaction’ is their take on
Heideggerian hermeneutics, which “originally referred to the discipline of interpreting
ancient texts, but it has been extended to denote the entire phenomenon of interpretation, understood as the enactment or bringing forth of meaning from a background of
understanding” (p. 149).

26

CHAPTER 1. ENACTIVISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY

Silverman & Villalobos, 2017). These offshoots include sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004) and radical or analytic7 enactivism
(Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017). All these schools of enactivist thought are
united in emphasising the active, bodily component of cognitive processes
and share a scepticism about intellectual and computational interpretations of minds. However, for the purpose of this chapter my focus will
remain on the main enactivist stem.
The pragmatist connection, contrary to enactivism’s phenomenological credentials, is less clear yet still present. In his book Enactivist
interventions, Gallagher (2017) provides a useful analysis of how a number
of key insights about situatedness and bodily interaction from pragmatist
thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey foreshadow the
enactivist approach. It is interesting to note here that Gallagher (2017,
p. 53) aligns the Peircean idea that artefacts may perform cognitive roles
with enactivism, and is inspired to do so by work on postphenomenology
(specifically, Aydin, 2015). Unfortunately, this connection is not further
developed. Gallagher further argues that “Dewey’s notions of situation
and organism–environment may offer a way to develop a theory of the extended mind that is based on enactivist rather than functionalist principles”
(p. 64).8 I am a bit sceptical about the frame of an enactivist version of the
extended mind, as I would argue that enactivism already, from the start,
conceives of mind as spread out over neural, bodily, and environmental
factors (see also Hutto et al., 2014), and Gallagher’s phrasing suggests that
the extended mind hypothesis is not already assumed in the enactivist
approach. I take it that Gallagher’s suggestion about an ‘enactive extended
mind’ is not so much about the contribution of the thesis that minds can
extend, but that discussions and research on mind extension that have
borne theoretical and empirical fruit can be read enactively. This reading is plausible, I think, and leaves us with the emphatic suggestion that
enactivist need to draw more on pragmatic resources.

7
8

Thanks to Russell Meyer for coining this phrase.
Of note is also Menary’s (2007) related ecumenical proposal for cognitive integration, in
which he, inspired by the pragmatist Dewey, develops an account of biological coupling
that denies “the strict separation between mind and world” (p. 104) and expands on the
extended mind thesis. To restrict the scope of this chapter to enactivism, I will not engage
with this line of thought here.
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With respect to mind–technology interaction, pragmatic resources for
enactivism may be provided through the postphemenological approach.
Concretely, postphenomenology provides a classification for different
types of mind–technology interactions, which I will discuss in detail in the
next section. This distinction can inform enactivist research on different
types of roles artefacts may play in cognitive processes. Doing so, answers
De Preester’s (2010) call to bring enactivism and postphenomenology into
closer alignment and contributes to answering Di Paolo’s (2009) challenge
to have enactivism catch up with the extended mind approach.

1.3

Kinds of human–technology relations
My next move is to make postphenomenological resources available for
the enactive approach. For this, I propose to look at a distinction made by
the former with respect to different kinds of mind–technology interaction,
see Table 1.3. The categorisation I draw on was first proposed by Ihde
(1990), who distinguishes four types of mind–technology relations9 : the
embodiment, hermeneutic, alterity, and background relations. The cyborg
relation was added to this list in a more recent paper by Peter-Paul Verbeek
(2008). Additionally, Verbeek (2011) discusses different ways in which
technologies may shape action. I will introduce these concepts in this
section in order to operationalise them for enactivist use in the next. But I
first discuss how postphenomenology understands human intentionality
in relation to different technologies.
In true phenomenological fashion, Ihde (1990) further develops the
concept of intentionality to encompass the different ways that humans
may engage with technologies. Intentionality is here to be understood
as the manner in which human experience is directed towards reality.
9

Postphenomenologists tend to speak about ‘human–technology relations’ to avoid the
suggestion that humans (or minds) are somehow opposed to technologies or that minds
and technologies would exist independently from each other. While I understand this
worry and would not want to make that suggestion myself, I shall nevertheless sometimes
use the phrases ‘mind–technology relation’ or ‘mind–technology interaction’ here to
emphasise the cognitive and active modalities of these relations, in line with the enactivist
motto that cognition is action. In addition, I do not want to commit myself to the suggestion made by Verbeek (2008, p. 389) that interaction is only a key component for the
‘alterity relation’ between human and technology. A similar critique is the motivation for
Nørskov (2015) to reduce the alterity and background relations to the other two relations,
though I propose to uphold the distinction here for clarification purposes.
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Type of relation

Schematic

Example

Embodiment

(human – technology) → world

Augmented reality glasses

Hermeneutic

human → (technology – world)

Heart rate monitor

Alterity

human → technology (– world)

Computer keyboard

Background

human (– technology – world)

Space shuttle

Cyborg

(human/technology) → world

Semi-autonomous wheelchair

Composite

human → (technology → world)

Black hole photograph

Table 1.3: Human–technology relations as discussed by Ihde (1990) and
Verbeek (2008, 2011). The direction of the arrows signals the intentionality of the agent. The dashes signal a more general kind of relation

My senses and emotions are about something, like the delicious smell of
a fresh meal, or my disappointment at watching the newest Star Wars
film. Ihde’s addition to this core phenomenological concept is that he
elucidates how different types of technology engagement may each shape
our intentionality in their own distinct way. On this account, technologies
mediate human intentionality, as will explained in more detail next.
The embodiment relation is the first type of technology engagement
and can be explained as singling out those types of relation where an agent
engages with the world through the use of an artefact that is incorporated
in or on the body. Examples include: wearing a pair of spectacles, using
hearing aides, or augmented reality goggles which overlay information on
what the user is looking at. In most use cases, the human agent will not
directly notice the devices she engages with and as such, we can say that
the intentionality of the agent is directed through the device at the world
or environment, for example, when I use my spectacles to study an image
or text.
The intentionality of an agent in the second, hermeneutic relation is
also pointed at the world, but only indirectly. This is because this relation
describes those situations where a device is providing an interpretation
of an environmental aspect and presenting it to the user. This happens in
cases of thermometers and heart rate monitors, when they respectively
present the ambient temperature or cardiovascular activity. So when the
human agent is interested in physical or physiological measurements, they
are perceived through an artificial construction.
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Third is the alterity relation, where an agent’s intentionality is aimed
at the artefact itself, while the wider environment fades into the background. In cases of alterity, the technology is itself the object of attention
and is the use case that for most people likely comes to mind first when
they think about technologies. This is unsurprising because, as Ihde (1990)
points out, most accounts about technology see such devices as instrumentalist and in “such accounts technologies as objects usually come first rather
than last” (p. 97, see, for a critical discussion of such a theory, Section 3.2).
Examples of alterity relations are me typing on a keyboard or drinking
water from a glass.
The background relation is the fourth and final relation introduced by
Ihde. In cases where this relation applies, the technology in question has
faded into the wider environment and is itself not the focus of attention
by the user yet still is of, perhaps subtle, influence on the environment.
This occurs in rooms with climate control or automated light dimming,
but more advanced instances such as the interiors of a space shuttle of
submarine also fall in this category. There is no intentionality of human
agents directed towards the technology in this relation.
In addition to human–technology relations that depend on mediated
intentionality, Verbeek (2008, 2011) discusses two other types of intentionality: hybrid and composite. In hybrid cases, the intentionality involved is
part human, part device-bound. This is not to say that such technologies
have a phenomenal consciousness. The idea is that, for example, because a
designer set up a technology to behave in a certain way, such a technology
carries part of the overall intentionality of the hybrid human-technology
system. Take, for instance, cases where a person who is unable walk and respond quickly to environmental cues moves around in a semi-autonomous
wheelchair with a joystick controller. This wheelchair is designed to help
steer the user away from obstacles, particularly when the user would
respond too slowly to steer away or stop, like when an animal suddenly
scurries in front of the wheelchair. In this case, the wheelchair may override a previous instruction to move forward in order to avoid an accident.
Human user and wheelchair, by virtue of its design, together give shape
to a hybrid intentionality. Verbeek calls this the cyborg relation.
Naturally, the design choices made for technologies that are involved
in cyborg relations are even more important than in other human–technology
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relations, as they directly affect a human agent’s freedom and responsibility. Of special ethical relevance is the threefold distinction that Verbeek
(2011, p. 126) makes regarding the steering effects of technologies. First,
technologies may force the human to do something, like requesting a code
or fingerprint to unlock a mobile phone. Second, technologies can persuade the users to perform an action, such as when a emergency exit that
is accidentally kept open emits a screeching sound to invite passers-by
to close the door again. Third and finally, some technologies seduce the
human agent to act a certain way. One example is a large touch screen
in the middle of a campus that invites the user to play around with the
map it displays. Because of their bearing on morality, awareness of how
technologies can elicit behaviours is extremely important for designers.
This does not necessarily mean that the direct or indirect influence of
technologies on human behaviour is always suspect: many would agree
that placing speed bumps on roads in front of schools in order to force
cars to slow down is an important safety measure. Furthermore, Verbeek
(2008, p. 391) emphasises the co-constitutive nature of cyborg intentionality: the human agent’s intentionality is not overridden but rather merges
with the technology’s intentionality to give rise to a new agent (see also
Floridi & Sanders, 2004).10 For this reason Verbeek (2011, p. 112) advocates a democratic approach to the design of new technologies, involving
not only engineers, but also ethicists and end-users, to make transparent
decisions about how freedom and responsibility are affected by the end
product. Against this background, I have contributed to the democratic
design process of sex robots in Chapter 3, particularly in Section 3.4 where
I discuss freedom and responsibility.
The final type of relation discussed here and also introduced by Verbeek (2008) is the composite relation which itself leans on the idea of
composite intentionality. Unlike hybrid cases, where human and technology merge to create a new intentionality, composite intentionality
describes those situations where human agents are oriented towards an
10

Not all philosophers of technology will agree with this optimistic view. In personal
correspondence to me, Pieter Lemmens, drawing on Bernard Stiegler’s discussion of
technical retention, argues that human intentionality can be reduced to technologies
(see also Lemmens, 2008, pp. 401–402). However, the aim of the present argument is to
connect enactivism and postphenomenology, and so a critique of the latter on this level
of detail falls outside its scope.
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artefact which itself is directed towards something else, presenting a constructed reality to the human agent. In a way, this is an alteration of the
previously discussed hermeneutic relation. But where the hermeneutic
relation may specifically quantify or represent an aspect of reality that is
in itself already in some way accessible, as in the case of the heart rate
monitor, the composite relation involves scenarios where something that
was previously entirely inaccessible is revealed through the technology.
The photograph of the black hole in Figure 1.1 is a (complex) example of
this type of this relation.
I must admit I am sceptical about the usefulness of invoking a new type
of intentionality to differentiate the hermeneutic and composite relations.
Even in cases of the hermeneutic relation, such as with heart rate monitors
or thermometers, reality is altered and presents an experience that was
previously not available, namely the exact quantification of a natural
phenomenon (cf. Verbeek, 2011, p. 146). That being said, I include this
relation here for the sake of completeness.
Now that we have an overview of the different types of relations
discussed in postphenomenology, the pieces on the board are in place for
the execution of the final part in my strategy. This involves the operationalization of the human–technology just discussed in the language of
dynamical systems. This will help enactivists to investigate the cognitive
role of different technologies and provides postphenomenology with a
cognitive framework.

1.4

Sensorimotor contingencies and technology
Now that the review of the different types of human–technology relations
is in place, I turn to the task of opening them up for the enactivist framework. I aim to do so by translating them into dynamical systems terms,
which is an approach embraced by many leading enactivists, though for
the present section I mainly draw on the excellent work done by Di Paolo
et al. (2017). Their enactive proposal is the most concrete with respect
to performing enactive cognitive science experiments and should thus, I
hope, make application of what is discussed here fairly straightforward.
However, it must be noted that this section should be seen as an initial
attempt to showcase how an enactivist philosophy of technology can
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be informed by postphenomenology and requires future elaboration and
specification. The different types of human–technology relations may be
mapped in distinct ways on the enactive framework, depending on the
concrete technology and situation involved. My strategy in this section is
therefore to look at a few instances of concrete technologies and use the
different human–technology relations to help inform enactive research on
those. But before I start this translation I will first briefly introduce some
concepts central to sensorimotor contingencies and dynamical systems.
The overarching frame within which Di Paolo et al. (2017) develop
their dynamical take on enaction, depends on a particular understanding of how agents are structurally coupled with their environment. This
structural coupling gives rise to regularities of interaction. For example,
from experience with the general shape of doorknobs I will automatically
grasp (most) doorknobs in the right way if I want to move through a
door. Because these regularities arise out of the sensory apparatus and
motor control of the agent, they are called sensorimotor contingencies
(see O’Regan & Noë, 2001).
Four different kinds of sensorimotor contingency are provided by
Di Paolo et al. (2017, p. 59), and each captures a different domain. In order
of decreasing abstraction these are: the sensorimotor environment, the sensorimotor habitat, sensorimotor coordination, and sensorimotor scheme.
The sensorimotor environment models agent–environment coupling from
a very general point, abstracting away from the agent’s internal motor
and sensor activity. On the level of the sensorimotor habitat, the agent’s
internal, neural states are included in the method of analysis. Both the
sensorimotor coordination and sensorimotor scheme regularities zoom
in further on specific cognitive acts, respectively including the task being
performed and the level of proficiency with which that performance is
executed into the mix.
To describe these contingencies, Di Paolo et al. (2017) rally the language of dynamical systems theory, charting the changes in different
cognitive systems using vectors. The number and relation between these
vectors can be adjusted according to the cognitive system under investigation. For example, if one is solely interested in investigating the larger
body-environment system, one vector for state variables of the environment and one vector for the variables of the agent may be posited such
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that a variable change in one vector influences a change in the other. The
authors provide several justifications for applying the language of dynamical systems to their approach. Firstly, a dynamical model may describe
a system in terms of enabling and restraining conditions without positing a central processing unit as a regulatory device (p. 16), and therefore
steers clear of more traditional, computationalist accounts. Secondly, such
a model allows for non-representational descriptions of cognitive systems
(p. 20, footnote 4) and can easily include or exclude parts by adding or
removing variables that serve as extra constraints, such as those describing
an agent’s internal motor or sensor activity (p. 42). As powerfully put by
fellow enactivists Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton (2009):
Both the nervous system and the body are compositionally
plastic. They can alter their structure and dynamics by incorporating (taking into themselves) processes, tools, and resources that go beyond what the biological body can metabolically generate (e.g., artificial organs and neural and sensorimotor prostheses). (p. 28)
Having described the dynamical toolkit in the enactivist framework,
let us now turn to an examination of different technologies. I previously
discussed spectacles and augmented reality goggles as example use cases
of the embodiment relation. But seemingly similar scenarios and types of
spectacles and goggles may actually invoke very different types of human–
technology relations. For example, many ‘smart eye-wear’ devices such
as Google Glass attempt to present the user with additional information
about the environment such as with displaying architectural information
when one looks at the Sydney Opera House through such glasses. However,
the way information is presented is relevant for user interaction.
Imagine a piece of eye-wear that supports their user in finding the
right way through a new city. This can be done by displaying a top-down
map of the streets, by showing lines of textual directions, or even by
projecting arrows on intersections (as fondly anticipated by Clark, 2003,
p. 52). Now, one might be inclined to categorise this kind of use in terms of
the embodiment relation. However, displaying symbolic information on a
screen is actually more in line with the hermeneutic relation as it interprets
or quantifies aspects of the environment and the user’s attention might
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shift from environment to the symbols on the screen worn. This reveals a
tension between the intended use, namely the transparent embodiment
relation that merely mediates a user’s intentionality, and the actual use,
where the device gets into the way of the job performed. For this reason,
Vicente Raja and Paco Calvo (2017) have proposed a different approach
to such devices. Instead of distracting the user with overlays or risking
informational bloat, they suggest to look more carefully at the sensorimotor
contingencies normally involved with perception and pathfinding. In order
to support navigation without becoming obtrusive, Raja and Calvo suggest
highlighting areas that offer the best route and slightly dimming those
areas that should be ignored. I offer a detailed application of this idea
for virtual reality devices in Section 2.4. This is much more in line with
the embodiment relation as previously discussed and fits well with the
sensorimotor environment level of description that abstract away from
the agent’s internal processes, which are not relevant in this case.
There may be use cases of augmented reality goggles where a hermeneutic relation – or the alternation between embodiment and hermeneutic
relations – does seem appropriate. Consider a medical doctor performing
an operation and wearing a smart device (see Muensterer, Lacher, Zoeller,
Bronstein & Kübler, 2014). The ability to wear the device on one’s face
allows the doctor the freedom to perform her surgery. Like in the case
of pathfinding, certain areas of the patient’s body could be highlighted
when the device detects an issue or can be zoomed in on to enable a higher
precision. But besides these instances of the embodiment relation, where
the use of the device remains transparent, sometimes an overlay showing
symbolic information may be required. We can imagine cases where it is
important that a patient’s drug history is readily available, or where the
exact dose of a medicine is required. Here, even though the device is the
same in both instances, its use here invokes the hermeneutic relation as
the main candidate of description, as the goggles itself become the focus
of attention.
It may be the case that hermeneutic technology engagements, like
the surgeon reading off the smart glasses, can only partly be captured in
terms of sensorimotor contingencies. Originally, hermeunitics refers to
the study of textual interpretation and is thus about reading (Ihde, 1990,
p. 80). The act of reading may be said to involve the level of sensorimotor
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schemes, where eye saccades take in the words and fingers flip pages. But
reading also involves a number of higher cognitive processes that are less
easily captured in terms of sensorimotor contingencies, as the meaning of
words and sentences is interpreted and made available for consciousness
(see Di Paolo, Cuffari & De Jaegher, 2018).
Technology use that is subsumed under the alterity relation lends
itself readily for analysis in terms of sensorimotor contingencies. Take the
instance of a computer keyboard: on the level of sensorimotor coordination
this involves hand coordination and tactile feedback to perform the key
strokes. On the level of sensorimotor schemes it involves recognising that
the right keys are pressed, for example, by reading along on the screen or
by checking a text one is citing from.
Artificial environments that operate in the background while the
human agent is going on with their business can be mapped almost directly onto the level of the sensorimotor environment. Taking a look at
space shuttles and submarines, but also refrigerators, what is of cognitive
relevance here is the larger area of possibilities and background conditions that such spaces provide. For space shuttles and submarines that
means that human agents can move around (relatively) easily on the inside
of these environments, but going outside is only advisable in particular
circumstances. The agent’s internal state is of less concern in these cases.
In Verbeek’s account of technologies that give rise to hybrid intentionality, we encounter a case for which the enactive proposal by Di Paolo and
colleagues seems a natural fit. The postphenomenological analysis reveals
that the technological part of the merged intentionality can be anticipated
and intervened upon during the design process, even if only partially. That
means that with semi-autonomous wheelchairs, for example, the designers
will purposefully have build in fail-saves to override the user’s command
to move if it means it will hit a sudden obstacle, like an animal or child.
Especially in cases where the hybrid intentionality unfolds through an
interpretation made by a brain–computer interface (Haselager, 2013), does
it seem useful to give an analysis of agency on the level of the humanplus-wheelchair or cyborg system. Enactivism can provide this for actual
practical situations. Because the levels of sensorimotor coordination and
sensorimotor schemes have the influence of environmental factors on an
action built-in, they lend themselves naturally to understanding hybrid
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intentionality in cyborg relations. This is useful in such cases where it is
important to analyse the level of influence the human part of the system
has and compare it to the technological part. Sadly, this may be shown
clearly by the tragic crashes of the Boeing 737 Max airplanes from Ethiopean Airlines and Lion Air in early 2019, where the pilot’s commands
were continuously overridden by the airplane’s control system in a case of
mistaken course correction.
Finally, the composite relation seems to me not different from the
hermeneutic relation in a meaningful and cognitively relevant way, even
if there might be an ethical difference in some cases. Looking again at
the black hole photograph, we may say that the similar sensorimotor
contingencies are involved when compared to the reading of other images
or texts off a screen.
With this brief investigation of how the various human–technology
relations can be interpreted in an enactive framework, I trust to have
shown the mutual benefit of more closely aligning postphenomenology
and enactivism.

1.5

Answering Di Paolo’s challenge
This chapter’s goal to move towards an enactivist philosophy of technology
involved rallying a large number of chess pieces and has been achieved as
follows. First, I argued that the critique of philosophers of technology on
the extended mind thesis is justified in at least some cases, and motivates
looking for an alternative cognitive framework of mind–technology interaction. I have then shown how enactivism is a prime alternative candidate
by elucidating the common roots it shares with the postphenomenological approach, from which the previously mentioned philosophers of
technology draw inspiration. My third step involved a review of a number of human–technology relations on offer by postphenomenology. For
my final step, I have analysed how, in different use cases, the way we
cognitively engage with technologies can be understood in an enactive
dynamical framework mapping actions along several types of sensorimotor contingencies. To conclude, I shall point towards potential future lines
of research.
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If it turns out that my proposal bears fruit, further work is required to
provide both a theoretical framework for connecting human–technology
relations to sensorimotor contingencies, and a proposal for how multifarious use cases can be cognitively analysed using this framework. This will
require an in-depth examination of such connections in the formal language of dynamical systems, which unfortunately falls outside the scope of
the present argument. Formalizing the different mind–technology interactions in relation to sensorimotor contingencies could start with a proposal
for what sort of vectors would adequately capture these interactions. Such
vectors need to capture, using a number of variables, which parts of the
cognitive system interact. With respect to technology interactions in particular, a focus on the initiation of actions would be of special interest, as
the vectors would be able to reflect how actions are initiated either solely
by the organism or the artefact, but emerge from ongoing interactions.
In line with broader discussions by, among others, Gallagher (2017) and
Wilson (2004), such vectors, ought to be framed within the broader social
context in which the agent operates, as even the mere presence of others
might influence the dynamic of the technology interaction. For example, a
person might be inclined to drink from a milk carton when living alone,
but not when having a roommate.
However, I have contributed to future lines of research by analysing
a number of use cases in terms of enactive engagement. In Chapter 2 I
have done this for virtual reality devices, and in Chapters 3 and 4 for
human–robot relations. With all of this in place, it looks like the extended
mind approach to technology is at last in check.

Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking
in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory
palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet
it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its
efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users.
Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical
challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that promise. We address
both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied, enactive approach to
memory can better help us understand the effectiveness of the memory palace.
Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual memory palace. Our
theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute to solving both
problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive account over
an information-processing treatment of the memory palace.

This chapter is published, in a slightly modified form, as: Peeters, A. & SegundoOrtin, M. (2019). Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual
memory palace. Consciousness and Cognition, 76, 102834. Anco Peeters is the main
author of this chapter, having authored the first three sections, introduction, and
conclusion, and taking the lead on structuring the argument. Anco Peeters and
Miguel Segundo Ortin co-wrote the fourth section. Both authors contributed to
polishing the text. Miguel Segundo Ortin permits the inclusion of the chapter in
the present thesis.

Miguel Segundo Ortin
October 15, 2019
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Chapter 2
Misplacing memories in virtual
reality
“The best aid to clearness of memory consists in orderly arrangement”
Cicero, De oratore, 2.86.354, trans. E.W.B. Sutton

Though the memory palace technique, a mnemonic making clever use
of places and images, is enjoying newfound attention by researchers on
virtual reality (VR), its use goes back centuries. According to one famous
story, Giordano Bruno, a Napolitan philosopher and influential memory
palace master, earned himself an accusation of plagiarism while presenting
at Oxford in 1583. Apparently, one attentive Oxford don did not appreciate
that Bruno, in a top-off-the-head lecture, recited long text passages from a
contemporary scholar without a reference (Rowland, 2008, p. 146). Bruno’s
mnemonic use was careless, yet his memory feats remain impressive. Cognitive scientists have been trying to make use of the memory palace more
accessible through visualising the technique’s places and images in VR,
but their efforts have so far yielded underwhelming results. In this paper,
we address the issues surrounding recent attempts at operationalizing the
memory palace through VR and we present a new and improved way of
understanding the technique. Our proposal is inspired both by going back
to the technique’s roots and by insights from embodied, enactive cognitive
science and should help towards solving the issues mentioned.
The main problem with mastering the memory palace technique is
the time and effort involved. The technique takes long-term practice, in
a suitable environment, and requires creative imagination. This explains
39
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why, given the strength of the technique, its use in education and training
practices is not more prevalent. To increase accessibility of the memory
palace, researchers have attempted to operationalize its use through VR
devices. So far, it has proved hard to gain similar levels of remembering
with the use of such devices when compared to traditional mnemonics.
To make steps towards solving this issue, we propose to consider
the difficulties in the translation of the memory palace into VR against
the background of the so-called ‘pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science.
The pragmatic turn signals a move towards conceiving of cognition as
dynamic, embodied and enactive and away from cognition as informationprocessing (Engel, 2010; Engel et al., 2013). Reframing how we think about
the cognitive underpinnings of memory will help in the design of the
virtual memory palace.
What is the advantage of examining the memory palace from the
perspective of embodied, enacted cognition? We provide two related incentives. The first stems from the observation that current cognitivist
investigations into the workings of the technique, which are based on
the information-processing paradigm, have not shed sufficient light on
why it is so powerful, as we will elaborate in the next section.1 This opens
the door to the consideration of an alternative paradigm. The second and
related reason is that the memory palace, because it leans heavily on
memory scaffolding through environmental resources, calls for a cognitive
framework which places the role of the body in the environment front and
centre.
Keeping in mind the pragmatic turn, our paper develops as follows. In
Section 2.1, we will examine current cognitivist approaches to the memory
palace technique and show how they are unable to explain its dynamics,
concluding that there is, as we call it, an Explanation Problem. Following
this, we will argue in Section 2.2 that current attempts to operationalize
the memory palace in virtual reality fall short, because they depend on cognitivist understandings of the technique. Call this the Operationalization
1

We take inspiration from a recent critique on symbolic interfacing with augmented reality
devices. Raja and Calvo (2017) argue that instead of programming augmented reality
glasses (like Google Glass) to navigate spaces using symbols and icons like arrows and
text (cf. Clark, 2003, p. 52), such devices would instead function better if they leveraged
their user’s sensorimotor capacities through changes in brightness. Froese (2014) provides
a similar, generalized critique of symbolic interfaces.
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Problem. Because addressing the Operationalization Problem first requires
addressing the Explanation Problem, we turn to the latter in Section 2.3,
where we argue that an enactive account of the memory palace captures
the technique better than its cognitivist rivals. This sets the stage for Section 2.4, in which we address the Operationalization Problem by presenting
design recommendations for designers of virtual memory palaces based on
our proposed enactive account. In doing so, we will rely on influential theories in embodied cognition, such as ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979;
Chemero, 2009). We conclude with some considerations on the application
of the virtual memory palace in educational settings and for future lines
of research.

2.1

The memory palace in cognitive science
Much of our understanding of the memory palace is derived from historical
sources. In her titular and seminal book on the art of memory, historian
Frances Yates (1966) develops a now classic account of the memory palace.
Drawing on instructions by Roman rhetoricians like Cicero and their further development by Bruno, she explains that the memory palace strategy
rests on two pillars: loci (places) and images.2
A locus is characterised as part of a spacious environment with distinct features. Classic examples of such environments include large and
varied buildings with decorations inside, such as churches and cathedrals.
Environmental parts which qualify as loci are usually those that stand out
when one would take a familiar route through the environment, such as
a gargoyle statue at the entrance, or a niche under a window. Loci and
images play a role during both the learning and the recalling phase of the
technique. In the learning phase, one moves through the building (preferably physically) and has to imagine placing images of that which has to be
remembered at specific locations in and around the building. Then, during
the recalling phase, one imagines moving through the building and gets
triggered by the images positioned there to reconstruct the memory. It
is advised to use vivid and personally resonating images for maximum
recall-effect.
2

In fact, the technique is often called method of loci (MOL), though this is a bit of a
misnomer as it puts undue focus on the first of the two pillars.
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To illustrate the use of the technique and draw out some important
aspects, let us imagine the following. While applying the technique to
a talk on robot ethics, I choose the Sydney Opera House as my locus of
choice. During the learning phase, I physically move around the Sydney
Opera House. Initially I imagine a porter at the entrance who holds a
copy of Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot. Moving on, I approach the Opera House’s
wardrobe, where I imagine Aristotle arguing with Immanuel Kant while
Jeremy Bentham hands his head to a robot attending the cloakroom. I
continue to move around and create and place images for every part of my
talk. When I am ready to present the talk I enter the recalling phase. During
that phase, Asimov’s book serves to remind me that I need to start my talk
by presenting the three laws of robotics, both as an introductory ‘hook’ and
to mark them as a starting point in robot ethics. The image of Aristotle and
Kant arguing triggers me to say that virtue ethics and deontology might
have something to say on robotics, though both theories are not dominant
in current discussions. This is where the image of Bentham comes in, as
it cues me to say that utilitarianism is currently the dominant theory in
debates on robot ethics. The vividness and personal quality of the images
will help me remember, and placing them at specific positions in the locus
will help me to order my recollection. The use of personal imagery in
combination with the scaffolding of memories through environmental
cues are the defining features of the memory palace.
An impressive study by Eleanor Maguire and colleagues (2002), on
the functional and neurological differences between normal and highperforming memorizers, shows that the memory palace technique is much
alive today. Of the high-performing memorizers, drawn from a pool of
participants in the World Memory Championships, 90% report using the
technique for some or even all of their tasks. The goal of the study was to
capture the possible causes that could differentiate superior memorizers
from normal ones. As expected, the superior memorizers performed significantly better in tests on both working and long-term verbal memory.
No differences in terms of general intellect or brain structure between
the two groups were found. However, functional brain-imaging showed
that the superior memorizers, in contrast with the controls, had consistent higher activation levels in the medial parietal cortex, retrosplenial
cortex, and the right posterior hippocampus. These regions are “known
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to be important for memory, and are implicated in spatial memory and
navigation” (p. 93). Unsurprisingly, these brain areas showed increased
activity during the learning phase of the task. Thus, Maguire and colleagues conclude that mnemonics like the memory palace, which they
defined as “strategies for encoding information with the sole purpose of
making it more memorable” (p. 93), constitute the main explanatory cause
for the performative difference between superior and normal memorizers.
The memory palace technique provides the “top participants of the annual
World Memory Championships ... the ability to memorize hundreds of
words, digits, or other abstract information units” and is therefore called
the “most prominent mnemonic technique” (Dresler et al., 2017, p. 1227).
As of yet, there is no single explanation for why the memory palace
technique is so effective. There is nonetheless a suspicion that the “additional motor imagery aspect is likely the reason the method of loci has
been found to be particularly effective—a connection that has not been
previously made” (Madan & Singhal, 2012, p. 220). This in contrast to
other memory strategies which often solely depend on visual imagery.
However, it is unclear exactly why motor imagery in combination with
visual imagery would explain the effectiveness of the memory palace as a
cognitive technique.
Moving further down these lines of thought, Martin Dresler and
colleagues (2017) hypothesize that with the memory palace technique
“abstract and unrelated information units are transformed into concrete
and related information patterns that can more easily be processed by
memory-related brain structures, such as the hippocampus” (p. 1232). But
what does it mean to say that “concrete and related information patterns”
are more easily processed by brain structures? What does the memory
palace technique do which transforms a random deck of playing cards
from “abstract and unrelated information units” into “concrete and related
information patterns”? This transformation seems to presuppose two types
of information: abstract and concrete. Are there such different kinds, and,
if so, why is concrete information more easily digested? We will take a
closer look at this issue in Section 2.3.
The relation between, on the one hand, Yates’ account of the memory
palace as deeply dependent on both the environment for structure and
the individual for creating images, and, on the other, the information-
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processing paradigm of the previously discussed experiments, remains
underdeveloped. The support of the environment is, in this paradigm,
defined as the ordering of information units which are processed by a cognizer’s brain. But that this reordering allows for more efficient information
processing is, at best, in need of further explanation, or, as we will argue,
a fundamentally flawed approach to the understanding of the technique.
Let us call this issue the Explanation Problem.

2.2

The virtual memory palace
The Explanation Problem, as we argue in the next section, lies at the root
of why efforts at making the memory palace accessible through VR devices,
are not yielding results comparable to traditional memory palace practice.
Why is there a need for a ‘virtual memory palace’? Memory theorists
have observed that the “primary flaw of mnemonics is that effective use
often requires extensive practice” (Madan, 2014, p. 3). And, specifically
in the case of the memory palace, not only does it take practice but it
also takes time to familiarize oneself with a large and spacious building
and to translate what one wants to remember into images which can
then be placed in and around that building. Moreover, the learning phase
can be extra problematic for someone who may not always have ready
access to a locus that fits the described purpose. Large, easily accessible
buildings fit for practice are after all not always available when one wants
to, for instance, practise and memorize a talk. Furthermore, the creatingand-placing-the-images phase of the memory palace technique depends
on having a creative imagination to come up with evocative pictures
which translate to whatever it is one would like to remember. So while
the memory palace is acknowledged as a powerful mnemonic technique,
potential users are often hesitant to go through the effort of learning it.
Virtual reality technologies might hold an answer to the previously
outlined challenges. Virtual environments can be tailor-made for and readily accessible to the memorizer and, when a database of (personalizable)
three-dimensional models is provided, the creation of a fitting image for a
certain idea in a speech would not be so complicated. The time it takes to
practise the mnemotic would also decrease when a virtual environment is
available, as there is no need to physically travel to a suitable environment
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or spend time conjuring up an imagined one. In the words of Thomas Jund,
Antonio Capobianco and Frédéric Larue (2016), given “its intrinsic spatial
nature, VR seems to offer the perfect technology devices to implement ...
[the memory palace]. Not only [does] it allow ... immersive exploration
of any given architectural environment, but it also provides rich sensory
cues (spatial contiguity, optic flow, self-directed navigation)” (p. 533). In
theory, virtual reality seems to be made, as it were, for the memory palace
technique.
Early research on investigating the memory palace through the lens
of virtual reality aimed to establish whether virtual environments can
support the memory palace technique as well as conventional, physical
environments do. In an initial and exploratory study, Eric Fassbender and
Wolfgang Heiden (2006) found that participants who interacted with a
virtual environment through the use of a personal computer and desktop
monitor remembered images from that virtual environment better than
words from a sheet of paper. This study is limited because different types
of items were compared – images with words – in a within-subject design
without randomisation, and there was no between-subject comparison that
compared the virtual memory palace to a conventional one. Furthermore,
more immersive interfaces than a desktop computer monitor are now
available for a consumer market. Higher levels of immersion in virtual
environments, specifically in terms of field of vision, improve performance
on memorization (Ragan, Sowndararajan, Kopper & Bowman, 2010). This
shows that it is preferable to use, for example, a head-mounted display
(HMD), rather than a desktop computer monitor to interface with a virtual
environment (see also Huttner & Robra-Bissantz, 2016).
In a foundational study on the virtual memory palace, Eric Legge
and colleagues (2012) addressed the question of whether the memory
palace technique works as well with aid from a virtual environment as
from a physical one. In order to test this, the experimenters assigned
participants to three groups: a traditional memory palace group, a virtual
memory palace group, and a control group. All participants first practised
on a memory task, recalling lists of words, then moved through a virtual
environment, and finally performed another memory task similar to the
first. The first two groups were asked to use the memory palace on the
second task, with the former imagining familiar place like their home and
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the latter imagining the virtual environment just before encountered. The
third group were not given a specific strategy to use.
The results of Legge and colleagues’ (2012) research confirm that a
virtual environment does not perform worse than a conventional space.
However, at least two critical remarks can be made about the study. First,
the participants in the study were not present in the virtual environment
during the learning phase of the memory task. Instead, they were shown
the virtual environment for five minutes and those in the virtual memory
palace group were then asked to use their memory of the virtual space for
their task. Hence, the study does not speak of how effective the memory
palace technique could be when the whole learning phase is performed in
a virtual environment. Second, the level of immersion in the virtual environment was again quite low: the environment was shown on a desktop
monitor and movement occurred by means of mouse and keyboard. This
runs counter to the theory of the conventional memory palace where an
active, bodily involvement from the memorizer, in terms of navigation and
image placement in the loci, is supposed.
In an effort to make the virtual memory palace a more immediate and
immersive experience, Jund et al. (2016) present a study in which participants engaged with a virtual environment by means of an HMD that
provided a stereoscopic image. Three types of environments were presented. In the first, participants were sequentially and briefly shown items for
remembering in the same frontal virtual position, without spatial cues. In
the second, participants were sequentially shown items to remember, with
each item briefly appearing next to the location of the previous item in
the virtual environment. No further spatial cues were given. The first two
conditions were categorised as ‘egocentric’. In the third, participants were
guided through a virtual apartment with nine different rooms. In this third
condition, categorised as ‘allocentric’, participants used a passive navigation technique: they were moved along a preprogrammed path and could
only move forward by pressing a key. Jund and colleagues were surprised
to find that the egocentric conditions resulted in better memorization than
the allocentric condition. In a follow-up experiment, they adjusted the
third condition and found that participants performed significantly better
when using a virtual environment of a familiar building. We do not think
this result is surprising as per Yates’ (1966) suggestion that the memorizer
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should use a building which is intimately familiar to them. In the next
sections, we argue that an essential cognitive part of the memory palace
technique is the training of a cognizer’s memory in such a way that it
allows for effortless re-imagining of the building in question. In a manner
of speaking, such a memorizer would carry the building with them, though
we emphasise this should not be understood representationally. However,
even with this performance improvement on the allocentric condition,
Jund and colleagues found that this condition still did worse than the
egocentric ones.
We point out two likely aspects which may help explain the poorer
results in the allocentric condition when compared to the egocentric ones
in the study by Jund et al. (2016). Both figure in the learning phase of
the memorization process. First, the participants could only indicate the
moment of movement, upon which they were passively moved along a preset path. Second, the participants were presented with images, rather than
given the opportunity to create and actively place images in the virtual
environment. Both aspects signify the passive relation of the participant to
the employed environment and this runs counter to the active anchoring as
described by Yates (1966). Jund and colleagues seem to agree, at least on the
first point, when they conclude that “the navigation technique and sensory
cues associated with displacement might be of primary importance when
it comes to use spatial information to support memorization” (p. 537). A
new and improved experimental design would be required to determine
whether our proposal holds merit, though, and we will provide a design
suggestion in Section 2.4.
In a study designed to determine whether immersive HMD interfaces
perform better in memory tasks than desktop computer monitors, Eric
Krokos, Catherine Plaisant and Amitabh Varshney (2019) take an embodied
and embedded approach to the virtual memory palace. Unsurprisingly,
they found that the increased immersion of an HMD allows for better
memory recall than a traditional desktop monitor. Of even more interest
are the peripheral observations they made regarding the manner of interaction between participants and virtual environment. About a third of
the participants “mentioned that they actively used the virtual memory
palace setup by associating the information relative to their own body”
(p. 10). The authors further remark on the previously discussed tension
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between active and passive movement through an environment. They
refer to Barbara Brooks (1999), who found that active movement allows
for more accurate familiarisation with an environment when compared
to passive movement. However, as the same study also concluded that
the manner of movement, namely whether it was active or passive, had
no influence on the recall of items or their positions in the environment,
Krokos, Plaisant and Varshney suggest that “memory was only enhanced
for those aspects of the environment that were interacted with directly –
particularly the environment which was navigated” (p. 4). It should further
be noted that Brooks’ findings are based on a traditional desktop computer
monitor interface with mouse and keyboard, and it would be of interest
to redo his experiment with an HMD and direct, haptic interaction of the
participants.
Until now, research on the virtual memory palace has presented the
memorizer as a somewhat passive participant. We think the observations
made by Krokos, Plaisant and Varshney (2019), on the role of the body in
(virtual) environments, merit closer attention if we are to properly understand the memory palace technique and develop appropriate interfaces
for it – like, for example, via haptic controllers. In line with Krokos and
colleagues, we propose to have future experiments assign free movement
to the memory palace users in VR. But we suggest departing from this
experiment in two ways. First, the images used for testing in the virtual
environment were pre-given, while masters of the memory palace emphasise using personalized imagery for stronger memory evocation. Second,
the order of images in the virtual environment was signalled by symbols
(the numbers 1, 2, and so on). In Section 2.4, we present a way of using
lighting to direct the user’s attention in virtual environments, to move
away from symbolic cues.
With this review of current developments in the field of the virtual
memory palace in place, we conclude there is currently no conclusive
answer to the question of whether a fully immersive approach, with headmount display and haptic controllers, can perform as well as (or even better
than) conventional memory palace techniques. This means that there is
a need for research which compares memory performance of memory
palace practitioners both using a conventional memory palace and a virtual
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one.3 It would furthermore be interesting to compare the performance
of memory palace practitioners not using a virtual memory palace with
ordinary subjects using a virtual memory palace, to establish whether VR
operationalization of the memory palace is on par with traditional usage.
Based on our interpretation of Yates (1966) in relation to our review of
current scientific approaches to the virtual memory palace, we surmise
that new research needs to take at least the following into account. First,
such an approach needs to investigate what sensory and navigational cues
can best support the memory palace. Second, the role of the body in virtual
environments needs to be more pronounced than it has been, specifically
in terms of how the body is virtually reproduced and whether a haptic
interface to the architecture of the locus and the placement of images can
enhance the technique. Third, this approach has to promote the active
engagement of the memorizer in navigation, choice of loci, and choice of
image. Let us call this challenge, to integrate embodied implementations
of the memory palace in VR, the Operationalization Problem. It should
be clear by now that addressing the Operationalization Problem requires
rethinking our cognitive approach to the memory palace, in other words,
it requires addressing the Explanation Problem.

2.3

Addressing the Explanation Problem
In addressing the Explanation Problem, we consider two different and
competing frameworks which put the embodiment and embeddedness of
the cognizer in a larger environment centre stage: extended functionalism
and enactivism. In what follows, we connect the memory palace to broader
debates on embodied, extended cognition and evaluate the two proposals
just mentioned. Our conclusion is that the enactive approach offers more
3

Another way to look at virtual memory palaces is through the lens of augmented reality
devices. In a study performed at the MIT Media Lab, Rosello, Exposito and Maes (2016)
present the NeverMind application. NeverMind is designed to run on spectacles or ‘smart
glasses’ which can project images on existing physical locations in the field of vision of the
user. The preliminary study found that images projected along a route with NeverMind
were better remembered than a list of words on a paper. While definitely an interesting
approach, NeverMind still depends on having an appropriate physical environment
available. Furthermore, it suffers from the same passive involvement of participants as
the studies of Legge et al. (2012) and Jund et al. (2016). As such, it falls beyond the scope
of our paper.
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powerful resources to account for the effectiveness of the memory palace
than its functionalist competitor.
Our examination starts from recent suggestions made in cognitive
anthropology and philosophy of mind. Cognitive anthropologist Edwin
Hutchins (2005, p. 1564) recounts that the memory palace makes
opportunistic use of space. The spatial relations of the landmarks do not contribute any semantic content to the problem.
But the landmarks themselves do provide memory cues, and
the sequential relations among the landmarks, that were created by mapping a particular shape of motion onto them, is
inherited by the set of items to be remembered.
This seemingly supports the idea, outlined in Section 2.1, that smart
rearrangement of ‘concrete and related information patterns’ allows such
patterns to be more easily processed. However, understanding Hutchins
this way would skirt over a crucial difference between his description and
the currently salient idea on the memory palace in neuroscience. Instead
of focusing on how information patterns might be picked up by the brain,
Hutchins, using terms like ‘landmark’ and ‘motion’, rightly emphasizes the
role of environmental triggers to cue memories and of bodily movement
to help in the ordering of them.
The relevance of environmental resources to thinking about the
memory palace has also been emphasised by John Sutton (2007). Using
the distinction between engrams, or biological memory, and exograms, or
external memory carriers, Sutton interprets the physical environments
the memory palace technique relies on – like the Sydney Opera House in
our example – as “prostheses” or “internalized exograms.” Such prostheses,
he adds, should be seen as “structuring supplements which construct and
maintain the biological processes which they simultaneously and deeply
transform” (p. 27).
We will now consider the contribution of such environmental resources from the perspective of extended functionalism. Extended functionalism aligns with current information-processing accounts that we
have discussed in the previous sections and can be traced back to Andy
Clark and David Chalmers’ (1998) classic paper on the extended mind.
In this paper, they question the traditional cognitive boundaries of skin
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and skull and argue that mind can sometimes be partly constituted by
parts of the environment. Clark and Chalmers argue their point by way of
their famous thought experiment about Inga and Otto. Inga and Otto are
both looking to visit the Museum of Modern Art while in New York. But
whereas Inga uses her biological memory to recall the museum’s address,
Otto, a sufferer of early-onset Alzheimer’s, retrieves it through his notebook. The notebook, Clark and Chalmers argue, plays the same role for
Otto that biological memory plays for Inga (p. 13). In it, Otto stores the
things he would like to remember and his daily routine depends structurally, not incidentally, on his writing – similar to how Inga depends on her
biological memory. It is important to note that this constitution claim is
stronger than the trivial claim that mind is (merely) causally affected by
the environment.
Early extended mind theorists stressed the idea that physical boundaries do not demarcate the mental and argue for this by way of the so-called
parity principle. The idea is that “[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of
the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would
have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark
& Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). The parity principle encourages us to think that
restraining cognitive processes merely to, for example, the brain, would
be a case of misplaced neural chauvinism.
The parity principle is the main reason the extended mind is usually
seen as part of the larger cognitive programme of functionalism (Clark,
2008a; Wheeler, 2010b, 2015), roughly the idea that mental states are to be
defined and characterized by the job they perform. Focusing on functions,
instead of material realizers, opens up the way to think that some cognitive
processes can be implemented, at least partly, by elements outside the skull.
Therefore, theorists working on functionalism are neutral with respect
to the whereabouts of cognition, thus providing a natural home for the
extended mind thesis.
So how exactly does the memory palace relate to the extended mind
hypothesis? Sutton (2010) proposes that, even though mnemonic devices
such as the memory palace are not literal external artefacts, the structures
they provide function much like Otto’s notebook. In this way, Sutton
expands the reach of the initial extended mind hypothesis by arguing it can
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capture not only natural and biological objects, but also cultural practices.
He therefore concludes that “taking EM [Extended Mind] seriously ...
means that we treat such architectures, systems, and practices as both
cognitive and extended whether or not they happen to be outside the skin”
(p. 209).
Let us then give a tentative account of the memory palace according to
an extended functionalist framework. As said previously, mental states are,
for the functionalist, to be understood in terms of the job they perform.4
Extended functionalists cast these jobs in terms of information-processing
– recall Inga and Otto and that “the information in the notebook functions
just like the information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief”
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Biological memory is, on this framework,
understood as a process which involves the storing and retrieving of
informational content, where this content is “sitting somewhere in memory
waiting to be accessed” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). When an event is
experienced, some piece of information is stored to be later retrieved when
required. It has to be noted, however, that the extended functionalist would
emphasize that it “doesn’t matter whether the data are stored somewhere
inside the biological organism or stored in the external world. What matters
is how information is poised for retrieval and for immediate use as and
when required” (Clark, 2003, p. 69). In light of this framework, we could
understand the memory palace technique as a way of structuring the
contents and marking them through image-association. During retrieval,
the memorizer recollects the relevant contents while she imagines walking
through the palace. The images are encountered, the information they
encode picked up, and integrated into that which was to be remembered.
On this account of extended memory, remembered contents are conceived
of as accessible, objective commodities (see Loader, 2013, p. 167).
This type of canonical, “first wave” (Sutton, 2010) extended cognition
thinking seems to come some way in explaining the memory palace. It
helps us to think of the memory palace as a cognitive structure which
supports the memorizer in placing images in a particular order. However,
there are two flaws with the current functionalist explanation. First, though
it putatively captures the role the environment plays in the process of
encoding and retrieving information, it neglects to explain why the role
4

For a current and general functionalist account of memory, see Fernández (2018).
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of bodily movement in both learning and recall phase of the memory
palace is of importance. Second, it is unclear how, on this account, the
extra information the memory palace would presumably require being
processed during the recall phase, actually helps with remembering.
Some extended functionalists, however, have enriched their account
to accommodate the role of the body. Clark (2008a), in advocating extended
functionalism, proposes two different takes on the role of the body. On
the one hand, there is what he dubs the ‘Larger Mechanism Story’ (LMS),
while, on the other, we find the ‘Special Contribution Story’ (SC). These two
stories are explanatorily competitive in that they each assign a different
role to the body in the context of embodied cognition.
On LMS, the body is thought to play a special role in the larger
information-processing mechanism. To illustrate, Clark (2008a) compares
the mental calculation of a sum by a human with how a snake, called
Adder, may slither across the keys of an electronic calculator in such a
way as to achieve a similar result. He concludes that in both cases the
same cognitive operation is performed. The process of the snake’s body
moving over the keys is functionally equivalent to whatever activity the
brain putatively performs to process the relevant information. Because
the calculation of the sum is defined in terms of symbol manipulation,
extended functionalists can abstract away from the specific material implementations of the calculation and, as such, consider that the body of
the snake is no more special than whatever parts of the brain realize these
operations. Clark associates LMS with the general (extended) functionalist
agenda.
The story is, unsurprisingly, different for SC. On SC, as advocated by
Lawrence Shapiro (2004, 2019), the role of the body is not that of one informational piece of the puzzle among many. Instead, as the name implies,
those who adhere to SC advocate that at least some of the contributions
the body makes are not reducible to mere informational processes. The
implication is that some of an organism’s cognitive processes are shaped
by the specific features of its body in a way that does not lend itself to an explanation in terms of information-processing. Shapiro specifies that there
are at least two ways in which the body may influence cognition: “first, it
might generate associations that determine certain cognitive proclivities;
second, the body might, via activation of motor plans, facilitate or inhibit
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various cognitive processes” (p. 12). Thus, on SC, for the understanding of
at least some cognitive processes the consideration of the role of the body
is required.
To justify the body’s role in shaping cognition, Shapiro (2019) draws
on empirical sources. Illustrating the first path of the body’s influence,
he cites research which shows that right-handers prefer to interact with
objects on their right side, and left-handers on their left. The idea is that the
increased ease with which people interact with objects on their dominant
side informs their concept of “good” or “preferred” (Casasanto, 2009, 2014).
How would that human preference for one’s dominant hand be translated
to LMS with a functional description such that a handless organism would
exhibit similar cognitive dispositions? Or, as Shapiro (2019) puts it, should
“we expect Adder to prefer objects to its right or its left given that it has
no hands?” (p. 11).
Empirical evidence supports the notion that at least certain acts of
memorizing depend on a special contribution from the body, and we can
divide those into the two pathways distinguished by Shapiro. In terms of
the first way, that of association, research in psychology has uncovered
the relevance of the context-dependence of memory (Smith & Vela, 2001).
One foundational study in this regard showed that divers who memorized
material while under water better recalled those materials while being
under water, while material learned on dry land was better recalled on land
(Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Sutton & Williamson, 2014). In terms of the
second way, we can draw on the idea that the activation of motor plans are
relevant in acts of memorizing, particularly those acts of memory which
involve the unfolding of a sequence. I might, for example, try to remember
my PIN code by, physically or imaginatively, moving my fingers in its
familiar pattern, or recall the order of the alphabet by mouthing parts of it.
Scientific research supports this idea, showing that a specific starting point
and reenactment through bodily movements is involved in the recollection
of interconnected sequences both in musical parts (Ginsborg & Sloboda,
2007; Leman & Maes, 2014; Chaffin, Demos & Logan, 2016) and dance
phrases (Kirsh, 2013; Stevens, Malloch, McKechnie & Steven, 2003). On
this account, humming a tune or moving one’s foot involves the triggering
of the next instance in a sequence, domino-style, by the instantiation of
its predecessor.
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Contextual relevance and the unfolding of familiar patterns are both
distinctive aspects of the memory palace technique. Yates (1966, p. 4)
stresses that the strength with which a memory is triggered depends on
carefully crafted and intense images. Furthermore, the whole environment
of a memory palace may contribute to the act of associative recall, as with
the divers underwater. Similarly, the sequence with which the images
are encountered at the different loci and, as mentioned previously, the
neuroscientific evidence of brain areas normally associated with navigation
activating during the technique together point towards the idea that motor
plans unfold offline during the recall phase (see Section 2.1). Such relations
between the role of the body and the memory palace do not conceive of
“the body as playing an information-processing role in cognition” (Shapiro,
2019, p. 9) and so the LMS, as cast in its familiar functionalist garb, is
unable to adequately capture the memory palace.
For these reasons, we propose to look at an enactivist theory of mind
and memory that is, we argue, better able to explain the special contribution
of the body in acts of remembering. Enactivism understands cognition not
in terms of the processing of information, but in terms of the participation
of an organism in sensorimotor loops of active engagement within the
context of a larger environment (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007).
Evan Thompson (2007), one of enactivism’s main architects, suggests that
remembering is better understood, not as the retrieval of a mental image,
but as the reproduction of a person’s past experience and that it “could
involve emulating earlier sensory experiences and thus reenacting them
in a modified way” (p. 291).
Enactivists of a radical stripe have further developed this line of
thought, casting remembering as a dynamical, re-creative act. Radical
enactivists argue that basic forms of cognition do not involve mental
representations (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017). In line with this research
programme, Daniel Hutto and Anco Peeters (2018) put forward the idea
that procedural memory “can be understood as the capacity to reenact
embodied procedures – often prompted and supported by patterns of
response that are triggered by external phenomena” (p. 105). Rather than
depending on the metaphor of memory as the storage and encoding of
information, a radically enactivist take on procedural memory “would
focus not on access to the contents of a store but on remembering as a
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type of action” (Loader, 2013, p. 168). Familiar patterns of response are
initiated by internal or external triggers. For example, the remembering
of how to prepare a specific meal is triggered by the ingredients and
tools which are available to the cook. These familiar patterns involve the
activation of trained neural configurations, which, according to context and
circumstance, enable specific acts (see Anderson, 2014, 2015). Following a
recipe in order to prepare a meal is, on this account, not the retrieval of
the stored information on that recipe, but the re-enactment of the different
steps required to make dinner according to external signposts (the onion
is glazed) which direct the individual to follow a specific familiar path
(lower the fire).
Procedural memory is in current debates commonly characterized as
not relying on information-processing (Michaelian, Debus & Perrin, 2018),
but enactivism is not limited to accounts of procedural memory per se.
Recently, a number of scholars have proposed that episodic memory centrally involves the construction and consideration of possible past episodes
through simulative imagining (Gerrans & Kennett, 2010; De Brigard, 2014;
Michaelian, 2016). Such proposals assume that episodic acts of remembering, because of their simulative nature, necessarily involve representational
content. Memory theorist Kourken Michaelian (2016), who agrees that
understanding procedural memory need not depend on positing representational content, claims, by contrast, that appealing to contents in the case
of episodic memory is essential. The reason is that episodic memory is declarative: it is available to consciousness and affects behaviour (pp. 27–28).
However, why not allow that episodic memories, like the remembering
of a conversation last week, is an act of, perhaps imperfect, simulative
reconstruction through which a proposition with the content of that conversation is formed and available to consciousness? That this is indicative
of current thinking about memory is shown by Michaelian, who recently
argued that radically enactive remembering aligns well with an emerging
tendency in discussions of philosophical of memory which cast remembering as non-contentful (Michaelian & Sant’Anna, 2019). In following
Hutto and Peeters (2018a), we see no need to assume that all acts of remembering through simulative re-enactment depend on the manipulation
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of informational content. We maintain that acts of memory, such as using
the memory palace, can be explained in a non-representational way.5
Applying an enactive account of memory to the memory palace then
leads us to the following theory. In the remembering phase, the memorizer
would either walk or imagine walking through an appropriate environment, such as the Sydney Opera House, with which she has become intimately familiar through active, bodily exploration. The order of the loci in
the environment ensures that they are sequentially triggered during the
recall phase, but it is up to the memorizer to ensure that the loci are then
associated with the images to be remembered. During the recall phase,
the memorizer will use her imagination to sequentially reconstruct the
environment through the familiar triggers. For example, in the case of
the Sydney Opera House, she would not remember the Opera House as
a whole. Instead, she would reconstruct the relevant features while she
images walking through it, letting the triggers guide her. Because of the
learned association with the images, these images will spring to mind
and can then be used by the memorizer to reconstruct whatever it is she
would like to remember. The previously discussed findings by Dresler et al.
(2017), on the structural rearrangement of neural networks for users of the
memory palace, can then be reinterpreted as the construction of a network
which enables the triggering sequence – in essence, a well-practised user
of the memory palace carries the triggers of its loci with her. The user of
the memory palace is, on the enactive account, not picking up information
5

One might rightly ask how reconstructive or simulative processes of enactive remembering unfold if they are not based on information storage. While this is an important issue
that deserves further elaboration, it is also an open question that needs to be addressed by
enactive approaches to memory in general. A proper discussion of this unfortunately falls
outside the scope of the current paper. As a tentative proposal, we suggest that enactive
remembering involving the previously mentioned processes depend on the sensorimotor
activation of familiar patterns. To illustrate, we refer to how artificial neural networks
can be trained to generate images (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Such networks do not store
specific pixels, but depend on adjusting the signalling strength between nodes during
training. After training they may then activate areas on a pre-given (digital) canvas
and thus generate an image. Similarly, a person, with an adult, developed brain, may be
triggered to think about the Sydney Opera House because of a word read or a sound
heard. This trigger may generate, through many intermediary steps, partial images of
white, rounded domes against the background of water. It may even be that this person
will use her consciousness to help herself generating the memory, for instance, by asking
herself “Are the distinctive white shells of the Sydney Opera House spread across two
or three separate parts of the building?” Naturally, this is a gross simplification, but it
serves as an initial step towards developing a robust enactive account of remembering.
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but reconstructing something resembling that which she was supposed to
originally remember.
Though enactive remembering seems well suited to explain the role
of embodiment in the memory palace while those bodily engagements
are not straightforwardly intelligible in information-processing terms,
extended functionalists may counter with an adjustment to their theory. In
a striking experiment, Wendy Mackay and colleagues (1998) investigated
the adaptation of new electronic air-strips at an airtraffic station. In the late
1990s, traditional paper-made strips contained information about speed
and direction of incoming airplanes and were used as an integral tool in
the safe control of air traffic around Paris. Researchers were tasked to
investigate how the use of such strips could be improved or even replaced
with electronic devices. Initial trials with replacing the paper-based system
with a computer-based one met with resistance by the traffic controllers.
Advocating extended functionalism, Michael Wheeler (2010b) observes
that, from the perspective of an engineer, “one is inclined to focus, naturally
enough, on the information carried by these strips. But this is not the only
contribution of the strips.” (p. 33). It turns out that the strips were used
in ways beyond merely carrying information. For example, they may be
held in the hand as a reminder, placed at an angle to indicate two planes
on a potential collision course, or, supported by the use of a strip-holding
board, afford the signaling of important flight movements through body
language. Wheeler’s analysis is worth quoting in full:
From a practical perspective, this recognition of the noninformational contribution of the flight strips is far from idle.
The testimonial evidence suggests that a number of previous
attempts to introduce new computer technology into air-traffic
control may ultimately have been rejected as unworkable
by the controllers precisely because the proposed replacement
systems attempted to reproduce the straightforwardly informational aspects of the flight strips while ignoring the extra factors.
(Wheeler, 2010b, p. 33, emphasis added.)
Wheeler concludes that “nothing about this story undermines the
extended functionalist line” (p. 33). This implies that the extended functionalist’s story either needs elaboration on the differences between ‘straight-
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foward informational aspects’ (like the writing on the strips) and material
informational factors (like the orientation of the strips), or that it need not
be an information-processing story exclusively. Extended functionalism,
as advanced by Wheeler, can thus allow for the materiality of artefacts,
such as flight strips, to implement cognitive states as well, because it is
neutral with respect to what cognitive states are made of.
Allowing extended functionalism to go beyond merely informationprocessing by recognizing the material roles artefacts play, looks like a
promising move to give a functionalist account of the memory palace.
As Wheeler admits, though, his proposal needs further analysis. We see
two paths which the extended functionalist could take. The first one is
to develop an account which explains the interplay between the informational processing of memories and the role the body plays when walking,
imaginatively or not, through the memory palace. Recall that cognitive
scientists currently explain the memory palace technique as somehow
transforming abstract information units into concrete information patterns. The functionalist needs to provide an explanation of these types
of information, explaining whether or not these are different kinds of
information, and how transformations between the two take shape. While
perhaps not logically impossible, this path seems to lead to conceptually
murky waters (Hutto & Myin, 2013, Ch. 4).
A second path for the extended functionalist is to get rid of informational talk altogether and lean on an embodied approach to the memory
palace which is entirely non-representationalist. This might seem like a
radical move to some philosophers, but it looks like Wheeler is opening
the door to that possibility. And a brief look at the history of functionalism
provides ground for supporting this move. As Gualtiero Piccinini (2010)
argues, functionalism in its purest form is merely the metaphysical claim
that cognitive processes are to be understood as structural organizations
with input and output relations (see also Putnam, 1967).6 It seems that
an extended functionalist account of the memory palace based on bodily
engagement and not on information processing, is a possibility.

6

Not all functionalists might agree with the claim that pure functionalism is merely a
metaphysical claim. However, my aim here is not to present some kind of essential feature
of functionalism, but to trace the genealogy of the extended functionalist line back to its
most general shape, like Piccinini (2010) does.
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Yet, if functionalists surrender their commitment to the informationprocessing framework, then what difference is left between extended
functionalist and enactivist approaches when it comes to explaining the
memory palace? It seems the functionalist’s metaphysical account would,
to the extent to which they could explain techniques such as the memory
palace in terms of bodily engagement, collapse into their competitor theories on enactivism (see Hutto, Peeters & Segundo-Ortin, 2017). Elucidating
the implications of this collapse lies beyond our current argument, but we
would be interested to hear what an adapted extended functionalist story
would offer that our enactivist story does not.
The extended functionalist, then, has two options. Either develop
an information processing account that is not only able to explain how
the body plays its role in the memory palace, but also the transformation
of abstract into concrete information (whatever that may be). Or, she
could surrender her commitment to information-processing altogether and
adopt a fully embodied and non-representational account of the memory
palace which basically collapses into an enactive account. In any case, the
functionalist is currently not in a position to explain the memory palace
while the enactivist is not trapped in a similar dilemma. We conclude
that thinking about the memory palace from an enactivist perspective is
therefore the better option.
We submit that a radically enactive account of memory, which depends on cues and triggers for re-enactment, may act as a clarifying lens
through which to look at mnemonic techniques that centrally involve
interaction between a person and their environment, such as the memory
palace, whether virtual, imagined or otherwise. As we have seen in the
previous section, cognitive scientists currently explain the memory palace
in terms of information encoding and retrieval, which leads to virtual
memory palaces in which the memorizer is a passive participant with only
a superficially strong connection to the used locus. Such operationalizations are better served by an enactivist approach which explains why a
multimodal memorization technique that heavily involves visualisation,
active involvement of a body with an environment, and the reconstruction
of memories is more efficient than learning words from a list. The latter
mnemonic after all, provides less triggers and cues with which to rebuild
memorized items, while the former builds upon such resources and abilit-
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ies for reconstruction which are already in place. Our next step, then, is to
determine which resources and abilities a virtual memory palace needs to
work on.

2.4

Addressing the Operationalization Problem
How can VR technologies support the practice of the memory palace
technique? We propose that VR can support the practice of the memory
palace in at least two ways. First, by supporting the user with a virtual
memory palace inspired by recent discussions in cognitive science, thus
both relieving the user of the need to go to a familiar, physical building
to practise and making sure that the virtual environment evokes those
sensorimotor interactions which resemble traditional memory palace usage. Second, by enhancing the memory palace technique by actually going
beyond that which is feasible through traditional methods, for example by
sharing virtual memory palaces with other users or by supplying the user
with visual cues to improve memorisation. These two notions form the
inspiration for the following operationalization proposal.
As said earlier, deciding on how best to support the memory palace
technique in VR depends on one’s answer to the Explanation Problem. In
contrast to existing operationalizations of the memory palace we argue
for an enactive and re-creative account of remembering. If this argument
strikes true, it has implications for the operationalization of the memory
palace in VR. Specifically, it means that such operationalizations need
to be rethought through the perspective of an embodied cognizer which
takes the movement within and active engagement with her (virtual) environment seriously and moves away from the idea that using the memory
palace is merely a way of reordering and picking up information. In what
follows, we propose that adopting an enactive take on memory will support the practice of the virtual memory palace and that it may help to solve
the Operationalization Problem of current designs. We do so by giving
concrete design recommendations based on this enactive approach.
To move away from the information processing model of the virtual
memory palace, the role of the memorizer needs to be recast from passive
observer to active participant. In order to do so, we will single out two
aspects of current memory palace operationalizations and translate them
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into active, body-engaging modes of interaction: movement of the user,
and the creation and placement of images. As discussed in the previous
section, this translation has to keep in mind the unfolding of sequences
through the activation of motor plans in acts of memory. This requires
active participation of the body.
Regarding the first aspect, instead of the user being moved through a
virtual space passively, we propose that any VR operationalization of the
memory palace ought to depart from the idea that the user is actively moving herself through an environment – say a virtual apartment or cathedral.
This is not only in line with Yates’ (1966) account, which posits the individual moving through the space and engaging with sensori-navigational
cues as an essential part of the technique, but also with the two main
insights gleaned from current memory research as discussed in Section 2.1.
The first is that, at least in some situations, the activation of motor plans
supports remembering – recall the examples on PIN codes, music, and
dance from the previous section. We have argued that the memory palace
is of a similar kind to those examples and thus involves motor activation.
Second, neuroscientific evidence supports the idea that brain areas associated with spatial navigation are involved in the use of the memory palace.
As such, we think approaches where users are either passively moved or
there is no movement at all, do not support the optimal unfolding of a
memory sequence.
Moving on to the second point, the placement of images, we present a
similar line of reasoning. Active participation of the body in the placement
of images in a virtual space would mean that the user should be able to
do two things. First, she should be able to either choose or, preferably,
create personalised images which may represent parts of that which she
wants to memorize. A database in the virtual space, where images can
be stored and retrieved, can support the user friendliness and re-use and
easy adjustment of images. Second, the user should then be able to place
those images in distinct locations in the virtual memory palace. Virtual
reality devices with hand-held controllers that can mimic regular hand
movements seem especially suited for these use-cases.
Now that we have discussed how the memory palace technique could
be translated to VR, by using insights from an enactive approach to cognition to improve movement and image placement, we will present ways
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Figure 2.1: Imaginary virtual memory palace with a suggested locus
highlighted.

of potentially enhancing the virtual memory palace. Is it possible to go
beyond the technique’s traditional limitations? And if so, how?
One way in which to take advantage of computer technology is to
highlight features of the virtual environment in such a way as to support
the user’s needs. In this, we take inspiration from work done by Vicente
Raja and Paco Calvo (2017), who propose a way of looking at augmented
reality based on ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979). In discussing navigational apps, such as Google Maps, they argue that instead of overloading
a user by presenting yet more symbolic information on a screen, for example, by showing a top down map with arrows and numbers, certain
pathways might be emphasised more subtly. For instance, one can imagine
a user wearing smart glasses which brighten those areas that the user
should go, and darken areas the user should avoid. This nudges a user into
the destination she wants to go to. Similarly, we suggest, parts of one’s
virtual memory palace can be highlighted during the learning phase if they
offer a memorable location to carry an image associated with part of what
one wants to remember (see Figure 2.1). Or, also during learning, when
unfolding the sequence of the memory the next part of the sequence in the
virtual space that a user needs to go to can be brightened, visually, as the
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Figure 2.2: The walls in these consecutive images expand in a process
of optic expansion.

next space to move to. So instead of overloading the user with symbolic
information, a virtual environment might support memory performance
by highlighting the relevant affordances this environment offers to the
user (Stoffregen, Bardy & Mantel, 2006).
A second way of enhancing the virtual memory palace concerns
what we dub ‘sensorimotor realism.’ Note that realism here should not
be understood in its common, digitalized meaning: as the photo-realistic
replication of images and textures. Contrary to this, perhaps intuitive,
idea, there is empirical evidence which suggests that familiar sensorimotor
interaction in virtual environments contributes more to the immersion
of the memorizer in her memory palace than high-resolution imagery
(Fink, Foo & Warren, 2009). Sensorimotor interaction in VR further seems
to improve one’s sense of agency, in the sense of experiencing control
over one’s actions and their consequences (Kong, He & Wei, 2017), which
ties in nicely with and supports the previously discussed active bodily
participation.
By sensorimotor realism we mean that a VR device involving movement needs to replicate the kind of sensory patterns we experience when
we move in real life. To illustrate, think of what occurs when you approach
a wall. As you approach the wall, you see how the texture gradients of
the wall radiate from the centre of your visual field, causing the wall to
expand from the perspective of the perceiver (see Figure 2.2). This is commonly described by saying that optic flow is centrifugal in the direction of
locomotion (Chemero, 2009, p. 124). The rate at which optic flow expands
is lawfully correlated to the speed to which we move towards the object –
the wall in this case. By saying that a virtual environment must be sensorimotor realistic we mean that it must echo the sensorimotor experience
we are used to in real life. The optic flow generated while moving towards
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an object in the virtual environment ought to be the same as the one
we get when we do so in real life. Otherwise, our experience of moving
through the virtual space will feel odd and unpleasant (Bubka, Bonato &
Palmisano, 2008), and it will require us to take extra effort to get attuned
to the sensorimotor contingencies of the virtual environment. Ensuring
sensorimotor realism will thus add to the immersiveness of the virtual
memory palace.
Incorporating active bodily participation lies at the heart of our proposal for operationalizing the virtual memory palace. For the translation
of the memory palace to VR, we argued that this requires the user to take
control in the virtual environment. For potentially enhancing the virtual
memory palace, we proposed to make use of sensorimotor guidance that
makes optimal use of the type of interactions the user is already familiar
with.

2.5

New horizons for memory research
Considering the memory palace from an embodied, enactive perspective,
in line with the pragmatic turn in cognitive science, helps in understanding
why current operationalizations of the technique in VR leave much to be
desired. Such operationalizations focus on supporting the picking up of
information by the user, but we have argued that this does not capture
what is at the core of the technique.
Instead, we presented design recommendations for improving the
virtual memory palace, focusing on embodied cognition and affordances.
Smart use of VR devices could make the learning of the memory palace
more accessible and increase the usage of one of the most powerful methods of remembering on offer. Our design recommendations are ready for
implementation. If their adaptation yields better results than current operationalizations, this will have both practical and philosophical implications.
To start with the latter: if virtual memory palaces based on our enactive
proposal work well outside of the head, it would provide a good reason,
by way of abduction, to re-evaluate what is going inside the head. By way
of a reversed parity principle, the enactivist research programme would
have provided an impressive case in point in terms of understanding the

66

CHAPTER 2. MISPLACING MEMORIES IN VIRTUAL REALITY

underpinnings of memory, placing the ball squarely in the functionalist
park.
The practical implications, if our proposal holds true, lie in making
the power of the memory palace more accessible and their advantages are
obvious. Special attention should be given to its potential use in educational settings (Putnam, 2015). We predict that using VR devices to support
learning through the memory palace can greatly enhance learning experiences (in line with: Mäkelä & Löytönen, 2017; Heersmink, 2018). Not
only that, but activities which are traditionally seen as boring, like the
rote learning of words from a foreign language, would potentially become
a lot more fun because of the engaged, bodily interaction. Furthermore,
in classroom settings, both teachers and students can benefit from the
shared experience which VR will allow. Unlike in the traditional technique,
teachers would be able to participate in and give feedback on how their
students utilize the memory palace.
Our proposal, though grounded on available empirical data, requires
more experimentation. Not only to test whether the hypothesized design
recommendations will improve the use of the memory palace, but also to
investigate aspects of the techniques that were hereto hard or impossible
to investigate. The sharing of the same loci, as described in the previous
paragraph is one aspect, but this could be generalized to the investigation
of loci which are not necessarily environmental landmarks as traditionally
imagined. For example, how will moving objects like animals or other
persons affect the technique? What about videos? Virtual realities allow
for plenty of creative freedom and the memory palace is a worthy candidate
for testing the limits of that freedom with respect to successful memory
strategies.
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Abstract
We propose that virtue ethics can be used to address ethical issues central to discussions about sex robots. In particular, we argue virtue ethics is well equipped to
focus on the implications of sex robots for human moral character. Our evaluation
develops in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics as a suitable framework for
the evaluation of human–robot relationships. Second, we show the advantages of
our virtue ethical account of sex robots by comparing it to current instrumentalist
approaches, showing how the former better captures the reciprocal interaction
between robots and their users. Third, we examine how a virtue ethical analysis
of intimate human–robot relationships could inspire the design of robots that
support the cultivation of virtues. We suggest that a sex robot which is equipped
with a consent-module could support the cultivation of compassion when used
in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. Fourth, we discuss the ethical implications
of our analysis for user autonomy and responsibility.

This chapter is published, in a slightly modified form, as: Peeters, A. & Haselager,
P. (2019). Designing virtuous sex robots. International Journal of Social Robotics,
1–12. Online first publication. Anco Peeters is the main author of this chapter,
having authored the first three sections, introduction, and conclusion, and taking
the lead on structuring the argument. Pim Haselager wrote a draft of the fourth
section and Anco Peeters then contributed to it. Both authors contributed to
polishing the text. Pim Haselager permits the inclusion of the chapter in the
present thesis. Footnote 3 was added to link to scientific developments presented
after the publication of the current chapter.

Pim Haselager
November 2, 2019
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Chapter 3
Designing virtuous sex robots
“We need an ethics that does not stare obsessively at the issue
of whether a given technology is morally acceptable but that
looks at the quality of life that is lived with technology.”
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011, p. 156)

Some may find it hard to come to grips with sex robots. Yet recent events,
like the 2015 Campaign Against Sex Robots in the UK, the 2017 publication
of John Danaher and Neil McArthur’s volume on the ethical and societal
implications of robot sex, and the fourth incarnation of the International
Conference on Love and Sex with Robots, show that this topic has captured
the public’s eye and provokes serious academic debate. A recent report by
the Foundation for Responsible Robotics (Sharkey, van Wynsberghe, Robbins & Hancock, 2017) calls for a broad and informed societal discussion
on intimate robotics, because manufacturers are taking initial steps towards building sex robots. We take up this call by applying virtue ethics
to analyse intimate human–robot relationships.
Why should we look at such relationships through the lens of virtue
ethics? Virtue ethics is one of the three main ethical theories on offer
and distinguishes itself by putting human moral character centre stage
– as opposed to the intentions or consequences of actions. Virtue ethics
has been discussed in relation to artificial intelligence more generally
(Wallach & Allen, 2009; Tonkens, 2012). However, virtue ethics has received
relatively little attention in discussions regarding sex with robots, even
though sex robots could have a significant impact on their user’s moral
character. Two main exceptions are Litska Strikwerda (2017), who assesses
69
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arguments against the use of child sex robots, and Robert Sparrow (2017),
who suggests that rape representation by robots could encourage the
cultivation of vices. Our aims are different, as we will not focus on either
child sex robots or robots that play into rape fantasies. Instead, we propose
how virtue ethics can be used to contribute to the potential positive aspects
of intimate human–robot interactions through the cultivation of virtues,
and provide suggestions for the design process of such robots.
We develop our thesis in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics
in relation to other ethical theories and argue that, because of its focus
on the situatedness of human moral character, virtue ethics is in a better
position to assess aspects of intimate human-robot interaction (see also
Vallor, 2016, p. 209). Second, we show how our virtue ethical account fares
better than current instrumentalist approaches to sex robots, such as those
inspired by the seminal and pioneering work of David D. Levy (2007a,
2007b). Such instrumentalist approaches focus too much on the usability
aspects of the interaction and, unjustly, frame sex robots as neutral tools.
Understanding the interaction with a sex robot as mere consumption insufficiently acknowledges the risk of their influence on how humans think
about and act on love and sex. Third, we propose a way to reduce the risks
identified by considering how the cultivation of compassion as a virtue
may help in practising consent-scenarios in therapeutic settings. This way,
we aim to show how, under certain conditions, love and sex with robots
might actually help to enhance human behaviour. Fourth, we examine the
implications our virtue ethical analysis on intimate human–robot relations
may have on our understanding of autonomy and responsibility.

3.1

Virtue ethics and social robotics
Current ethical debates on human–robot interaction are generally not
framed in terms of virtues, but in terms of action outcomes or rules to
be followed. It strikes us as regrettable that up until now, virtue ethics
has received relatively little attention in the literature on social robotics
in general, and on intimate human-robot relations in particular (but see
Abney, 2012; Gips, 1995). A virtue-ethical analysis can help evaluate how,
on the one hand, human agents could make use of love and sex robots in
ways that may be judged to be (un)problematic. On the other hand, virtue

3.1. VIRTUE ETHICS AND SOCIAL ROBOTICS

71

ethics may help to clarify how human behaviour and societal views are
influenced by the use of such robots and thereby help us to learn more
about what it is to be a virtuous person in an intimate relationship. To
establish the potential of virtue ethics for the evaluation of intimate human–
robot relationships, we will examine aspects of virtue ethics relevant to
the current discussion and consider what it has to add compared to other
ethical approaches.
Virtue ethics departs from the idea that the cultivation of human
character is fundamental to questions of morality. In the Western philosophical tradition, Aristotle’s theory of virtue ethics is the most influential
and he defines virtue as an excellent trait of character.1 Such traits, like
honesty, courage and compassion, are stable dispositions to reliably act
in the right way according to the situation one is in. Aristotle describes
a virtue as, in general, the right mean between two extremes (vices). He
states that courage, for example, can be described as the mean between
recklessness and cowardice (Nicomachean Ethics, II.1104a7). Finding the
right middle between extremes is a challenging task and approaching
that middle often requires extensive practice. In addition to practice, acquiring a virtue is helped by instruction from an exemplary teacher. A
virtuous person will have cultivated her character to be disposed to naturally act in the right way in the relevant situation. It should be noted that
although virtues are not about singular acts, acting honestly, courageously
or compassionately may help a person to become honest, courageous or
compassionate. This potential interactive loop, of internalising behaviour
by practice and feedback, motivates our interest in applying virtue ethics
to intimate human-robot interaction.
Consequentialism and deontology are the two main rival theories
to virtue ethics, and they dominate current discussions on the ethics of
social robotics. Consequentialism is the ethical doctrine that takes the
outcome of an action as fundamental to normative questions. Deontology
or duty-based ethics takes the principles motivating an action as central
to matters of morality. Operationalization of these frameworks can take
different forms. For example, in the case of consequentialism, artificial
1

Other influential virtue ethical traditions originated with, for example, Confucius or
Buddhism. For reasons of space, we shall restrict ourselves to a (neo-)Aristotelian account
of virtue, but we suspect that the investigation of other virtue traditions could yield an
interesting intercultural approach to the ethics of social robotics. See also Vallor (2016).
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agents could be programmed to evaluate the potential costs and benefits
of an action (Deng, 2015; Winfield, Blum & Liu, 2014; Sharkey, 2008; Floridi & Sanders, 2004). Or, in the case of deontology, designers may strive
to implement top-level moral rules in agents (Danielson, 1992).2 As consequentialism and deontology provide frameworks that can be translated
relatively straightforward into implementation guidelines, they may be
attractive from a roboticist’s perspective. While we value the contributions
of consequentialist and deontological approaches to the literature on robot
ethics, we think that there are ethical issues which virtue ethics is in a better position to address. Such issues include how, in the words of Shannon
Vallor (2016), advances in social robots are “shaping human habits, skills,
and traits of character for the better, or for worse” (p. 211). Importantly,
this insight supports the idea that robots are not neutral instruments, but
that they may influence the way we think and act. We side, therefore,
with other researchers who recognize that virtue ethics can be a fruitful
framework for AI and robotics (Abney, 2012, p. 37).
There are at least three ways in which virtues (and vices) might
play a role in social robotics. First, we may consider which virtues are or
ought to be involved on the human side of robot design. For instance, is it
desirable that a roboticist exhibits unbiasedness and inclusiveness when
designing a robot? Second, robots may nudge users towards virtuous (or
vicious) behaviour. An exercise robot, for example, can encourage proper
exercise and discipline by giving positive feedback to its user. Third, robots
may exhibit virtues (and vices) through their own behaviour. This can be
illustrated by the Sociable Trash Box robot developed at Michio Okada’s lab
at Toyohashi University of Technology (Yamaji, Miyake, Yoshiike, De Silva
& Okada, 2011): these robots exhibit helpfulness and politeness through
their vocalisations and bowing behaviour when they collaborate with
humans to dispose of trash (see Figure 3.1). So one could focus on the
virtues of the designer, on the way robot behaviour affects the virtues of
a human interacting with it, or on the virtues displayed by the robot, for
instance, as an example to be followed or learned from. We will focus on the
latter two points, but towards the end discuss their implications for design.
2

Isaac Asimov’s famous laws of robotics, often cited as illustration in the ethics of AI
literature, are modelled after deontological formulations of how one ought to act. They
brilliantly showcase the inherent tension between deontological robotic directives and
the potentially disastrous consequences that strict adherence to these might have.
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Figure 3.1: The Sociable Trash Box exhibits helpfulness and politeness
when it requests trash and then bows after receiving it. Reprinted by
permission from Springer Nature: Springer International Journal of Social
Robotics (Yamaji, Miyake, Yoshiike, De Silva & Okada, 2011), © 2019.

We think it is likely that the degree of anthropomorphism (Sparrow, 2002,
2016; Cappuccio, Peeters & MacDonald, 2019; Björling, Rose, Davidson,
Ren & Wong, 2019) will play an important role for especially the second and
third topics. This needs to be further investigated, but for the purposes of
this chapter we will discuss robots that tend towards the anthropomorphic
rather than the more functional end – like conventional sex toys – of the
anthropomorphism spectrum.
In relation to the third aspect, some have said that virtues might be
difficult, or even intractable, to implement in a robot. This idea is motivated
by the complexity of giving general, context-independent definitions of
specific virtues and because an implementation of a virtue like honesty “requires an algorithm for determining whether any given action is honestly
performed” (Allen, Varner & Zinser, 2000, p. 258). Although we acknowledge the specific implementation challenges that virtue ethics brings,
we think these challenges can be addressed by looking at the underlying
mistaken assumption that virtues need to be implemented top-down into
the robot. Analogous to how humans learn to be virtuous not by being
told what to do but by example, implementing virtues into the design of
social robots can take a similar situational approach. For this reason, it
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has been argued that the “virtue-based approach to ethics, especially that
of Aristotle, seems to resonate well with the [...] connectionist approach
to AI. Both seem to emphasize the immediate, the perceptual, the nonsymbolic. Both emphasize development by training rather than by the
teaching of abstract theory” (Gips, 1995, p. 249). This resemblance, we
suggest, can help inspire the implementation of virtues in modern-day
robots. The use of machine learning with artificial neural networks may be
a way of avoiding the need to write an algorithm that specifies what action
needs to be taken when. Virtues that depend on, for example, recognizing
emotions in a human and require an emotional response can be implemented by training a neural network on selected input – say, by analysing
videos of previously screened empathic responses made by humans (as
done by Janssen et al., 2013; Güçlütürk et al., 2017). Through machine
learning, robots could similarly learn to mimic certain behaviours that we
might consider displays of virtue, such as a light touch on the shoulder
to express sympathy.3 The challenging research question here would be
how to operationalize this kind of training so that the robot learns from
human teachers. Such implementations are not trivial, but they need not
be intractable either.
Two potential points of critique need to be addressed before moving
on. The first critique has been voiced by robot ethicist Robert Sparrow
(2017), who argues that sex robots could encourage vicious behaviour,
while at the same time maintaining that he finds it hard to imagine sex
robots could promote virtue. He proposes that if people own sex robots,
they can live out whatever fantasies they have on the robots – even rape.
He argues that repeated fantasizing and repeated exercise of potential
representations of rape will influence one’s character to become more
vicious. Though we agree with Sparrow’s premise that this development
is problematic and deserves careful consideration, we disagree with the
conclusion drawn. While rape representation might be facilitated by sex
robots, this does not mean that the production of such robots need always
be ethically inimical. Let us assume that rape-play between two consenting

3

After the publication of the present chapter, research by Senft, Lemaignan, Baxter, Bartlett
and Belpaeme (2019) has shown how it is possible to teach robots human-like social behaviour through mimicry and machine learning, with the authors specifically mentioning
application of their research in therapeutic scenarios.
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adults is not necessarily morally wrong.4 What is potentially morally
wrong in acting out this scenario, is that it might normalize the associated
repeated behaviour outside of a consensual context – the cultivation of a
vice. This could lead to unwanted degrading behaviour or generalization
to other contexts involving human-human interaction. The same risk of
inappropriate generalization applies to the scenario of the human–robot
interaction. In the case of humans, this means that careful and continuous
communication about what is allowed and what is not is crucial: the
partners have to trust and respect each other in order to safely play out
the fantasy and stay aware of the fact that it is a fantasy. Might a similar
approach be possible to intimate human-robot interactions? We submit
that there are ways to involve consent in the case of intimate human-robot
interaction aimed to prevent the risk Sparrow is drawing attention to,
without condemning the manufacture and use of sex robots in principle.5
It would require us to rethink sex education and the role sex robots can
play in this, which we do in Section 3.3. Interestingly, if one accepts that
sex robots may cultivate vices in humans, it seems possible that such robots
potentially also cultivate virtues.6
A second issue that needs addressing is a more general critique against
virtue ethics. It has been argued that virtue ethics as an ethical theory
is “elitist and overly demanding and, consequently, it is claimed that the
virtuous life plausibly could prove unattainable” (Fröding, 2011, p. 223).
Why propose such a demanding ethical theory for framing human-robot
interaction? First, because virtue ethics can do justice to an assumption we
make, namely that intimate, sexual relations between humans and robots
4

5

6

It is worth noting that on Sparrow’s account one will have to bite the bullet and say that
rape-play by consenting adults is morally wrong as well. Not everyone will be willing to
accept this implication.
Obviously, the consent provided by a robot does not amount to legally binding consent,
just like the rape of a robot would not constitute legal rape, for the simple reason that a
robot is not a legal person and not a sentient being. Hence, we are discussing here the
implications of a robot behaving in a certain way, not necessarily implying the existence
of human-like cognitive, emotional states or identical legal status.
Sparrow (2017) finds it “much less plausible that sustaining kind and loving relationships
with robots can be sufficient to make us virtuous” (p. 473). He acknowledges, however,
that such a claim needs to be supported by an argument as to why virtues are to be held
against a standard different from vices and that this is a topic for further discussion. We
do not share his intuition, though we agree with his latter point and would furthermore
like to add that more empirical data on how human–robot interaction influences human
behaviour is needed – which is one of the motivations for the proposal in Section 3.3 of
the present chapter.
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Consequentialism Deontology

Virtue ethics

Instrumentalism

Fundamental
concept

Action
comes

Moral rule

Virtue

Instrumental
use

Concept
applied

Obtaining
consent
maximizes
well-being for
both parties.

Obtaining consent is in accordance with
the rule: “Do
unto others as
you would be
done by.”

Obtaining consent is compassionate and respectful.

Obtaining
consent is not
necessary, unless required
for obtaining
satisfaction.

out-

Table 3.2: Suppose we compare the multiple approaches in a hypothetical scenario where sexual consent is negotiated, verbal or otherwise,
between two human partners. This table aims to show how such a
scenario can be analysed in the different ways discussed in the present
chapter. This rough distinction should not be taken to mean that, for example, consequentialism cannot talk about virtues. What distinguishes
the different approaches is which concept they take to be central.

should be understood as bi-directional. In this context, bi-directional means
that humans design robots, while the general availability of such robots in
turn may influence human practice of and ideas on intimacy and love. In
contrast, current ways of thinking about intimate human-robot relations
often depart from an instrumental and unidirectional assumption. Such
rival accounts understand these relations as the usage of tools by humans
and see any influence that robots may have on humans as value-neutral.
They are focused on the human perspective and therefore lose sight of
important potential ethical implications of human-robot interaction, as
we will argue in Section 3.2 and as illustrated in Table 3.2. Our assumption
is in line with current developments in cognitive science and philosophy
of technology, which suggest that the cognitive and moral dimensions of
artefact interaction need to be understood from a distributed perspective
that puts equal emphasis on agent and environment (Varela et al., 1991;
Verbeek, 2011; Coeckelbergh, 2012; Di Paolo et al., 2017).
Another and possibly even more exciting reason to engage with virtue
ethics, is that thinking about virtues in relation to robots might actually
help to make virtuous behaviour more attainable. This might be done
through the habit-reinforcing guidance of humans by robots designed to
promote virtuous behaviour: either by robots nudging human behaviour
directly or by robots exhibiting virtues themselves.

3.2. CONTRA INSTRUMENTALIST ACCOUNTS

3.2

77

Contra instrumentalist accounts
Recent discussions on intimate human–robot relations are often informed
by the work of David D. Levy (2007a, 2007b). Levy argues that humans
will have physically realistic, human-like sex with robots and feel deep
emotions for and even fall in love with them. Although we laud the pioneering work Levy has done to open up sex and love with robots for
serious academic discussion, we argue that his framework fails to properly
account for the ethical and social implications involved.
Regarding sex, Levy suggests that, physically speaking, realistic humanlike sex with robots will be possible in the near future. Though Levy paints
a colourful history of the development of sex technologies, discussion of
this is not of prime importance for our argument and we will not examine
it further. For the present discussion, we will assume that the physical
aspects of these robots can be worked out more or less along the lines
which Levy describes. Interestingly, Levy goes so far as to say that “robot sex could become better for many people than sex with humans, as
robots surpass human sexual technique and become capable of satisfying
everyone’s sexual needs” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 249).
Regarding emotions and love, Levy suggests that it is possible that
humans can be attracted to and even fall in love with robots. Without going
into too much unnecessary detail, his argument proceeds in four steps.
First, Levy lists what causes attraction of humans to each other. Second, he
considers how affective relationships between humans and pets develop,
and, third, how such relationships develop between humans and their
virtual pets. Fourth and finally, Levy applies his findings to human–robot
relationships.
Through a careful examination of feelings of bonding and attraction
in humans, Levy comes to the conclusion that humans will likely develop
similar feelings of bonding and attraction for robots. A large role in this
narrative is reserved for the human tendency to anthropomorphize artefacts (see Breazeal, 2002; Sparrow, 2002). He submits that “each and every
one of the main factors that psychologists have found to be the major
causes for humans falling in love with humans, can almost equally apply
to humans falling in love with robots” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 128). It seems
that there are no major hindrances for humans to, at some point in the
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future, fall in love with their robot. We can, in principle, agree, with this
conclusion and it furthermore looks like recent preliminary empirical
evidence supports it (Scheutz & Arnold, 2017).
Obstacles on the path towards the use of love and sex robots are
deemed by Levy to be of a merely practical nature. The robots described
are presented as taking care and recognizing the needs of their human
partner – in terms of the feelings of bonding and attraction he listed
earlier. On several occasions (D. Levy, 2012, 2007a, pp. 219, 233) Levy
compares sex with a robot to masturbation, and uses that comparison as
a reason why robot-sex would prevent cheating on one’s partner (p. 234)
– like in the case of soldiers on a long-term mission. Moreover, Levy
describes this perspective on sex as a kind of “consumption” (D. Levy,
2007a, p. 242). It is for this reason that we characterize accounts such as
Levy’s as ‘instrumentalist.’ Love and sex robots, on such accounts, are
merely tools to be used or products to be consumed. However, we suggest
that such an instrumentalist perspective could lead to practices that provide
cause for concern. Also, we are not convinced that a purely instrumentalist
use of sex robots would make many people “better balanced human beings”
(p. 240).
A first concern is that framing robot-sex as consumption underestimates the potential impact the acceptation of love and sex robots will have
on the way love and sex are perceived. Consider a world where your “robot
will arrive from the factory with these parameters set as you specified, but
it will always be possible to ask for more ardour, more passion, or less,
according to your mood and energy level. At some point it will not even
be necessary to ask, because your robot will, through its relationship with
you, have learned to read your moods and desires and to act accordingly”
(D. Levy, 2007a, p. 129).
Why would people, when such partners are available, be content with
any kind of relationship, emotional or sexual, that would not adhere to
this standard of perfection? Access to these robots would make it tempting
to view relationships as essentially one-directional need-catering and effortless, especially perhaps for adolescents who grow up with such access.
This is not how love and sex at present needs to be or even generally is
conceived, and it goes deeply against the conception of a relationship as
existing between two or more equal persons. Seeing humanoid robots
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capable of emotional and sexual interaction as tools is like being in a
relationship with a slave. There lies an important question at the core
of this issue, specifically on whether there are ways of considering the
relationship between human and robot that are not slave-like. However,
this falls outside the scope of the current chapter (though for a beginning
of an answer to this question, see Cappuccio et al., 2019). In any case, this
comparison illustrates the extent to which Levy’s framework is unidirectional, which is further exemplified by his comparison of robot-sex with
masturbation. Masturbation, at least generally speaking, is a solitary enterprise, and does not reflect the reciprocal interaction that characterizes a
typical sex encounter between two partners.7 Precisely because robot-sex
does not amount to either masturbation or sex between consenting adults,
one needs to address its particular ethical implications.
The second worry is that the instrumentalist approach allows for
downplaying the risk of addiction inherent in interacting with robots that
can perceive and immediately cater to their partner’s every need. Consider
how Levy describes that “robots will be programmable never to fall out of
love with their human, and they will be able to ensure that their human
never falls out of love with them” and “your robot’s emotion detection
system will continuously monitor the level of your affection for it, and as
that level drops, your robot will experiment with changes in behaviour
until its appeal to you has reverted to normal” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 118). This
sounds like the perfect gambling machine, which constantly updates its
rules according to its user’s desires – though these robots are potentially
far more addictive than any currently existing gambling machine. We think
this issue is insufficiently addressed by instrumentalist approaches such as
Levy’s, because, if one thinks of robots as merely neutral tools, as he does,
then any risk of addiction rests solely on the shoulders of the user and not
on a robot or its designers. However, it is an open question whether this is
how robot-sex will be experienced by human users (or their significant
others). Rather, we suggest that robots are not merely neutral tools.
A convincing argument in this regard is provided by Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011), who argues that for instance an obstetric ultrasound is not
merely a neutral tool, a ‘looking glass’ into the womb. Its use raises im7

This also illustrates that robot-sex is not or need not always be wrong. This would be as
extravagant a claim as the suggestion that masturbation is always wrong.
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portant ethical questions, like “What will we do when it looks like our
unborn child has Down syndrome?” or social pressure such as “Why did
you decide to let the child [with Down syndrome] be born, given that you
knew and you could have avoided it?”, or more general societal questions
like “Is it desirable that ultrasonography leads to a rise of abortions because
of less severe defects like a harelip?” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 27). This shows that
the use of obstetric ultrasound influences our moral domain. It is naive to
think that using technologies would not shape our behaviour and societal
practices. Instead, it is better to think about this shaping of behaviour
while designing technology. Similarly, instead of seeing robots as neutral
tools, we should acknowledge that, for instance, robots may evoke more
emotions in us than other tools do, as Matthias Scheutz (2012) suggests.
More importantly perhaps, the design and use of intimate robots presuppose or establish certain practices concerning ‘appropriate intimacy.’ At
the very least, these practices and their underlying assumptions should be
elucidated.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above account. First, humans
and technologies should not be seen as separately existing entities, with
technology providing neutral products for human consumption. Secondly,
ethical analyses are not based on pre-given ideas or criteria, but need to
re-evaluate how human-artefact interaction may be influenced or radically
changed by new technologies. This means that stakeholders participating
in the design of technologies have a responsibility both in considering how
their products will shape human behaviour and reflecting on the ethical
issues that may arise with the use of their product.
On this view, designers are “practical ethicists, using matter rather
than ideas as a medium of morality” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 90). In this framework there is room for the moral aspects of technologies in a pragmatic
context, without it becoming a ‘thou shalt not’-like ethics. A virtue-ethical
approach is exactly what the topic of intimate relations with robots needs,
because interacting with a robot as an artificial partner is, even more so
than with a regular artefact, a relationship which intimately shapes our
own dispositional behaviour and societal views as well. On first sight, Levy
seems open to a more interactive view when he refers to Sherry Turkle,
taking up her line of thought in saying that he “is certain that robots will
transform human notions” including “notions of love and sexuality” (D.
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Levy, 2007a, p. 15). The way Levy discusses situatedness resonates with
the notions that humans and technologies should not be seen as strictly
separate entities and that certain concepts are not pre-given but arise out
of interaction between humans and artefacts. Does that mean Levy has
successfully anticipated critique along the lines we have set out? It does
not.
Although Levy seems sensitive to the two notions mentioned, in practice it is merely a lip-service to interactive human–technology approaches.
His instrumentalist treatment of human–robot relations deals with humans
and robots in terms of isolated atoms with only a one-way connection
between them, from user to robot, without any consideration of the larger
reciprocal interactive effects on behaviour and social practices. He does
not analyse robot-sex in terms of the structures and situatedness he earlier
described. Any instrumentalist framework will focus on the human, subject side of things and portray robots as neutral artefacts to be used. What
Levy describes is a trend of an increasing acceptation of robot sex, not
how it would actually constitute or change (our conceptions of) sex or
intimate relationships. Even if one agrees that masturbation is not cheating
– an open question, likely to be influenced by many contextual factors –
that does not necessarily mean that having sex with a robot will not be
considered as cheating. An intelligent android functions on a distinctively
different level of companionship than, say, a vibrator. More dramatically, if
instrumentalist thinkers on the one hand argue that an intimate relationship with a robot is possible and imply that these kinds of relationships
can be as intense and realistic as intimate relationships between humans,
then they should agree that being intimate with such a robot, while in a
relationship with someone else, could be construed as cheating. At the
very least, one has to concede that robot-sex in such a scenario cannot
simply be equated to masturbation. In other words, even assuming that one
would find it hard to imagine someone being jealous about one’s partner
using a vibrator, one could still imagine jealousy plays a role when one’s
partner engages in sexual activities with a very human-looking and acting
robot.8
8

The Swedish science-fiction television drama Äkta människor (Real humans, 2012) depicts
an example of this when the relationship between Therese (Camilla Larsson) and her
husband turns sour because he grows jealous of her ‘hubot’ – a humanoid robot capable
of exactly the functions Levy discusses. This depiction is fictional of course, but the force
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The analysis we have given shows that instrumentalist approaches
may leave crucial ethical considerations unaddressed. Notions of love and
sex will be changed by the development of humanlike robots. But how will
these notions change? If we can have sex robots which are “always willing,
always ready to please and to satisfy, and totally committed” (D. Levy,
2007a, p. 229), what will that do to the way we view relationships? An
understanding of robot-sex not as instrumental, neutral use of tools, but
as involving a reciprocal interaction between human agents, robots and
their designers is required to develop adequate answers to questions such
as these. This is where virtue ethics can provide a guide for evaluation of
such interactions.

3.3

Consent practice through robots in therapy
In order to investigate how sex robots could make a positive contribution
to human moral character, we draw on virtue ethics for ideas on how
to cultivate virtues and connect those to insights from current empirical
data provided by literature on robotics and psychology. Our aim is to
avoid the problem of cultivating vices through repeated unnegotiated
practice – such as illustrated by Sparrow. Indeed, well designed robots may
create the possibility to actually improve attitudes and behavioural habits
regarding sex. First, consider the human–sex robot rape play scenario again.
Previously, we argued that what is problematic about this scenario is not
the act between consenting adults itself, but the potential normalization
of behaviour it could lead to. For instance, the human participant may
become accustomed to immediate satisfaction of desires through the use
of a human-looking object and might extend the involved behavioural
patterns to objectify other humans.
One way of preventing unwanted behavioural patterns is by providing
sex robots with a module that can initiate a consent scenario. Like consenting humans, a robot and its human partner will have to communicate
carefully about the kind of interaction that will take place and the human
will be confronted by the subject-like appearance and the behaviour of
the robot. And like in a relationship between humans, this communicaof the story at least casts doubt on any outright dismissal of the possibility that humans
will become jealous of robots.
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tion could potentially result in the robot sometimes not consenting and
terminating the interaction. Such interaction with a robot might prevent
the practice of unidirectional behavioural habits and a resulting increased
objectification of other humans.9 This consideration suggests that the potential psychological and behavioural benefits of a consent-module will
make it at least worthy of investigation. One should notice too, however,
that a consent-module may negatively affect the potential economic gains
of sex-robot producers, a consequence that is not our main concern here.
Second, there are potential benefits with respect to sex practice and cultural perception in general in the consent-module, namely in cultivating
the virtue of compassion. Though we focus on compassion for the sake of
limiting the scope of this case study, other virtues, such as respect, likely
ought to play a role in consent-practice as well. We take compassion here
as the ability to care for and open up to another person without losing sight
of one’s own needs and feelings. Virtuous displays of compassion strike
the right balance between care for others and for oneself. Compassion can
motivate a desire to help others and we take it to be related to, though
distinct from, empathy (see Goetz, Keltner & Simon-Thomas, 2010).
A robot equipped with a consent-module could potentially be used to
investigate ways of improving consent practice in general. Often, partners
communicate their willingness to engage in sex through nonverbal cues
(Byers & Heinlein, 1989). Yet, because nonverbal cues can be ambiguous,
miscommunication can and does occur (Abbey, 1991b). In response, some
governmental institutions have advocated the need for active, verbal consent. The practice of active consent has been met by at least two problems.
First, even verbal consent does not necessarily mean that a partner is freely
engaging in sex, because, for example, social pressure or substance abuse
may be involved (Lim & Roloff, 1999). Second, explicit consent has met
with cultural resistance, as men and women generally believe discussing
9

On the other hand, one might argue, as Sparrow does, that a non-consenting robot
could potentially facilitate (the representation of) rape scenarios even more if the human
partner ignores the robot’s consent. We do not have a solution for that problem here
(although, for example, a simple ‘complete close-and-shutdown’ routine might be an
option), but it is a main reason why we later in this chapter suggest to test this kind of
human–robot interaction in a therapeutic setting first, as testing under supervision may
give us new insights on how to potentially deal with issues such as these. In any case, we
are not convinced that this argument is sufficient to not further investigate the potential
benefits of consenting robots.
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consent decreases the chance that sex will occur (Humphreys, 2004). Still,
active consent is seen as a crucial way of combating sexual assault and
rape, for example, at college campuses (Abbey, 1991a; Banyard et al., 2007;
Borges, Banyard & Moynihan, 2008). There is a need to change perceptions
and practice, especially by men (Adams-Curtis & Forbes, 2004), concerning
healthy consent and sexual practices. Virtuous sex robots – supervised
– might help facilitate a much needed cultural change in this regard by
further investigating ways of navigating consent.
The advantage of using sex robots over traditional top-down education is that the robots can provide a kind of embodied training that helps
adolescents in negotiating sexual consent. Interaction with a compassioncultivating sex robot could raise awareness of how these scenarios could
play out and alter behaviour through training. A sex robot which not
only can practise consent scenarios with a human partner, but which can
actually cultivate a virtue like compassion could potentially be used in sex
education and therapy. A robot cannot suffer and so any moral harm during education or training will be minimized. It seems to us that compassion
is a suitable virtue to be practised using sex robots in sex education and
therapy. If successful in clinical trials, such robots can be used to support
a change in perception and behaviour of consensual sex on a larger scale,
and not just with adolescents.
One might be sceptical as to whether robots can facilitate a dependable
long-term change in compassion – both in negative or positive ways. It
seems reasonable not to judge this prematurely, as assessing the long-term
effects of sexual human-robot interactions requires empirical investigation
by sexologists and psychologists. A number of interesting experiments
on the influence of social robots on human behaviour in more general
terms, have been done in the lab of Nicholas Christakis. In one (virtual)
experiment (Shirado & Christakis, 2017), humans were placed into groups
which had to perform a task. Unknown to the participants, these groups
also contained robot agents. The robotic agents were programmed to
make occasional mistakes which adversely influenced group performance.
This behaviour led to the human participants who collaborated directly
with a robot, to become more flexible in finding solutions that benefited
group performance. Similarly, a related experiment (Traeger, Sebo, Jung,
Scassellati & Christakis, 2019) reported that humans who collaborated on
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a task with robots which made occasional mistakes and acknowledged
their mistakes with an apology, became more social, laughing together
more often, and more conversational.
The design of virtuous sex robots requires thinking about a setting
in which to test and apply them. A case study will give the constraints
necessary for the design to be specific and feasible. We further think that
building a robot which can operate in long-term intimate relations in
general first requires at least building a robot which can operate on a
smaller timescale with a specific target audience. Furthermore, it would be
necessary to have the support of supervisors – next to the AI researchers
which should of course also be involved – that have professional training
in psychology or psychiatry. We therefore propose to start with testing
virtuous sex robots in a therapeutic setting.
As the specific target audience or participants, we suggest to consider
persons who have been diagnosed with a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD) as the common medical understanding of NPD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013a) aligns well with the previously given definition
of compassion. We propose to consider NPD patients who are already
within a therapeutic setting, as this means that testing can be done in a
controlled environment, under supervision of professionals in psychiatry,
psychology, and sexology. The robot’s design, testing and development
beforehand should involve these same professionals, especially regarding
the potential effects of a robot’s refusal of certain kinds of interaction.
The anticipated link with compassion can be found in the latest edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).
In it, narcissism is described as a “pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need
for admiration, and lack of empathy” (American Psychiatric Association,
2013a). Nine indicators are listed for narcissistic behaviour, of which the
third, fifth, and sixth are of special interest for us here. Respectively, those
indicators are about the narcissist feeling special, being exploitative in social relations, and lacking empathy. If compassion as a virtue is the golden
mean between two extremes, then it seems that the narcissist, who feels
better than others and is self-obsessed, is at one extreme of the spectrum.10
10

In the spirit of virtue ethics, one could consider Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD)
to be the other extreme on the compassion spectrum (American Psychiatric Association,
2013a):
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We would describe this extreme (or vice) as having the tendency to being
overly involved with oneself. Hence, training the virtue of empathy and
compassion would be most relevant for this focus group. Designing and
evaluating a robot aimed at influencing the behaviour of persons is the
most prominent, and challenging, task to be set. Though there is a lack
of information on successful NPD treatments (Dhawan, Kunik, Oldham
& Coverdale, 2010), there is some preliminary evidence that empathic
treatments of those with NPD have positive effects (Bender, 2012).
Obviously, operationalizing our proposal requires careful testing before the possibility of actual use in training is even considered, as the care
for patients and the safety of those potentially harmed by their conduct
is paramount. One potential worry might be, for example, that people
with narcissistic tendencies become more proficient in their manipulations. Therefore, professionals involved would need to closely monitor
the patients and signal such possible undesired effects. These cautionary
words notwithstanding, the potential support of compassionate robots for
NPD treatments is in line with the aforementioned preliminary evidence
(Bender, 2012) and worth further investigation.
The next step in making the robot ready to teach compassion is
by training it to give basic responses to certain kinds of behaviour. As
proposed before, this could be done by training it on recordings of how
compassionate people respond to different kinds of (inappropriate) behaviour. This means the robot has to recognize at least one extreme on
the compassion spectrum in terms of behaviour of its partner, and has
to perform behaviour appropriate to what it observes. Figuring out what
good identifiers of those extremes are and what responses work best will
need to draw heavily on the expertise of the psychiatrists involved.
Compassion is considered here as the virtue which lies between the
extremes of only caring about oneself, the narcissist, or of only caring
about another person. That means that a robot designed to treat these
kinds of disorders should be able to direct behaviour towards the middle
They are willing to submit to what others want, even if the demands are
unreasonable. Their need to maintain an important bond will often result
in imbalanced or distorted relationships. They may make extraordinary
self-sacrifices or tolerate verbal, physical, or sexual abuse.
It would be interesting to investigate how love and sex robots could be relevant for
training and therapy for members of this group as well.
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of the spectrum, where there can be a healthy focus on both caring for
oneself and caring for others. We suggest that it may be worthwhile to
investigate whether and how such behaviours could be influenced by a
compassionate robot. If this turns out to have promising results, work can
be done on improving the design and expanding the use of such robots for
other settings and for other groups of people.

3.4

Implications of virtuous sex robots
We have striven to demonstrate that virtue ethics provides a useful framework for analysing the implications of sex robots, as well as for making recommendations for the design and application of such robots. We consider
robot-sex as involving and supporting a reciprocal interaction between
human agents and robots instead of as a form of uni-directional instrumental tool use. Applying virtue ethics led us to suggest a consent-module
for sex robots that could support the development or strengthening of
compassion in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. As such, sex robots may
contribute to the cultivation of virtues in humans. However, virtue ethics
does come at a price. In addition to its potential of providing an interesting
perspective on the issues surrounding sex robots, it may also raise new
problems. As an illustration of the latter, we would like to briefly reflect
on two implications of implementing a consent-module. Robots saying
‘no’ towards the human that uses or owns them can lead to at least two
related principled problems and one big practical challenge.
First, robots that refuse to comply with the demands or wishes of
human beings may obstruct a person’s autonomy, for example, as expressed
by someone’s immediate or long-term desires (see for a field study in the
context of service robots for elderly Bedaf, Draper, Gelderblom, Sorell &
de Witte, 2016). Second, there is the threat of a responsibility gap. Finally,
there is the practical challenge of how to design such a consent-module.
We will offer some minor suggestions to address the latter at the end of
this section.
We will illustrate the problem of a user’s autonomy by considering
a simple example in a different context. Imagine a beer robot, a simple
system that keeps a stock of beers cooled and that brings one on demand.
Obviously, at some point this might result in intoxication of the person
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demanding the beer. To what extent should a (‘virtuous’) beer robot be
enabled to refuse the demands for another beer? Even though the consequences of intoxication may be bad for the persons themselves, as long
as no one else or no one else’s property is hurt, one might conclude that it
is an expression of a person’s autonomy to keep the beers coming. It is only
or at least primarily in the context of negative effects for other persons
or legal agents, that one could morally or legally preclude someone from
having their wishes gratified. So, on the one hand, the human should be
in control, but at some point or in certain contexts it could be legitimate
or morally acceptable to limit the amount of control a human may have.
Regarding the responsibility gap, the problem is that when a human
instructs a well-functioning robot to do something, and the robot is programmed to refuse to follow the instructions, all kinds of consequences
may follow from that refusal for which the human, in essence, cannot or
need not be held responsible. This leads to the question: Who would be
responsible or accountable for any damages, psychological or physical,
that may ensue? Of course, problems regarding the consequences of saying
‘no’ are not specific to virtue ethics. Rather, they are a consequence of
any view that implies that robots under certain conditions should refuse
specific instructions. However, this is worth discussing here because our
analysis of virtue ethics leads to proposal of a consent-module, and its
consequences should be noted. In our brief discussion, we will try to focus
as much as possible on the specific nature of the ensuing problems in the
context of sex robots.
In order to address these issues of autonomy and responsibility, we
suggest considering the principle of ‘meaningful human control’. This
principle has been discussed in the contexts of military robots and selfdriving cars. The principle states that ultimately humans should remain in
control and carry (ultimate) responsibility for robot decisions and actions
(Article 36, 2015). However, it is far from clear what this principle amounts
to in practice, that is, what the requirements are for the robot so that it
is capable of enabling this principle. Filippo Santoni de Sio and Jeroen
van den Hoven (2018) indicate that humans merely ‘being in the loop’ or
controlling some parameters may be insufficient for meaningful control if
other parameters turn out to be more relevant to the robot’s use or if the
human lacks enough information to appropriately influence the process.
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In addition, possessing an adequate psychological capacity for (assessing)
appropriate action is required for meaningful control, as is, thirdly, an
adequate (legal) framework for assessing responsibility for consequences.
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven then analyse meaningful control in
terms of John Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s (1998) theory of guidance control. Guidance control is realized when the decisional mechanism leading
up to a particular behaviour is “moderately reason-responsive”, meaning
that in the case of good reasons to act (or not), the agent can understand
these reasons and decide to act (or not), at least in several different relevant contexts. Moreover, the decision-making mechanism should be “the
agent’s own”, in the sense that there are no excusing factors such as being
manipulated, drugged, or disordered.
This, admittedly brief, consideration of meaningful guidance control
provides a criterion that might be useful for the consent-module. It provides
ground to think that when a human does not possess sufficient guidance
control, or, by robot compliance with human instructions, may lose such
control, a robot could be justified in non-compliance. This leads to two
questions that need to be answered before a virtuous sex robot can be
enabled with a consent-module, allowing it to refuse commands:
1. Is the person giving the current command in a state of meaningful
human control?
2. Will complying with the current command lead to a reduction of
meaningful human control, such that (1) is no longer the case?
In relation to the first question, the beer robot could make use of
relatively reliable physiological measurements (like breath or blood analyses), or behavioural observations (like slurred speech or coordination
difficulties). It will be more difficult to figure out which input patterns
might engage the consent-module to generate refusals. Here too, the expertise of psychologists and psychiatrists, in relation to NPD for instance,
is required. The main suggestion here is that a DSM-5 classified disorder
in itself constitutes a reason for at least considering the possibility that the
ability to act reasonably and compassionately might be affected, or that
sound judgement and behavioural control might be impaired. Practically
speaking, it would be relevant to investigate the extent to which data
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acquisition methods related to emotion recognition and sexual harassment
might apply. Among potential indicators one could think of, for example,
the human’s lack of allowing turn-taking in communication, tone of voice
and body posture, neglect of robotic non-verbal signals of non-interest,
and so on (see, e.g., Miranda, Canabal, Portela García & Lopez-Ongil, 2011;
Rituerto-González, Mínguez-Sánchez, Gallardo-Antolín & Peláez-Moreno,
2019). As a second step, investigations regarding the applicability of machine learning techniques are relevant (e.g., Fernandes, Cardoso & Astrup,
2018).
The second question points to a difference between the case of the
beer robot and the virtuous sex robot. In case of the beer robot, a prediction
about the intoxication can be made on the basis of physiological variables.
Given certain physiological aspects, the time course of the intoxication
can be inferred with reasonable, and legally satisfactory, certainty. An intoxication level close to life-threatening alcohol-poisoning, just to mention
a relatively clear case, could result in justifiable robot non-compliance.
However, in the case of the virtuous sex robot such a prediction about
the consequences of (non-)compliance is not as straightforward. For this
reason too, it bears emphasis that we are suggesting the investigation of
the consent-module within clinical contexts. Assuming, for the moment,
agreement regarding the appropriateness of a robot’s non-compliance
in certain situations, there is still a further question about how the noncompliance should be put into effect. We just mention a few possibilities
here. One option is that a robot may refuse to comply, provide an explanation in terms of its assessment of the potential negative consequences,
and provide information aimed at improved self-understanding and selfcontrol. Ideally, this could result in a retraction of the instruction given.
Another option may be that the robot refuses and informs a support group
of, say, significant others or therapists. A more extreme option would be
that the robot refuses and stops functioning altogether, by way of an emergency close-and-shutdown operation. Finally, it is worth noting that we
may need to stretch our concepts of autonomy and responsibility beyond
the individual and recast them in terms of open-ended and ecological processes (see Clark, 2007). Unfortunately, picking up this topic lies beyond
the scope of the present chapter.
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Undoubtedly, many other issues and ways of addressing them surround the notion of a consent-module. We have explicated the present ones
to emphasize that virtue ethics does not provide easy solutions. Rather, it
opens up a research domain in itself, one that comes with its own set of
promises and difficulties that will need to be addressed.

3.5

Next design steps
The field of robotics advances rapidly and robot ethics ought to keep up. In
the foreseeable future, there will be robots advanced enough to evoke, even
if only for a few minutes, the experience in humans that they are interacting
with another human being. Unless a ban is implemented (Richardson,
2016), which we do not want to rule out, it is likely that love and sex
relationships with robots will be formed. How can we best understand
and evaluate such relationships? We have taken some initial steps towards
answering this question by arguing that virtue ethics is better suited than
instrumentalist approaches to evaluate the subtleties of intimate humanrobot relationships. Next steps should involve careful testing and with this
in mind we have outlined how testing a consent-module for robots in a
therapeutic setting may yield useful insights. Importantly, implications
for user autonomy and responsibility should remain in focus of future
research.
Some challenges are anticipated. First, the misuse of sex robots could
have a lasting impression on an adolescent learning about intimate relationships, but there is also a positive side to developing realistic looking
and acting love robots. Such robots could train people how to behave confidently and respectfully in intimate relationships. In a therapeutic setting,
such robots could be used to improve empathy or increase self-love in
persons with respectively narcissistic or dependent personality disorders.
Another challenge is society’s response to sex robots. It is difficult if
not impossible to predict how our conceptions of love and sex will change
with the introduction of love robots. One risk here is that a potential
societal taboo on love and sex with robots would lead to fringe behaviours
and scenes, similar to the domain of drugs and prostitution. It is therefore
important that the topic of sex-robots, challenging, exciting, or revolting
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as it may appear to different parties, remains open for investigation and
discussion.
The implications of developing love and sex robots are potentially
huge and we have striven to tentatively chart one path, a virtue theoretical
approach, within this domain. Advances in other robotic fields, like care
robots or military robots, might have analogous implications. In these
areas too, we should avoid the mistake of assuming that robots will not
change the way we view healthcare and warfare. On the contrary, we
need to consider and assess which of these changes would be desirable or
should be avoided. In any case, we would do well to avoid the suggestion
that all these developments are necessarily bad. We suggest that there is
the possibility, worthy to be investigated, that some changes might be for
the good. When we realize that the way we design and use such robots
is bound to affect us, we can think about ways of improving ourselves
through the technology, by careful consideration and monitoring.
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Abstract
Recent discussions in the ethics of technology consider the effects that technological artefacts may have on the cultivation of virtue. In social robotics in
particular, some have proposed that designing robots to behave virtuously could
support human moral flourishing. But accounts of this sort are vulnerable to
several critiques regarding both practical wisdom and the prominent influence of
situational factors on virtue. In this paper, I respond to such worries by showing
how robots may indeed contribute to virtue. I first evaluate a prominent argument
that practical wisdom a priori prohibits virtuous interactions with social robots
and find it wanting. Then I consider a recent critique from situationists that
specifically targets practical wisdom, from which result two potential issues for
virtuous robots. I resolve these issues by developing an account of how we can
self-program our practical reasoning and by arguing that an enactive account of
self best serves recent attempts at extending virtue. The paper concludes with
considering the implications of the present investigation on social robots for
technological artefacts in general.

This chapter is in preparation for publication as: Peeters, A. (in preparation-c).
Virtues, robots, and the enactive self..
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Chapter 4
Virtues, robots, and the
enactive self
“In order to know virtue, we must first acquaint ourselves with vice.”
Marquis de Sade

Daring new arguments in virtue ethics have provided reasons for thinking
that artefacts might help human beings to acquire and maintain virtues
(Skorburg, 2019, p. 2344). These arguments depend, in part, on connecting
two parallel developments in distinct branches of philosophy. In philosophy of mind and cognition, the debate on extended cognition has made
plausible the idea that part of our cognitive processes are constituted outside our physical body. In ethics and moral psychology, the situationist
challenge to virtue ethics has put pressure on the traditional notion that
moral character only depends on robust internal dispositions in agents.
Combining insights from both debates, some virtue theorists have developed new and provocative arguments in favour of the idea that virtues
are, sometimes, constituted not only by individual agents, but also by
environmental factors (Alfano & Skorburg, 2017; Howell, 2016; Alfano,
2014). Given the ubiquity of technological artefacts and their increasingly
invisible yet present influence on our daily lives (Aydin, González Woge &
Verbeek, 2019), more consideration of artefactual influences on virtue and
vice is prudent.
In this paper, I examine the virtue ethical status of artefacts within the
context of social robotics. There are two incentives for this choice. First,
recent discussions in roboethics have specifically targeted the cultivation
95
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of virtue and vice in human agents through interactions with social robots
(e.g., Sparrow, 2019, 2017; Peeters & Haselager, 2019; Coghlan, Vetere, Waycott & Neves, 2019; Strikwerda, 2017; de Graaf, 2016; Vallor, 2016). These
discussions may benefit from an updated look on virtue theory. Second,
among the artefacts with which we engage, social robots have a unique
status because of their anthropomorphic aspects combined with their capacity for semi-autonomous operation (Cappuccio et al., 2019; Scheutz,
2012). This status enhances their potential impact on our moral behaviour
and makes robots of particular interest for philosophical reflection. I aim
to establish that robots are suitable artefacts for the cultivation of virtue
by drawing on the embodied, enactive cognitive framework.
My argument develops as follows. In section 4.1, I present recent
discussions on virtue and vice in relation to social robots. I argue that virtue
ethics is a useful framework when evaluating human-robot interaction
and provides reasons for thinking that robots may not only negatively, but
also positively contribute to character education. This discussion largely
revolves around the virtue theoretical notion of practical wisdom, which
has been specifically targeted by some prominent situationists (Merritt,
Doris & Harman, 2010). I examine this critique as it applies to social
robotics in depth in section 4.2, concluding that this situationist challenge
to practical wisdom leads to two tensions that need to be resolved.
The first tension takes the form of a paradox. On the one hand, situationists challenge the traditional idea of practical wisdom as causally
effective. This depends on empirical research that support the idea that
consciously deciding that one will do better next time has in most, if not
all, cases no effect on changing one’s behaviour. On the other hand, they
need to assume the causal efficacy of practical wisdom to some extent
in their suggestion that human beings need to be more aware of their
social surroundings. After all, how else than through the application of
practical wisdom would one decide and carry out that hanging out with an
old friend who is a bad influence is no longer a good plan? Resolving this
tension is the aim of section 4.3, where I examine the empirical findings
that this argument depends on. I argue the argument is vulnerable to the
objection that only a particular kind of deliberative reflection is considered
while the psychological literature paints a richer empirical canvas. It may
ultimately be the case that there is a form of practical wisdom that is caus-
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ally efficacious while acknowledging the force of the situationist challenge
for particular contextual structures.
The second tension involves the idea that if human agents depend on
robots for acquiring and maintaining virtue, those human agents cannot
be said to actually be virtuous. I argue, in section 4.4, that, although such
a critique could seem viable against traditional agent-based accounts of
virtue, a reconsideration of the self from an embodied, enactive perspective gives reason to think that certain artefacts, including robots, can be
considered to partly constitute a person’s self. To establish this, I defend
an enactivist account of cognition and discuss recent attempts at combining insights from extended cognition and situationism (Skorburg, 2019;
Alfano & Skorburg, 2017; Alfano, 2014). I argue that such accounts are
better served by an enactivist cognitive framework than a functionalist
one. By resolving this second tension, I provide an embodied, enactive
perspective on virtue cultivation through social robots and contribute to
the consideration of how artefacts more generally may be said to bear
virtue.

4.1

Arguments for and against virtue cultivation
How would social robots contribute to the cultivation of a moral character? In answering this question, I propose to first go some way into the
opposite direction, namely, by looking at how social robots may detract
from the cultivation of moral character. If we understand how some types
of interaction with robots can lead to vicious character traits, then we are
in a good position to develop a positive, virtuous account. Before I do this
though, we first need to have an ethical theory which provides us with
the tools required to ground these concepts.
The way moral character is shaped and why it is relevant to answering ethical questions is of central concern to virtue ethics. For the virtue
ethicist, an understanding of moral character is required to answer the
question “What kind of person ought I to be?” Different theorists give
different answers to this question, but for Aristotle, to whom many contemporary accounts of virtue ethics pay tribute, the answer lies in having
an excellent moral character. Being of excellent moral character means
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that one is disposed to behave virtuously. This is why virtue lies at the
heart of moral character for virtue ethicists.
In the philosophical literature, a virtue is often, in line with Aristotle
(NE II.2 1106b36–1107a3), understood as the mean state between two
extremes or vices. In this vein, virtues and vices are to be understood
not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to specific, concrete
situations. For example, I may understand the virtue of confidence as being
the right mean between the vices of boastfulness and self-deprecation.
In the situation of a job interview, were I a person of excellent character
exhibiting confidence, I should not only present my skills and knowledge
without claiming I have done things or can do things which I cannot,
but also without being overly modest – indeed, I would behave this way
without even considering otherwise. In a different situation though, such as
when I would be a comedian making jokes, some display of self-deprecation
may be perfectly fine. The point is that the virtuous person is disposed to,
almost reflexively, behave appropriate to the situation at hand.
How does one become a virtuous person? Answering this question
is hard, not in the least because the psychological development of virtue
has received little recent attention (Sanderse, 2015). Some steps have been
made, particularly by Wouter Sanderse (2012) and Kristján Kristjánsson
(2015), towards the development of philosophically informed psychological
models of virtue education.1 Though such models are work in progress,
authors debating them agree on the importance of two aspects of virtue
education: the repeated practice of virtue and the availability of virtuous
exemplars or mentors. Virtue ethicists recognise that practising and seeing
examples of virtuous behaviour by others will help a person find the right
middle between vices. Becoming virtuous is hard and a supportive social,
political, and educational environment helps make this process easier
(Aristotle, NE IX.9). Analogously, a person who practises vice and has
vicious exemplars, may likely cultivate a vicious character.

1

I focus here on (neo-)Aristotelian accounts of virtue development, as these are, as far
as I am aware, the most psychologically and empirically informed of the virtue ethical
accounts. There is some debate about just how Aristotelian such accounts are, but such
considerations lie beyond the scope of the current paper (for further discussion see
Curren, 2016). That being said, further analysis of these issues could be strengthened by
including other virtue traditions, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, as Vallor (2016)
does.
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Some ethicists have argued that social robots could cultivate vices.
In the context of sex robots for example, Robert Sparrow (2017) claims
that the use of human-looking sex robots which are designed to initially
resist advances – or which engage in a raping scenario – and that finding
pleasure in such actions, will contribute to having “a vicious disposition”
(p. 473). Curiously, Sparrow does not find it plausible that kind or loving
interactions with (sex) robots might similarly lead to the cultivation of
virtues. His reasoning is based on two intuitions. First, he expresses scepticism about the idea that fantasising about good deeds would make us
good, claiming that sustaining “kind and loving relationships with robots”
(p. 473) are a kind of fantasy. Second, Sparrow finds it problematic that
robots would encourage users to falsely attribute thoughts and emotions
to them as a way of eliciting the right behaviour. He concludes that these
intuitions might be grounded by the idea that virtue is harder to attain
than vice, because “virtue is more closely associated with action than is
vice, which may sometimes be at least partially determined by patterns of
emotional responses” (p. 474).
In a more recent paper, Sparrow (2019) elaborates on his intuition
that our interactions with robots may contribute to vice but not to virtue.
To start with, he makes a strategic decision, namely to develop an argument that does not hinge on any empirical claims regarding behavioural
transference of vicious or virtuous actions from one situation to another.
In other words, Sparrow aims at articulating why vicious behaviour towards robots is vicious in itself, and not because I might transfer such
behaviour to my interactions with human or other animals. This strategic
move is motivated by Sparrow’s desire to avoid getting mired in discussions similar to those had about playing violent videogames. On the one
hand, some argue that playing such games leads people to become more
violent in other situations as well, while, on the other, there are those who
argue that these games actually lead to players ‘blowing off steam,’ thus
becoming less violent, or that, at most, there is no causal effect. Empirical
research has so far not been able to settle this debate and Sparrow suspects
it may similarly take long for discussions on human–robot interaction to
be settled empirically.
In order to argue for the claim that our interactions with robots can
render us vicious but not virtuous Sparrow (2019) takes up the meaning of
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vice and virtue in a narrow sense. He wields a narrow definition of vice
and virtue in order to avoid resorting to claims about the “causal powers of
robots” (p. 5). These causal powers pick out the idea that vicious or virtuous
behaviour towards a robot might translate to other context, including with
humans. First, vice and virtue are said by Sparrow to be constituted, at
least in part, by “characteristic thoughts, emotions, fantasies” (p. 5). He
then develops a case for his intuition that, for example, treating a robot
pet cruelly may be a genuine display of vice, while engaging affectionately
with a robot pet cannot demonstrate genuine kindness, by drawing on
an asymmetry between vice and virtue. This asymmetry leans on two
pillars: first is the premise that “there are more ways to be vicious than
virtuous” (p. 7). By this Sparrow means that one can fail in many ways
while setting out to accomplish something (like teaching), while there are
only a limited number of ways in which one can be doing something in an
exemplary way. Second is the premise that virtue requires a measure of
practical wisdom which precludes genuine virtuosity in our interactions
with robots. I will return to the idea of practical wisdom shortly and will
first focus on the first premise. While I am inclined to agree with Sparrow
that virtue, in general, is harder than vice because there are more ways
to be unsuccessful at doing things than there are at being successful, this
does not prevent our interactions with robots from contributing to virtue.
At most, granting this point allows that it will be harder to show that
engaging with robots contributes to virtue than it is for vice.
The second explanation of the asymmetry between vice and virtue,
on practical wisdom, requires more consideration. In the Aristotelian
tradition, a practically wise person knows how to be virtuous in “the
concrete circumstances of everyday life” (Sanderse, 2012, p. 87). ‘Practical’
here is to be contrasted with ‘theoretical’, where knowledge of the latter
signals knowledge of general truths such as those about mathematical
relations, while the former is about concrete and particular situations
(Carr, 1991, p. 57). A person of practical wisdom will see a new situation,
in the words of Martha Nussbaum (2001), as “an occasion for courage, for
generous giving, for justice” (p. 306, drawing on Aristotle NE, 1142a12–
1143b14), because she recognises the need to practise such virtues if she is
concerned with internalizing and embodying them. Now, Sparrow (2019)
argues that because in order to have practical wisdom one must know
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about how the world works, a practically wise person would know that
“[r]obots are not appropriate objects of kindness or cruelty as they don’t
feel anything” (p. 8).
Taking the idea of practical wisdom seriously demands that one is
sensitive to the particular conditions of any concrete situation. This motivates some scepticism against Sparrow’s (2019) blanket statement that
there is “nothing” (p. 8) virtuous in kindness towards a robot. He provides
one exception to this claim and this involves cases of genuine confusion
about whether the robot part of the interaction might actually be an animal
or a human. Such cases might arise when we are able to create robots
that are realistic enough to fool humans – though we certainly have not
yet reached the level of technology to be able to do so for a sustained
amount of time. It seems to me that there are many more situations of
human–robot interaction where the particulars of the situation allows
for virtuous behaviour and, indeed, would demand it of the practically
wise person. I will discuss some cases in more detail later on, but for now
we may consider any situations where both robot pets, children, and an
adult is involved. It seems to me clear that it would be better if the adult
behaves kindly towards the robot pets in order to teach the children about
kindness (or at least, to prevent more vicious behaviours). More of these
situations reveal themselves when two confusions about practical wisdom
in Sparrow’s account are elucidated.
The first confusion about practical wisdom stems from Sparrow’s
desire to divorce his virtue ethical analysis from any discussion about the
causal powers – or lack thereof – that our interactions with robots might
have. I am sympathetic to his point that, at least for the time being (p. 5), it
is worth looking at alternative accounts of vice and virtue in human–robot
interaction in order to avoid getting the debate bogged down by the current
lack of consensus on the empirical data. But in his zeal to move beyond
the causal powers of robots being able to influence our behaviour in other,
future situations, Sparrow advances an account of practical wisdom that,
I would argue, does not align with how it is generally understood and
even is directly at odds with the central tennets of standard Aristotelian
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approaches to virtue ethics – approaches which Sparrow seems inclined
to follow given his reliance on practical wisdom.2
Heeding our previous discussion of practical wisdom, it should be
clear that the idea of practical wisdom entails that virtue is to be affirmed
and practised in new situations. Recall Nussbaum (2001) stating that the
practical wise person sees such situations as occasions for virtue. The
reason, or at least one of the reasons, for characterising situations with a
moral dimension as an opportunity for virtue is that virtue is precisely only
learnt through doing. As David Carr (1991) confirms: “Aristotle speaks of
the acquisition of virtue in the very homely, familiar and quite unmysterious terms of the learning of a practical skill” (p. 50; see also Jimenez,
2016). This intimate connection between virtue and practise casts doubt
on Sparrow’s attempt to say that a person of practical wisdom could not
display a virtue, such as kindness, by being kind to a robot, if we see this act
as an expression of virtue and virtue practise. Though action and emotion
(like feeling pleasure in being kind) can be thought apart, they cannot be
separated in concrete acts and therefore “any strict distinction between the
two corresponding dispositions is not useful” (Sanderse, 2012, p. 84). Even
for a person who already is truly virtuous – assuming this is a possibility –
there is reason to view interactions with robots as opportunities for virtue
practise. To borrow an elegant metaphor from Sanderse (2012, p. 114):
attaining virtue is not so much like reaching the finish line as a racing
cyclist, as it is moving with a finish that moves with you as you approach
it. Thus it seems incongruous with the very idea of virtue to judge acts
in human–robot interaction as completely separate from their potentially
disposition-altering powers.
The second misconception underlying Sparrow’s account of practical
wisdom is the assumption that only agents with the capacity for emotions
and (or?) a phenomenological consciousness deserve the status of being
worthy of kindness and related virtues. There may be many situations
which can call on me to be kind even though the recipient of my kindness
may not possess the functioning cognitive machinery to appreciate my
efforts. Imagine a mortician preparing a corpse in the morgue, or a doctor
examining a brain-dead patient. Both corpse and patient would be unable
2

Main rival virtue theories such as agent-based (Slote, 2001, 2010) and pluralistic (Swanton,
2003) accounts do not necessarily rely on practical wisdom.
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to enjoy any display of kindness or other virtue their respective partner
shows towards them. Yet, a kind, caring, and respectful mortician seems
to be more virtuous than one who treats the corpse as just a slab of meat.
A similar point can be made for the doctor and her patient.
Granted, corpses and brain-dead patients are not robots: they differ
in at least one potentially relevant way, which is that the former two could
once feel emotions and possessed a subjective perspective on the world.
My aim is not to equate former persons to robots in that respect. However, I
would like to argue that corpses and brain-dead patients deserve kindness
and respect not for their own sake, but for the sake of the social web
that they are still a part of. For robots, then, the social web that they are
part of should be taken into account, even if the robots themselves were
unaware of how they are being treated. This is perhaps shown most easily
in situations where other people, in particular children, participate as
well. Within the context of such situations, where the acting party may
in some sense be taken to be setting an example, it is better to behave
virtuously in interactions with robots and, indeed, to call such acts virtuous
in themselves, if one wants to take into account the presence of others and
the influence one’s acts might have on them. It is because of the potential
relevance of the social web that human–robot interactions take place in,
as well as the tight connection between virtue and practise, that I remain
unconvinced by Sparrow’s argument against virtuous acts with or against
robots.
What does my analysis reveal about virtuous acts in interactions
between humans and robots, and the role of practical wisdom in such
interactions? Let us, for the sake of the argument, allow that Sparrow is
right and that there is an asymmetry between vice and virtue. I will then
say that acts with robots are more easily called vicious than virtuous –
though many such acts may just be inadequate or inappropriate instead
of truly vile. However, this does not bar us from saying that a practically
wise person may potentially act virtuously in scenarios of human–robot
interaction when context allows or calls for it. A person of practical wisdom
will see instances of human–robot interaction as occasions for virtuous
behaviour in so far such situations relate to relevant social contexts. But
before I can turn to a more positive account of practical wisdom in our
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engagements with robots, I will first discuss recent situationist critiques
against virtue ethics, particularly those on practical wisdom.

4.2

The situationist paradox of practical wisdom
In the last two decades, the empirical viability of virtue as a stable character
disposition has been hotly disputed by philosophers and psychologists.
Though both disciplines had been working on virtue and character largely
separately for most of the last century, the “emerging enthusiasm for virtue
in philosophy was bound to clash with the emerging skepticism about
character in psychology” (Prinz, 2009, p. 118). This clash is epitomized
by the claim that moral behaviour is largely dependent on situational
factors and that this undermines the notion of stable character traits, such
as virtues, as central to moral acts (Harman, 1999; Doris, 1998, 2002). To
support this claim, critics draw on a wealth of empirical findings from
social psychology which supports the idea that moral behaviour is for
many people, on average, largely dependent on context and circumstance.
I do not aim to recapitulate the situationist debate here. Instead, I will, in
this section, discuss the situationist critique on practical wisdom and how
it bears on virtue cultivation through social robots, before, in the next two
sections, developing a two-pronged response to this critique.
Within the context of virtue cultivation the situationist challenge
is credited with two main contributions (Kristjánsson, 2015, p. 58). First,
it has urged virtue ethicists to consider a more nuanced approach to
behaviour as depending on both character and environment. Second, it
raised awareness to the idea that a student of virtue would be wise to
approach unfamiliar situations with caution as they may lead to unfamiliar
responses. Not all situationist contributions have been so readily integrated
into contemporary virtue theories and recent discussions have shed a
critical light on the role of practical wisdom.
In their recent review chapter, prominent situationists Maria Merritt,
John Doris and Gilbert Harman (2010) not only present an overview of
the situationist debate but also look specifically at its implications for the
idea of practical wisdom. The main critique against virtue ethics advanced
by the authors is that what people predict they would do under moral
pressure does not align with their actual behaviour in such situations.
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Examples include the Milgram obedience experiments where, under stress
of authority, participants applied electric shocks to unseen crying and
begging victims in a nearby room (Milgram, 1974) and the Stanford Prison
experiment, where students role-playing as guards began to abuse students
role-playing as inmates (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 2007).
In both types of situations, participants were pushed to act in a way they
previously thought themselves incapable of. But even in less extreme
circumstances can moral behaviour be affected. An occurrence as minute
as the finding of a coin can apparently be enough to make it 22 times more
likely that a person will assist a stranger (Darley & Batson, 1973). Merritt,
Doris and Harman use these and others cases to support their thesis that
there is a mismatch between what people say they would do and actually
do and dub this the incongruency problem.
It must be noted that a number of the experiments just presented have
recently been called into question. Some rely on the so-called ‘priming’
paradigm, which has been heavily criticised in discussions concerning the
ongoing replication crisis in psychology (see, e.g., Doyen, Klein, Pichon &
Cleeremans, 2012). A similar critique can be made against the ‘bystandereffect’, the proposal that a person is less likely to help someone in need
when other people are present than when alone (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Though Merritt et al. (2010, p. 373) cite this study in support of their
argument, in fact a recent international study finds that in 90% of the
cases at least one bystander, and usually more, does intervene (Philpot,
Liebst, Levine, Bernasco & Lindegaard, 2019). Enough experiments remain
uncontroversial, however, to cast doubt on the notion that reflection is
supposed to straightforwardly affect actual action outcomes.
It will come as no surprise that this evidence is marshalled to call the
empirical adequacy of ‘moral reasoning’ into question (Merritt et al., 2010,
pp. 369, 375), and thus dislodge practical wisdom from its position as a
governor of virtue. After all, it is hard to advocate virtue ethics has a strong
claim on psychological realism when it turns out that in many moral cases
people do not do what they say they would do. Taking a cue from the
obedience experiments: the conviction that it is not right to electrically
shock other people at lethal levels, does not, in the majority of cases,
translate to a corresponding behaviour under duress of authority. Thus
the authors conclude that to “the extent that incongruency is pervasive,
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it renders the virtue-ethical model of practical rationality problematic”
(p. 378). One of the main issues they single out is that the empirical evidence
they present shows that humans often just are not open to the plights
of other people. This “breakdown of other-oriented attention” (p. 371)
occurs under duress of nearby authority figures, such as in the Milgram
experiments. In all, the incongruency between moral reflection and moral
action resulting from this breakdown propels the authors’ argument to
conclude that practical wisdom is not an empirically sound notion.
Though Merritt et al. (2010) argue that reflective deliberation will
not be sufficient for agents to improve their moral behaviour, they do
offer another potential way forward. Their suggestion is to set up one’s
social environment in such a way that attention directed towards others
will not be overruled by contextual pressures or even that attention is
bolstered by supporting circumstances. For this they reach again towards
the Milgram (1974) experiments. In the original experiments, there were
different scenarios. The scenarios which have been embedded into the
shared consciousness of academia are the ones where an unchallenged
authority figure directed the participants into applying ever increasing
levels of electrical shocks to a supposed victim in another room. In other
variations, however, the authority of the experimenter is undermined.
This is done, for instance, through decreasing the social distance between
experimenter and participant by placing both in a learner role, or, in
another example, by having the experimenter being challenged by another
experimenter. Both of these variations saw an overwhelming majority of
participants refusing to obey the given instructions, in some cases even
rushing towards the supposed victim to help release them. Inspired by
these alternative scenarios in the Milgram experiments, Merritt et al. (2010)
subsequently propose that persons enmesh themselves in social webs that
support the training of desired responses to certain situations (p. 389).
Two tensions are brought to the fore by the proposal to remedy a loss
of faith in practical wisdom through a strong reliance on “environmental
factors such as interpersonal relationships, social and organizational settings, and institutional structures” (p. 392). First, as Sanderse (2012, p. 100)
notes, is the issue that embedding oneself in the right social structures to
form the desired sensitivity to other people’s needs assumes precisely the
kind of practical wisdom which the authors want to reject. The authors
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seem to partially acknowledge this when they summarise that “there is
still an important role for the strategic application of individual powers of
deliberation, self-monitoring, and self-control” (p. 392) while maintaining
that such deliberation needs to be supplemented with an awareness of the
interplay between cognitive processes and their environment. Yet this conclusion is strangely at odds with the authors’ critique of practical wisdom.
How can one simultaneously hold that practical wisdom is empirically
inadequate while proposing that we need to deliberate on the social webs
we live in? After all, such deliberation requires the very kind of practical
wisdom that is denied. I will propose a way to reconcile these seemingly
mutually exclusive statements in section 4.3 by an appeal to a distinction
in different types of intentions. The upshot of my proposal will be that
there is no reason not to include other environmental factors in our social
web, such as robots, once this obstacle is overcome.
Traditional virtue ethicists will likely find the argument by Merritt
et al. (2010) to be too inclusive regarding external moral assistance, thus
revealing the second tension. Relying on external factors for one’s moral
behaviour might seem a promising pragmatic solution to counteract the
aforementioned incongruency between conscience and action, but it runs
counter to the virtue-theoretical ideal of a having a robust moral character,
as indeed the situationists argue. Adding social robots to the mix will not
mitigate this issue unless this tension is also resolved. Resolving the issue is
indeed what I aim to do with section 4.4, where I argue that extending the
notion of what constitutes one’s self is an attractive way of acknowledging
both the empirical evidence presented by the situationists, while holding
onto the core of what makes virtue ethics attractive.

4.3

Self-programming practical wisdom
The situationists presently under investigation find deliberate reflection
wanting as a means to govern action control. To support this claim they
draw on work on conscious intentions done by psychologists and cognitive
neuroscientists, specifically that by psychologist Daniel Wegner (Wegner
& Bargh, 1998; Hodges & Wegner, 1997; Wegner, 2002). Expanding on the
pioneering eeg experiments by Benjamin Libet (Libet, Gleason, Wright &
Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1985), Wegner argues that our consciousness plays no
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role in governing our actions: it is merely epiphenomenal. The experiments
have repeatedly shown how conscious awareness of motor intentions only
arises after the neural machinery has already been set in motion. Our mind
apparently plays a classic post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy on us when we
experience an intention to act and then act accordingly, connecting both
occurrences into an experienced – but not actual – causal chain. Understandably, these claims have elicited critical responses from philosophers
and cognitive scientists (e.g., Dennett, 2003, 2004; Verbaarschot, Farquhar
& Haselager, 2015). It is not my aim to question the empirical validity of
such claims. I do, however, question the scope of these claims, as there are
ways in which conscious intentions may actually turn out to be causally
efficacious and can help us better frame practical wisdom, which I aim to
show in the following.
Though evidence provided by Wegner and others (e.g., Soon, Brass,
Heinze & Haynes, 2008) indeed suggests that conscious intentions in many
cases do not cause action outcomes, it would be presumptuous to therefore
conclude that no conscious intentions are causally efficacious. In fact, many
other experiments provide empirical evidence that points at a contrary
conclusion, namely that conscious intentions do influence action outcomes
(Baumeister, Masicampo & Vohs, 2011; Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010;
Morsella, 2005; Gollwitzer, 1999). How may we reconcile these disparate
findings? One likely answer suggests that these findings point at different
types of conscious intentions.
In a number of recent papers, Marc Slors (2015, 2019) develops a
nuance to Wegner’s proposal that conscious intentions are merely epiphenomenal and do not contribute to action. Rather than dismissing the
proposal outright, Slors argues that Wegner is merely talking about one
type of conscious intention. According to Slors (2015), there is “a striking
tendency in a significant portion of the neuroscientific and psychological
literature on conscious intending [...] to consider the class of conscious
intentions to be more or less homogeneous” (p. 98). This homogenisation
fails to account for the paradoxical findings just discussed in the previous
paragraph. To explain the paradox, we may distinguish between proximal
and distal intentions: proximal intentions pertain to short-term timescales,
on the level of milliseconds to seconds, while distal ones figure on the longterm, measured in minutes, days, weeks or even longer (see, e.g., Pacherie,
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2006). The research initiated by Libet and expanded upon by Wegner is
situated at the level of proximal intentions, while the experiments that
show the causal efficacy of consciousness targets distal intentions.
How does the distinction between proximal and distal intentions
help us explain the paradoxical results regarding action outcomes? Slors
(2019, p. 4) argues that the common distinction between proximal and
distal intentions not only targets different timescales, but should also be
understood to chart a functional difference. This functional difference is
one between consciousness in an observing, passive role and consciousness
in a structuring, active role. For proximal intentions this means that we may
become aware of our intention as we perform the action, for instance, when
I am moving my arm to grab my drink I may become aware of the fact that I
am thirsty. In this case, underlying cognitive processes have led me to grasp
the drink while simultaneously leading to me becoming aware of the action.
For distal intentions, on the other hand, conscious awareness is not the
product of the cognitive process but helps form the intention, for example,
when I plan to book a flight from Sydney to Düsseldorf in a few months and
end up going to the airport and boarding the airplane at the appropriate
date. Slors augments this conceptual distinction between the two roles
of consciousness with a explanation of the concrete implementation by
drawing on another distinction, namely between triggering and structuring
causes (following Dretske, 1988, and reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction
between efficient and formal causes, Metaphysics, V.1013a).
The distinction between proximal and distal intentions is mapped
by Slors (2019) onto the distinction between triggering and structuring
causes. To explain the latter difference, I will use the analogy of a burglar
alarm. Imagine your house has a burglar alarm that will go off when a
point of entry is inappropriately opened. There is circuitry in place that
will detect when a lock on the entry is forced or the glass of a window
breaks, prompting the eruption of a loud noise. The proper configuration
of the circuitry provides the structure for the alarm going off while any
specific event that prompts the alarm provides the trigger. Analogeously,
when I am planning my trip from Sydney to Düsseldorf, I buy a ticket,
put the correct time and flight in my calendar, and check if my suitcase
is still in working order. As the date arrives and I check my calendar, I
am prompted to pack my bag and hop on the train to the airport. The
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process of setting oneself up to respond in a certain way under relevant
circumstances which is then translated into bodily movement, is called
“situational anchoring” by Elisabeth Pacherie (2006, 2008). We can use our
reflective consciousness to do set all of this up by consciously forming
distal intentions to act a specific way in a specific situation. As Slors
(2015) describes: “such an intention, conclusion, or decision is in fact a
complex change in one’s behavioral dispositions” (p. 106), stressing that
this research is in alignment with the empirical literature on effective
conscious intending.
What is important to note here is that, though the environmental
prompts that trigger me to move my limbs can be said to be externally
prompted, the structuring of my self and my environment are, at least in
part, self-initiated. Therefore, the two distinctions just discussed – between
proximal and distal intentions and between triggering and structuring
causes – support the idea that reflective deliberation, at least sometimes,
can be causally efficacious, as conscious reflection might lead to the formation of distal intentions.3 Because it seems like we set up or programme
ourselves on how to react in future situations Slors (2015) calls this model
‘self-programming’.
The model of self-programming leads to an elegant solution to the
situationist paradox previously discussed. Recall that the paradox assumed,
on the one hand, that practical wisdom does not lead to the desired behaviour under pressure of contextual factors. On the other hand, situationists
argue that we ought to embed ourselves in appropriate social webs and
institutional structures to supplement deliberative reflection, thereby assuming the causal efficacy of practical wisdom. To explain how practical
wisdom sometimes (or often) fails in bringing about desired outcomes
we can now say that the conscious aspects of proximal intentions are
merely playing a monitoring, and not a formative role. In situations where
peer pressure is exerted, for example, the environment is wired in such
a way that resisting something that should be easy under other circumstances, like refusing to smoke when offered a cigarette, suddenly becomes
incredibly hard. To explain how practical wisdom can be effective in pos3

Slors (2019) develops some of the psychological details of how conscious deliberation
might lead to the intended behaviour in certain circumstances. For my purposes, however, those details are not relevant – though I am a bit sceptical about the language of
‘informational pickup’ that Slors uses – so I will not elaborate on them here.
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itioning oneself in preferable social environments, we draw on the idea
of the structuring aspects of distal intentions: we are able to consciously
reflect on our embeddedness and try to make long-term improvements
so that certain prompts and triggers may be less effective. Therefore, the
situationist challenge really only puts pressure on one kind of practical
wisdom, namely the kind that pertains to short-term, immediate acting in
circumstances that are stacked against the agent.
If the previous argument for being practically wise about the social structures we embed ourselves in holds true, then the door opens
to considering other contextual factors as potentially aiding us in practical reasoning. After all, if social and institutional structures can support
virtuous behaviour, then why not consider artefacts as well? In the case
of robots, we may program them to remind us of what to do in case we
display behaviour we would like to avoid (such as stealing a cigarette when
trying to stop smoking) or to support us in practising behaviour we would
like to cultivate (such as exercising properly). And so we end up with two
options. Either we should consider artefacts as parts of our selves, or we
view them in a more pessimistic light: as external influences that force or
manipulate us to behave properly, for example. In what follows I argue
that the first option is viable and preferable.

4.4

Rejecting the artefact dependence claim
In order to consider the virtue-ethical role that artefacts may play, a second
situationist issue needs to be resolved. The issue can be unpacked as follows.
Situationists have argued that virtue ethicists are wrong to assume that
moral character is robust. Those amenable to the situationist challenge
could argue that if we were to rely on artefacts such as robots to guide
ourselves towards virtue without the expectation that this will affect a
robust change in the human agent, then this would merely show the
fragility of human moral character and not a genuine case of virtue: call
this the artefact dependence claim. This worry is articulated well by Howell
(2016, p. 161), when he says:
Many will remain uneasy about extended virtues. Among
other things, there is the enduring sense that someone whose
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virtues are extended is less than fully virtuous. Not everyone
who entered the Milgram room acted horrendously. Some defected. Aren’t those people better in some moral sense? Don’t
those people, whose virtue appears to be more skindividualistic, deserve more credit for their virtues even in non-Milgram
circumstances when everyone is acting well?

Howell points at the intuition that it is better if someone behaves virtuously
regardless of the situation one is in. There is an assumption underlying
this line of reasoning that deserves careful examination. The assumption
is that situational factors, because they are external factors, are not part of
our selves or our moral character. I aim to show in this section that there
are good reasons to reject this assumption, at least for some situational
factors, thereby restricting the reach of the artefact dependence claim.
My aim here is to defend an enactive approach to self and moral
character. I will argue that the self is constituted by habits and that, depending on our habitual coupling with certain artefacts, those artefacts
can sometimes be considered to inform and shape those habits thereby
forming a part of our self. I furthermore make an initial proposal for the
conditions under which artefacts can be considered part of the self. To
inform my account, I will engage with several scholars who, spurred on
by extended mind thinking, have considered whether we ought to rethink
the self.
When they presented the extended mind thesis in their 1998 paper,
Andy Clark and David Chalmers not only argued that cognitive processes
may in part extend beyond the boundaries of the body, but they also
suggested that the self extends and that it is better to “see agents themselves
as spread into the world” (p. 18) than as bundles of occurrent states. Inspired
by this suggestion, those striving to revise the concept of self rely on
arguments about ecological control (Clark, 2007), memory (Wilson &
Lenart, 2015; Heersmink, 2017, 2018), and the idea that situations are a
better predictor for behaviour than character traits (Howell, 2016). More
specifically, Mark Alfano and Joshua Skorburg (Alfano, 2014; Alfano &
Skorburg, 2017; Skorburg, 2019) have argued that the extended mind thesis
has implications for how we ought to think about virtue and moral agency
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which is why I will start my examination of the self as extended or enactive
with their work before turning to my enactivist alternative.
Naturally, there have been arguments against the idea of an extended
self. These can be found in work by Lynne Rudder Baker (2009, 2013), Keith
Harris (2019) and Eric Olson (2011). Relatedly, Neil N. Levy (2007a, 2007b)
utilises the extended mind thesis to argue that discussions about cognitive
enhancement often lean on artificial distinctions between internal and
external types of neuronal interventions, about which I have elsewhere
made a similar argument (Olthof, Peeters, Schelle & Haselager, 2013).
Because my present aim is to develop an enactivist alternative to extended
self and extended virtue, discussing arguments that specifically target the
extended self falls outside the scope of the present chapter. I do however,
briefly want to reply to Baker’s reasoning that extended systems do not
support extending the first-person perspective, by drawing attention to
experimental results that show phenomenological extension is possible.
First, there is the case of the famous “rubber hand” illusion (Botvinick
& Cohen, 1998) that shows pain can be felt in spatial locations that fall
outside of our biological body. Second and related, Lenggenhager, Tadi,
Metzinger and Blanke (2007) have used virtual reality to induce out-ofbody experiences in participants, who felt sensations at spaces where their
physical body was not present. These results seem to at the least open the
door to a revision of the idea that the first-person perspective is restrained
to our (unextended) bodies.
Both Alfano and Skorburg seek inspiration from the extended mind
thesis to address issues raised by situationists. They understand virtues as
dispositions to reliably act in a certain way under certain conditions. To
account for how environmental factors, such as mood and social context,
influence dispositional behaviour, Alfano (2014) recasts virtue as a triadic
relation between agent, social milieu and a wider, nonsocial environment.
For example, Alfano considers the case of a long and enduring friendship,
where my friend prevents me from doing something that I would regret
later, an instance of ‘wide’ virtue. That friend can be considered to be part
of my moral make-up and thus my virtue to be resistant to temptation
– for example, by going out too long – though in part realized by my
friend is also part of me. This is a move away from traditional accounts of
virtue that would cast it as an internal, purely agential property. Skorburg
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(2019) argues by way of example. First, he makes the case for soldiers and
police officers potentially becoming part of an extended system through
tight coupling with augmented reality smartglasses that provide risk assessments in the field, and how persons working with these devices for
an extended amount of time will likely see their “cognitive and affective
processing” (p. 2343) transformed. This means that they will operate differently with those glasses on, making other risk assessments by integrating
the device as part of their own cognitive system.
The cognitive underpinnings of Alfano and Skorburg’s story remain,
however, unclear. Though they explicitly seek inspiration from extended mind thinking, to which cognitive framework they wed their take
on the extended mind is never made explicit. Skorburg (2019, p. 2336)
mentions a number of options, from functional parity (Clark & Chalmers,
1998), complementarity (Sutton, 2010), and cognitive integration (Menary,
2007a), yet refrains from deciding on a specific route. A not unreasonable
assumption might be to read their account in line with a functionalist
philosophy of mind, as the extended mind thesis is most often connected
to this framework (Wheeler, 2015). Alfano’s (2014) attempt at answering
the question ‘What are the bearers of virtues?’ certainly seems to point in
the direction of a framework, such as extended functionalism, that deals in
content-bearing vehicles (Clark, 2008a; Wheeler, 2010a). But understanding the social and nonsocial external factors of Alfano’s triadic relation in
information-processing terms, even if those processes are partly carried
by the environment, is not an obvious choice because of a number of
explanatory troubles.
Take, for example, the influence of both internal and external factors
on evoking dispositions. As Alfano (2014) and Skorburg (2019) argue,
moods and asocial situational influences such as ambient lighting influence
behaviour and affect how or even if dispositions unfold. But how can
an extended functionalist account, that casts cognition as informationprocessing, explain the shaping effect that moods have on behaviour? One
natural option is to say that moods prime the way information is processed,
perhaps by altering connections in the brain. But the idea that moods need
to be explained in terms of structural changes is hard to square with the
functionalist tenet that mental states are characterised by the functional
roles they play. Thus it seems incongruous with the very idea of virtue to
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judge acts in human–robot interaction as completely separate from their
potentially disposition-altering powers.
More pressure is put on the previous line of thought when we consider that the phenomenology of moods, such as happiness or depression,
suggests that they are not themselves a functional role between input and
output. In functionalist terms, the problem is that “the attitudes we take
towards the contents of our mental states seem to make a difference to how
those contents appear to us” (Kriegel, 2019, p. 9). That would mean that
the cognitive information being processed means something different under different moods. Interestingly, Skorburg (2019, p. 2339) himself seems
sceptical of mood as a computational mechanism, saying that “the process
of emotion regulation (both in the moment, and the longer-term development of the capacity) is not de-composable into simple child inputs and
caretaker outputs”. But he does not provide an alternative interpretation
of the effects of mood. Considering the accounts of Alfano and Skorburg
along the lines of the extended functionalist framework is thus problematic
in light of the behavioural altering effects of moods.
A second problem for cashing out Alfano and Skorburg’s account
in functionalist terms is revealed by looking at the literature on the embeddedness of bad habits or vices, specifically addictions. Addiction is
generally understood as a disease of the brain by psychiatrists and psychologists, who state that what addictive drugs “taken in excess have in
common direct activation of the brain reward system, which is involved in
the reinforcement of behaviors” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013b).
This seems to lend itself to a relatively straightforward translation into
a functionalist framework, where addiction could be characterised as a
structural relation between certain substances as input and a resulting
feeling of euphoria as an output, which, after some time, prompts for
more drug intake. This functionality could be seen as supervening on
the aforementioned reward structure of the brain. Naturally, this is an
oversimplified account but serves to highlight the direction a functionalist
answer could take.
But as a number of philosophers and neuroscientists have argued
recently, the frame of addiction as a mere brain disease is inadequate. An
important assumption for those who hold that addiction is a brain disease
and that it should medically be treated as such is that addiction changes the
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brain. Yet, as Neil N. Levy (2013, p. 1) observes, “there are neural changes
associated with and causally involved in all behaviors. Establishing that
this is true with regard to addiction therefore does not establish that it is
a brain disease.” This is supported by empirical evidence on successfully
treating addiction. For instance, in a recent review article, neuroscientist
and former drug addict Marc Lewis (2018, p. 1555) notes that “most people
with addiction recover, and most of those who recover do so without
treatment” and concludes this is hard to reconcile with the hypothesis that
addiction is a brain disease that merely requires pharmaceutical treatment.4
Another issue with the brain disease model is that it does not sit well with
addictions that are not based on substance abuse, such as addictions to sex,
porn, internet or gambling. Even though these varied types of addiction do
not involve the intake of substances that directly affect the brain, research
has shown that structural changes in the brain are similar across all these
types of addiction, including the ones that do involve substance abuse
(Brewer & Potenza, 2008).
These issues with the addiction-as-a-brain-disease model, have prompted scholars and practitioners to develop alternative interpretations of
addiction that take neuronal and bodily and environmental factors into account (see the recent editorial of Frontiers in Psychiatry by Pickard, Ahmed
& Foddy, 2015). A central position in these lines of thought is reserved
for habits. To wit, addiction is instead seen as “motivated repetition that
gives rise to deep learning. Addictive patterns grow more quickly and become more deeply entrenched than other, less compelling habits” (Lewis,
2017, p. 15, emphasis removed). It is no surprise then that advocates of
understanding addiction as habitual learning align themselves with an
embodied cognition approach. In the words of Lewis (2018, p. 1558): “the
embodied-cognition framework can help model the interaction between
neurobiologic and social-environmental contributors to addiction. Addictive activities are determined neither solely by brain changes nor solely
by social conditions.” The activities described by Lewis do themselves
often narrow the social environment as well – for example, by losing
one’s job or losing touch with friends. This in turn limits the possibility
for behavioural change and paves the way for further reinforcement of
4

In a review study on drug abuse in the Netherlands I argued for a similar conclusion
(Noten, Peeters, van Toor, Winkens & Jäkel, 2013).
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the addictive behaviour as a means of escape. Explaining this interaction
requires an account of habit that captures the reciprocal and mutually
shaping influences between organism and environment.
Extended functionalists wishing to explain virtue and vice will need
to face the challenges presented by the literature on addiction. Drawing
on the preceding discussion of the literature, these challenges include the
need for: first, providing a cognitive explanation of addictions as habits;
second, clearing space for the contributions of external factors to these
habits; and, third, accounting for the reciprocal, shaping influence of habits
on one’s environment. Building on the previously described functionalist
model, N. Levy (2014) sees addiction as “the result of a dysfunctional reward valuation system” (p. 338) and augments this idea by marrying it to
the predictive processing framework. This is currently the best developed
functionalist proposal on capturing the nature of addiction. It may potentially meet the first challenge head-on, by describing the learning aspect of
addiction in terms of rewards. But how does it fare in light of the second
and third challenge? For this, Levy’s account has no ready-made answer.
To be fair, his account, while functionalist, is not an extended functionalist
proposal. Perhaps the remaining challenges can be dealt with by extending
Levy’s proposal to include environmental factors. It is not clear, however,
how an extended functionalist version of this story would deal with the
reciprocal influence of habits on environment and environment on habits
in entirely information-processing terms. While this may be possible, the
issues discussed fuel the motivation to consider an alternative that avoids
these issues from the start.
Enactivists are already equipped with the tools to capture both the
shaping aspects of moods on dispositions, and to explain habits, including
addictions, as learned and simultaneously shaping and being shaped by
environmental factors. In enactive approaches, cognitive structures arise
from the ongoing and active sensorimotor engagements of an organism
with its environment (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007). Rather than
using the language of mental computations which may or may not involve
representations, many enactivists belong to a growing group of cognitive
scientists who “have adopted the mathematical methods of nonlinear
dynamical systems theory, thus employing differential equations as their
primary explanatory tool” (Chemero & Silberstein, 2008, p. 11). This means
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that such enactivists formalise the cognitive processes of a system in terms
of the dynamical change in the hills and valleys of a state space landscape
over time (Di Paolo et al., 2017). Furthermore, enactivists question the
viability of mechanistic approaches that motivate thinking of intentions as
causes for action (e.g., Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2015), as is assumed by
the situationists discussed previously. I will return to the use of dynamical
system theory by enactivists shortly in more detail, but first I will discuss
how enactivism fares in light of the two challenges previously set to
extended functionalism.
Inspired by insights from classic phenomenology, most enactivists
recognise that our cognitive interactions with the world are not attempts
at neutral puzzle-solving, but instead are engagements coloured by affect
and perspective. This is unpacked by Shaun Gallagher (2017, p. 151) as
follows: “Schemata of sensorimotor contingencies give an agent the how
of perception, ... without giving its why, which depends on latent valences
that push or pull for attention in one direction or another, and for potential
sensory–motor engagement, reflecting, for example, a degree of desirability.” He illustrates this by saying that food will appear more desirable to
us when we are hungry than when our stomachs are full. In proposing an
enactive way of properly capturing this interplay between the how and the
why of actions Giovanna Colombetti (2014) draws on the tools provided by
dynamical systems theory. She proposes that moods are best understood
as altering the landscape of a cognitive system’s state space resulting in
certain states acquiring a stronger pull, such that “we can say that moods
make some emotional episodes more likely than others by affecting the
topology of the organism’s state space” (p. 78). On this enactive proposal,
both emotions and moods are to be seen “not as outputs of neural programs but as depending on the reciprocal influences of brain, bodily, and
environmental processes” (p. 60; see also Thompson & Stapleton, 2009;
Stapleton, 2013). Given that an organism’s future behaviour depends on
its current cognitive state space, this approach readily explains how even
subtle mood changes may affect behaviour.
A similar story may be told for how enactivists approach the dynamics of habitual behaviour. Though the concept of habit has been neglected
by cognitive scientists for the better part of the twentieth century, an
impressive number of scholars have recently called for a rehabilitation of
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the concept in resistance to dominant information-processing frameworks
that neglected it (Barandiaran & Di Paolo, 2014). In line with enactivist
thought, Susana Ramírez-Vizcaya and Tom Froese (2019) have recently
proposed to understand a bad habit or addiction as “a habit whose expression ... is negative for a person’s well-being because it consistently
overrules the expression of other situationally relevant actions and habits”
(p. 8, emphasis removed). This would explain why it is sometimes so hard
to move away from addictive behaviours.
To see how some habits overrule others, we must situate habits within
a larger discussion of sensorimotor actions. Di Paolo et al. (2017) cast habits
as, at their base, a special kind of sensorimotor schemes. Sensorimotor
schemes can be described as acts that are regularly performed by an agent,
while incorporating some measure of proficiency or mastery. I enact, for
example, the writing of the present text by typing on my keyboard: the act
of typing calls on a network of sensorimotor schemes, like pressing a key
and moving my finger, and the level of proficiency with which I perform
this act is shown by how fast and faultless it unfolds. What sets habits
apart from other schemes is that the former are “self-sustaining precarious
sensorimotor schemes” (Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 144). On this enactive
proposal, habits are self-sustaining because they recursively call upon the
same (collection of) schemes, and they are precarious because they need
regular enactment to avoid degradation of the scheme – as per the familiar
metaphor of how regular travel through a forest carves out a path and
prevents overgrowth. Depending on which environmental aspects and
agential support structures are available, certain schemes become more
easily activated than others. The previous example of typing shows this
by the observation that the subtle ridges on the F and J keys guide my
fingers while they tap over the keyboard. With practice, my index fingers
will tend to linger more often than not on these two keys, suppressing
potential schemes that would have them float to other ones.
The present enactive proposal of habits has innate tools to meet the
challenges set out by our discussion of addiction. Recall that the critique
on addiction-as-a-brain-disease called for an account that could both explain addiction as learned behaviour and would recognise the reciprocal
influences of external factors on habit formation and vice versa. Meeting
the first challenge takes the form of a two-step. First, because enactivists
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have advanced habits as part of “hierarchical, sequential, and ultimately
networked relations in a kind of ecosystem, whereby a given scheme calls
for, reinforces, inhibits, or subsumes others” (Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 147),
they create space for explaining how some habits overrule others. This can
be elaborated upon by, second, considering bad or addictive habits as imposing “their own normativity at the level of the whole network of regional
identities, ensuring their preferred enaction even under circumstances
that would have normally called for the activation of a different set of
habits” (Ramírez-Vizcaya & Froese, 2019, p. 7). Though specific substances
may enable the formation of bad habits, no where in this story are they
required for a description of what addiction is. And because sensorimotor
schemes, of which habits are a particular kind, depend in their enactment
on the confluence of external factors and agential support structures, does
the enactive proposal also meet the second challenge. More details are
naturally required to properly frame addictive habits in terms enactive
terms. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate if addictions can
be described as strong attractors in a dynamic state space from which escape is increasingly hard. Nevertheless, the preceding discussion provides
strong reasons to prefer an enactive account (bad) habits over an extended
functionalist one. Accordingly, this means that the enactivist proposal
is better positioned to provide the cognitive framework for Alfano and
Skorburg’s project: virtue and vice can be understood as particular sensorimotor schemes, constituted, per Alfano’s (2014) suggestion, by agential
and environmental factors.
This brings us finally to my rejection of the artefact dependence
claim. Recall that this claim presents the worry that putative ‘virtuous’
persons who depend on artefacts such as robots are, at best, not truly
virtuous and, at worst, acting viciously because they relinquish their moral
autonomy to external technologies (Howell, 2014). This conclusion is far
from inevitable on the present enactivist proposal as enactivists see the
self not as intrinsic to a single agent’s skindividualistic body. As Francisco
Varela (1999), a founding father of enactivism puts it: “The cognitive self is
its own implementation: its history and its action are of one piece” (p. 54).5
5

It should be noted that some enactivists conceive of the self as arising out of the social
environment, downplaying the organism’s bodily role in self-formation (Kyselo, 2014).
This strategy has been accused of being inconsistent with leading enactivist thinking on
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And the cognitive self is in this regard not crucially different from the moral
self. Unsurprisingly, Varela draws on Buddhist and Confucian virtue ethical
traditions to inform his enactive account of virtue.6 Varela’s notion of the
self as constituted by action is mirrored and further developed by current
enactivist theorists, who, in discussing habits, say that the “processes
that individuate a sensorimotor agent are acts themselves” (Di Paolo et
al., 2017, p. 142) and that “agents do not hold monolithic identities that
remain constant independently of the activities they perform” (RamírezVizcaya & Froese, 2019, p. 6). Given that the self is constituted by these
(habitual) actions, and that such actions themselves evenly depend on
external factors and agential influence, it follows that the self is essentially
spread out over the organism and the environment. This unbalances the
artefact dependence claim. But before we can topple it, it requires one final
push.
Not every manner of virtue support or cultivation through artefacts
should readily be accepted as part of one’s self. There is a crucial difference
between – as provocatively put by Howell (2014) – a fictional smartphone
application like “Google Morals,” programmed by others to tell me what to
do in a moral dilemma, and me setting an alarm at noon to remind myself
to take a break from working and have lunch. In the latter situation, I am,
at least in part, the author of the nudge. Being able to program how a
device should nudge me in future situations or, in the terms of the previous
section, construct my own structural cause, is more virtuous than being
forced to act my entirely external factors. Similarly, users engaging with
social robots in situations that intend to cultivate virtue, must be involved
in the development and programming of those robots, both at the design
and at the daily interaction levels to safeguard their moral agency.

6

the role of the body as primary in cognitive and individuating acts (Maiese, 2019), and I
shall not pursue this line of reasoning here.
What is surprising though, is how dismissive of Aristotelian virtue ethics Varela (1999) is,
accusing it of being overly intellectualist because of its emphasis on practical reasoning
which he takes to be a solely conscious decision making process (p. 23). He relies for
his critique on a fragmentary reading of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After virtue as cited in a
book by Hubert Dreyfus. I think this is carelessness on Varela’s part, as he himself readily
admits he is new to ethics (p. ix). My discussion of practical wisdom as self-programming
in section 4.3 is, I hope, enough to subvert his critique.
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Situating the self

This chapter has cleared the grounds for considering the potential that
technological artefacts have for cultivating virtue, by focusing on the case
of social robots. My reasoning against a prominent argument against the
possibility of being practically wise while being virtuous to social robots,
led me to a discussion of practical wisdom as seen through the lens of the
situationist challenge. This discussion led me to two issues that needed to
be resolved. First, the very possibility of having autonomy over one’s practical reasoning was challenged. Through drawing on recent discussions
concerning conscious intending, I argued that self-programming practical
wisdom is a live option. Second was the tension between recent attempts
by ethicists to extend the notion of virtue and the artefact dependence
claim. By showing the merits of an enactive and habitual approach to
the self, I elucidated a potential cognitive framework for extended virtue,
while rejecting the artefact dependence claim.
The idea that agents relate to technological artefacts and may actively
incorporate them into their enactive selves opens the door to exciting new
lines of research. For instance, we may reconsider how people can actively
steer themselves towards moral virtue by artefactual habit support. But
to properly do this, a more concrete and formalised future account of the
dynamical roles of artefacts in sensorimotor schemes is required.
Let me conclude by emphasising that I am not arguing in favour
of a blind acceptance of every handy artefact into our moral selves. In
line with recent thinking in philosophy of technology, we need to reflect
carefully on the kind of autonomy that is (or is not) supported through
our interactions with specific artefacts. Artefacts can tempt, persuade, or
force us down particular behavioural paths (Verbeek, 2011, p. 107), and not
all of those options similarly contribute to our moral agency. In the case of
robots, this means that education on the effects robots elicit in us through
their anthropomorphic characteristics is crucial. This further needs to be
augmented with both a democratic approach towards the design of such
robots so that the end-user’s autonomy is considered, as well as a clear
and accessible way to program what type of interactions one’s robot is
expected to facilitate. Only when space is cleared for such interactions to
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be transparent and accessible can our technological artefacts truly help us
to become virtuous.

Abstract
Enactivist theories have put particular emphasis on the concrete, material implementations of cognitive acts. This could be seen as a disadvantage when compared
to theories, such as functionalism, that allow for the multiple realization of cognitive processes. In this chapter, I argue that enactivism is compatible with multiple
realization. To establish this, I examine arguments from identity theorists who
provide a restrictive definition of multiple realizability. I argue that even on this restrictive definition, enactivism can allow for the realization of cognitive processes
in different physical kinds if we consider cognition to be a wide phenomenon,
involving structural environmental contributions as well as bodily and brain
factors. This puts enactivism on equal, if not higher footing than functionalism
when it comes to explaining how environmental resources, such as artefacts, may
help realize cognition.

This chapter is in preparation for publication as: Peeters, A. (in preparation-b). Is
enactivism compatible with multiple realizability?
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Chapter 5
Is enactivism compatible with
multiple realizability?
“One could, I suppose, develop a version of [extended mind] (as
standardly conceived) without buying into functionalism, if one could
have multiple realizability without functionalism.”
Michael Wheeler (2010b, p. 33)

One of functionalism’s main advantages over competitor theories, or so it
is often said, is the claim that it passes the multiple realizability test. The
principle of multiple realization allows that the same cognitive process,
like vision or memory, can be realized by different physical underpinnings.
This principle lies at the root of the famous functionalist motto to judge
cognitive processes not by what they are made of but by what they do.
Enactivists, in contrast, have put particular emphasis on the concrete,
material implementations of cognitive acts. If enactivism is aiming to be a
viable alternative to traditional functionalist theories of mind, it needs to
take a position on the issue of multiple realization. If enactivism is not able
to accommodate the same feature, it stands to lose ground to functionalism
in explaining how seemingly different types of organisms may engage
in similar cognitive activity. Additionally, some have argued that our
cognitive and embodied engagements with artefacts is not well captured
by the extended functionalist (Clark, 2008a; Wheeler, 2010a) focus on the
multiple realizability of informational processes (Vaccari, 2017, p. 882).
That means that if enactivism is able to accommodate multiple realization
in a more embodied way than functionalism, the former would provide
125
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a more tempting account with respect to mind–technology engagement
than the latter. So, is enactivism compatible with multiple realization?
To answer this question, I look at recent work done by identity theorists who have typically denied that multiple realization of cognitive kinds
is possible. In particular, Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro (2016)
provide a sustained argument against the very plausibility of multiple
realization, and in the process introduce a nuance that the debate on the
topic has not seen in years. They also provide a restrictive operational
definition of multiple realization. I will critically review their argument
and claim it depends on an assumption that enactivists would not agree
with. This is the assumption that cognitive processes are constrained solely
to the body or even brain of an organism. Enactivists look beyond these
restrictions and can say that, if one is to look for the multiple realization
of cognitive processes, we ought not to look solely at underlying brain or
physiological structures but at the wider cognitive system that includes
external factors. Thus, the crux of my argument is that in different constellations of wide, environment-involving cognition, the same cognitive job
may be performed even on the provided restrictive definition of multiple
realization. I will therefore conclude that enactivism would not fail the
multiple realization test and is compatible with the notion that cognitive
processes may be multiply realized.

5.1

Multiple realization as organizational dissimilarity
A major attraction of functionalism, as initially presented by Hilary Putnam
(1960, 1967, 1973), is its claim to the principle of multiple realization.
This principle allows that mental states might be constituted by different
physical stuff. Whether a creature is in pain or pleasure does not depend
essentially on its physical make-up. You or I could be in pain, but so could
an octopus – which has a nervous system markedly more distributed than
a human’s – or a robot, or an alien. With his usual flair, Daniel Dennett
(2005) relates that in functionalism “matter matters only because of what
matter can do” (p. 17). Because functionalists pick out cognitive processes
by looking at the job that is getting done, like perceiving a tree or recalling
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a memory, they remain neutral about whether or not a process like vision
arises from nervous processes, silicon sequences, or carbon calculations,
as long as the appropriate input-to-output structure is observed.
In a move uncharacteristically fast for the philosophy discipline, functionalism’s main competitors were guided to the reserve bench when the
topic of multiple realization was broached. With Putnam’s proposal, those
that were worried about the perceived reductionist tendencies of functionalism had a viable alternative cognitive framework. Identity theorists,
advocating an approach to mind as leaning on identity relations between
brain states and mental states, have had particular difficulty dealing with
multiple realization. Crucially, they cannot readily explain how creatures
that might be able to perform cognitive processes similar to humans, like
aliens or intelligent robots, would do so on a potentially very different
physical make-up. And we do not even have to look for such alien creatures
in the recesses of outer space, as animals like octopuses are capable of
sophisticated and intelligent behaviour while having a physiology and
nervous system that has a structure completely different from that of humans (Godfrey-Smith, 2016). In a time where the development and success
of computing science promised not only an understanding of our own
supposedly mechanistic cognitive architecture, but also the creation of
intelligent machines, identity theory was quickly overtaken and has been
a minor player in the field of philosophy of mind and cognition since.
Fast forward a few decades and the limits of the computationalist
model of mind are put under increasing pressure (Chemero, 2009; Engel,
2010). And, while the fields of AI and robotics have seen impressive developments, the kinds of intelligent machines envisioned in the optimism
of the 1960s are nowhere in sight. It is therefore unsurprising that Polger
and Shapiro (2016) see their chance to rehabilitate the identity theory of
mind and have set their sights on dismantling the support for multiple
realization by considering and rejecting the empirical evidence. As such,
they take issue with the claim of Jerry Fodor (1981, p. 119) that lack of
empirical evidence for multiple realization does not matter to the functionalist. Their goal is therefore relatively humble, because they do not
aim to show that multiple realization is an in principle impossibility.
To rehabilitate the identity theory, Polger and Shapiro (2016) aim to
demonstrate that mind is best explained by identifying cognitive process
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kinds with neuroscientific process kinds. They oppose any “realization
theory [that] claims that identities rarely or never play an explanatory role
in the cognitive and brain sciences” (p. 35). In developing their argument
a number of distinctions are introduced that are helpful for the present
discussion.
The distinctions in question involve a proposed operational definition
for what counts as multiple realization that is meaningful and more strict
that previous definitions. In following Ruth Millikan (1999), Polger and
Shapiro argue that in order to speak of multiple realization, the relevant
differences between systems that perform the same function need to be
different in terms of their contribution to the job that is performed. These
differences are to be determined by experts of that field. Thus, when
talking about the multiple realization of cognitive processes in brain areas,
neuroscientists are in the best position to provide an explanation of their
physical and organizational structures. But these differences “must count
as different paths to the same end, not just variations within a single path
to the same end” (Polger & Shapiro, 2016, p. 67). If we accept this, and
I am inclined to do so, then the kind of multiple realization that is of
interest for us is the kind that hinges not on a mere physical variation but
on organizational difference: instances of multiple realization need to be
“differently the same” (p. 68).
We can apply this test to a simple case. Consider a reading board that
I might use to more easily read books so as to avoid straining my neck.
Reading boards can be made out of wood, plastic, metal and various other
stuffs. However, in so far as they all have a similar folding mechanism
which allows them to present a book or paper at an angle, the difference
in building material is irrelevant to their functionality. They perform the
same job in the same way.
What, then, would count as an instance of multiple realization? For
this we can look at types of watches (Shapiro, 2008). Watches come in
many different shapes and forms, and not just on the outside, though
all of them, by virtue of being a watch, tell the time. The time might be
off on occasion, but their intended function is clear. Now, let us look at
two different implementations of a watch: mechanical and quartz. The
architecture of the mechanical watch stores energy in a coiled spring.
Over time, the spring releases tiny amounts of energy that set cogs in
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motion and move the hands on the face of the watch. The inner workings
of the quartz watch are entirely different. A quartz watch contains a quartz
crystal and a small electrical system powered by a battery. When current
runs through the crystal it starts to oscillate at a specific frequency. The
system reads the frequency, which in turn determines the movement speed
of the hands. Watchmakers, blind or not, agree that these two watches
are physically different and that this difference contributes to a difference
in their organization. Therefore, Polger and Shapiro (2016) conclude that
these two watches “seem to be multiple realizations of watch: They are the
same in function but differ relevantly in realization, and these differences
in their realization explain how they manage to perform the same function”
(p. 71).
The operational definition provided also helps clarify which cases
of putative cognitive multiple realization are in fact not. When we look
at the biological architecture of colour perception, for instance, the mere
fact of having different cones in the visual perception system does not
constitute multiple realization. Like the wooden, plastic, or metal reading
boards, “[t]he cones with ala180 and ser180 opsins do the same thing in the
same way” (Polger & Shapiro, 2016, p. 110). The cones are physically, but
not organizationally different, as is confirmed by neuroscientists. Polger
and Shapiro review a number of cases similar to this one, as instances of
potential multiple realization and find them wanting.
In contrast, as will become clear in the next section, it is important to
note here that Polger and Shapiro focus on internal structures in the brain
for their discussion of cognitive processes. This is not surprising given
their framework, but it is an assumption that can be questioned and that
is precisely what I will do next.

5.2

Cognitive systems as extended systems
Enactivists do not identify mental processes by brain structure and activity, but instead conceive of cognition as arising out of the intimate and
structural coupling between an organism and its environment. On this approach, cognitive systems are not restricted to the brain and body but may
freely, according to circumstance and context, incorporate environmental
factors. In the words of Ezequiel Di Paolo, Thomas Buhrmann and Xabier
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Barandiaran (2017): “There is a sensorimotor body that extends beyond
the organic body, but at the same time, it is anchored in it” (p. 178).
Inherent to the enactive approach is the emphasis it places on the
sensitivity of bodily and contextual factors to the performance of cognitive
acts. For example, dancing the tango can be understood enactively as the
mutual coordination between two partners where each partner attunes
to the bodily cues of the other and to the background music (van Alphen,
2014). In light of this sensitivity to the material nature of cognition, it is
understandable why some enactivists have recently aligned themselves
with identity theorists and professed scepticism of the thesis that cognitive
processes are multiple realizable. In fact, Erik Myin and Farid Zahnoun
(2018) argue that, if enactivism does not depart from the assumption that
cognitive processes are instances of information-processing (an antecedent
that these authors argue is true), the “possibility that cognition is multiply
realizable ... doesn’t follow with the apparent immediacy it does within
an information processing framework” (p. 7). But not all enactivists share
this scepticism.
Enactivist Alva Noë (2004), when discussing the famous tactile-vision
substitution system (TVSS) (Bach-y-rita, 1983; Bach-y-rita & Kercel, 2002),
exclaims that it “is a striking example of multiple realization” (p. 27).
The TVSS is a device which lets blind people have a measure of visual
perception by placing a prosthetic on their head that translates the detected
distance to objects into tiny pricks on the back of their skull. After a period
of adjustment, test subjects report that they receive vision-like experiences.
Noë unfortunately does not elaborate much on why this case is an instance
of multiple realization. So, how are we to explain why some enactivists
are sceptical – and even dismissive of multiple realization – while others
seemingly do not perceive any issue at all? To answer this question, let
us look at a particular cognitive process from an enactive perspective:
episodic memory.
Imagine I go to the opening party of the Sydney Film Festival and
attempt to recall who was present and what happened at the event a
week after the fact. For enactivists, episodic remembering is best explained
as as a type of offline, simulated sensory experience (Thompson, 2007,
p. 290). This means that through the use of triggers and prompts, a past
experience is reconstructed on the fly and made available for recall through
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simulative reimagining (Hutto & Peeters, 2018b, Chapter 2). In the case
of the party, there seem to be several ways that this reenactment may
unfold. On one version, I may run into a friend who also was at the party,
and together we may recall who arrived at what time and had what to
drink, or intervene on the process with gentle prompts: “No, you left
after Jane, remember?” Couples who know each other well, like friends or
partners, can thus sometimes remember events that they could not as an
individual, in a process of transactive or collaborative memory (Wegner,
Erber & Raymond, 1991; Wilson, 2017). The cues for remembering are
in part provided by the ongoing ensuing conversation, feeding back into
the dialogue and supporting the reconstruction of the memory by both
partners.
Transactive remembering is just one way in which an event like the
festival can be recalled. Perhaps someone wrote a blog post about the party,
detailing the guests and speeches given. Through reading the blog I may be
provided by triggers about who attended and whom I might have spoken
to. Similar lines of reasoning can be given for browsing photos taken at the
party, or by noticing a stain on the shirt I wore that serves as a memento
(Heersmink, 2018). Or perhaps I am a sufferer of early onset Alzheimer’s
and I make meticulous notes about important things that happen to me,
including the event, in a little notebook that I can read back to prompt
myself into remembering (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). I propose that all of
these cases perform the same job, namely, the recollection of who was there
and what happened, but they do so in organizationally various ways. The
sensorimotor engagements that unfold when I remember with my friend
are different than when I remember through reading the blog, browsing
the photos, notice the clothes I wore, or study my notebook. Some involve
talking and gesturing, others involve reading, and a third might include
seeing or touching a stain. Yet they perform the same function. These
processes, in the words of Polger and Shapiro, are thus differently the same.
This conclusion provides reason to think that enactivism allows for the
multiple realization of cognitive processes.
Notice how I make no commitments about the neural processes that
may be involved in each of these cases. My focus here is on the organization
of processes that are realized in the larger cognitive system that is spread
over organism and environment. If I were forced to bet I would argue the
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neural processes in these cases are organizationally different as well in
so far as they involve distinct sensorimotor engagements: collaborative
remembering will likely activate different brain areas than prompts evoked
by the tactile sensation or smell of a piece of fabric. But even if the processes
that are constrained to the brain are the same, my argument stands because
it does not look at the level of the brain.
This perspective sheds light on the apparent discrepancy that I earlier
noted between Myin and Zahnoun (2018) and Noë (2004). The former
seem sceptical of multiple realization because they associate it with the
information-processing paradigm. But my argument leans entirely on a
non-informational, dynamic approach to cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2017).
The observation made by Noë (2004) fits naturally with my argument and
can now be better understood.
The identity theorist will, I suspect, attempt to show that the external
aspects are merely causally involved in remembering and do not play a
realizer role (see Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Rupert, 2004). This addresses a
deep disagreement between identity theory and enactivism and deserves
discussion in a paper of its own. A preliminary reply against identity theorists could argue, as Shaun Gallagher (2017) does, that on the enactivist view
“in their dynamical relations, neural and non-neural [factors], including
embodied, environmental, social, etc., may be causal in a way that they
are also constitutive” (p. 10). My purpose here, however, is not to convince
identity theorists that cognition is a deeply distributed phenomenon: I
merely aim to show the compatibility between enactivism and multiple
realizability.
And how would the functionalist feel about the present argument
for multiple realization as depending on environmental factors? Extended
functionalists, who allow that mental processes may sometimes extend
to external factors (Clark, 2008a; Wheeler, 2010a), will likely agree with
most of what I have said so far. Indeed, Michael Wheeler (2010b) vocally
embraces a “beyond-the-skin species of multiple realizability” (p. 33) and
says that it is a requirement for functionalist approaches to extended
cognition.

5.3. REALIZING COMPATIBILITY

5.3
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With the previous in place, it seems we have sufficient reason to answer our
original question about whether enactivism is compatible with multiple
realizability in the affirmative. And not only do we have reasons to accept
this compatibility, but we also, contra Polger and Shapiro, can point at
concrete instances of multiple realizability. Indeed, in passing the multiple
realizability test enactivists seem to be in a better position to explain why
acts of remembering prompted by collaboration, texts and other artefacts,
or direct sensory cues can all be called instances of the memory process.
What does the present conclusion imply for the relationship between
enactivism and functionalism? On the one hand, we see functionalists
going ‘wide’ in the quest to explain mind and cognition and thereby move
closer to the enactivist paradigm. On the other hand, my argument that
enactivism is compatible with multiple realizability means that we now
have two theories that pass the multiple realizability test. Will functionalist
and enactivist approaches converge on their current trajectories? In order
to answer this, questions about the nature of mental representations and
cognition as information-processing need to be resolved first. I for one
look forward to that discussion.

Concluding remarks
In the present dissertation, I have contributed to the development of an
enactive account of mind–technology interaction. This has been motivated
by recent discussions in philosophy of mind & cognition by a growing
number of scholars who advocate a pragmatic turn towards cognition
as action-oriented and dynamic. The pragmatic turn moves away from
accounts that, inspired by the computer metaphor, conceive of cognition
as relying on representations and information-processing. Within this
debate, functionalism is often seen as the main champion of the latter kind
of theories, while enactivism is heralded as part of the former. A special
kind of functionalism, one that departs from the extended mind thesis, is
currently the dominant theory when it comes to understanding mind and
technology. Current theories on enactivism have not yet yielded a mature
theory about the specifics of embodied technology engagements and so
an examination of mind–technology interaction within the context of the
pragmatic turn is a life issue for enactivists. Therefore, if this dissertation
is to bear fruit, it has to be shown that its contributions move the enactivist
programme closer – or beyond – its functionalist rival and further support
the pragmatic turn in cognition.
The first step towards an enactivist account of mind and technology
has been the building of a bridge between enactivism and philosophy
of technology in Chapter 1. From the field of philosophy of technology,
postphenomenology was presented as a potential partner to enactivism by
establishing their common ground. This common ground is most clear in
their shared assumption that mind is to be understood as co-constituted by
both agential and environmental factors. Enactivism and postphenomenology have been shown to be of mutual theoretical benefit through two
steps. First, by discussing how the postphenomenological division of the
six kinds of human–technology relations can inform enactivist research
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on mind–technology interaction. Second, by exposing how enactivism
may provide a cognitive underpinning to postphenomenological research.
Following up on the general issues outlined in the first chapter,
Chapter 2 considered a concrete case-study for a critical comparison of
functionalism and enactivism. In line with the pragmatic turn, this casestudy examined how functionalist and enactivist theories fare with respect
to operationalizing the memory palace mnemonic in virtual reality. Supported by a critical review of the current empirical literature on memory and
mnemonics, I argued that functionalist theories of memory fail to account
for the embodied aspects of the memory palace by their assumption that
cognition is information-processing. In its stead, I developed an enactive
account of the memory palace and offered design recommendations for its
use in virtual reality.
Having discussed the phenomenological and cognitive science aspects of enactive technology engagement, Chapters 3 and 4 turned on the
ethical aspects of mind–technology interaction. Chapter 3 cleared ground
by arguing that virtue ethics is highly relevant when it comes to the discussion of the impact of sex robots. I positioned a virtue ethical analysis
of sex robots against an instrumental use, arguing that the latter fails to
capture crucial implications of sex robot use on human moral character.
The main contribution of this chapter to the literature is its proposal for
the potential positive aspects of sex robot use in therapy. This contribution
leans on the idea that sex robots, when outfitted with a consent module
and, crucially, used in supervised therapeutic settings, might contribute
to virtue cultivation. The published paper that this chapter is based on
has already garnered much societal discussion and informed specialists
working in the field of robotics.
In Chapter 4, I picked up the thread left hanging at the end of the
previous chapter, namely what the connection between virtue ethics and
enactivism is. By using the situationist challenge against virtue ethics as
a foil, I argued for an enactive understanding of human moral character.
This chapter offered a rebuttal of situationism by dissolving the opposition
between moral character, as traditionally constrained to the body, and
environmental factors. Additionally, it has provided a proposal for virtue
cultivation through ‘self-programming’. In doing both, this chapter has
clarified slumbering connections between virtue and enaction.
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The principle of multiple realizability, often thought to be a major
trump card for functionalism, provided the stage for a brief reflection in
Chapter 5. Because of its emphasis on the concrete materiality of cognitive
acts, enactivism can be thought to be incompatible with the thesis that
cognitive processes can be realized in different physical kinds. However,
I have shown that, when we move away from assuming that multiple
realization must necessarily depend on information-processing and allow
for cognition to be realized over parts of the brain, body, and environment,
enactivism can be said to be compatible with multiple realization. This
result offers enactivism extra support in comparisons with functionalism.
The main contributions of this work were informed by a number of
fields and will, potentially, affect them in turn. By drawing on insights
provided by philosophy of technology, cognitive science, and virtue ethics
I have articulated how enactivism may categorise and understand different human–technology relations, add to the design of technologies, and
elucidate the moral issues surrounding embodied technology interaction.
This will enable enactivism to better investigate the crucial experiential,
scientific, and ethical issues surrounding mind–technology interaction.
Not only does this offer theoretical benefits by informing wider discussions
about the pragmatic turn in cognitive science. It also offers new insights to
engineering research on the embodied aspects of robotics, virtual reality
and the ethical issues surrounding those.
Invariably, a number of questions remain open and I shall briefly
discuss the main one here. Whereto can functionalism move to meet the
challenges raised in the present dissertation? It became clear, on a number
of occasions, that through the so-called ‘third wave’ in extended mind,
there might arise an extended functionalism that does not conceive of
cognition as the processing of information. So far, the work on third wave
extended cognition has been largely preliminary, but we can single out
one potential trajectory. In line with the pragmatic turn, the pressure
on functionalists to move away from representations and computational
mechanisms has steadily increased. Combine this observation with the
fact that a growing number of functionalists accept the extended mind
thesis, and the question is raised whether functionalism is on a course of
convergence with enactivism. Given the fact that many theorists, from
both sides, have, on a number of occasions, stated that functionalism
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and enactivism are incompatible, a future discussion of this observed
convergence would be highly relevant and interesting.
I aimed for this dissertation to make a positive contribution to the
vibrant and interesting discussions on mind and technology. Given the
initial uptake of the published papers in this work, I am carefully optimistic
that this aim was at least partially realized. It is my hope that the present
work empowers us to better understand mind–technology interactions,
and, therefore, also ourselves.
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